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Executive Summary
India is a Union of 28 States, two Union Territories with legislatures, and five
Union Territories without legislatures. The 7th Schedule of India’s Constitution
provides for a separate State List, which enumerates exclusive legislative and
executive authority that lies with state governments. The State List entrusts major
responsibilities in the areas of human and physical development to the states.
These responsibilities require major expenditures by the states, but the tax
revenue sources assigned to the states, although they have not been fully used,
are not sufficient to meet these expenditure responsibilities. The resulting fiscal
imbalances of the states is addressed through a complex system of
intergovernmental transfers in various forms and through several other channels,
including borrowings.
Over the years, in practice, the States of India have sought to finance their
increasing needs for expenditures through different forms of transfers from the
Union Government and loans, rather than by raising additional tax revenues
and/or charging for services delivered. This has resulted in the states running
large revenue and fiscal deficits and accumulating potentially unsustainable debt
burdens. In this process, most states have compromised budgetary discipline,
resorted to off-budget forms of borrowings, and accumulated large contingent
liabilities, with the attendant risks of default.
The lack of fiscal discipline among the states is symptomatic of a flawed
intergovernmental fiscal system. In addition to the lack of aggregate fiscal
discipline, the level and quality of services delivered by the states are well below
where they ought to be with the money actually spent. There is much evidence of
inefficient service delivery. For example, many states have high rates of illiteracy,
particularly among women, and high infant and maternal mortality rates. In
addition, the quality of economic services provided by the states, particularly
electricity and transportation, is poor.
Due to the deteriorating fiscal situation of the states, the Government of India has
taken several initiatives, including the creation of a Fiscal Reform Facility, which
sought to provide financial-grant incentives to the states, in order to encourage a
movement toward budget balance over the five year period coinciding with the
implementation period of the Eleventh Finance Commission (2000-2005). The
largely unsuccessful experience with the implementation of the Facility has made
it necessary to explore other policy alternatives and, in particular, to examine
what lessons international experience offers in managing sub-national fiscal
crises and improving fiscal management of sub-national governments. The
purpose of this report is to undertake that task.
This report begins by reviewing the key issues responsible for the current fiscal
condition of the States of India. Then, it provides an analysis of relevant
international experience in this respect. Finally, it evaluates various options for
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reform in India suggested by lessons drawn from international experience, and it
provides a set of recommendations for the consideration of Indian policy-makers.
Section I.
Major Challenges and Issues in Sub-National Fiscal Reforms in India
1.

Expenditure Assignments and Policies

The role of the states is unclear in regard to concurrent responsibilities with the
Union, and local governments lack any exclusive responsibilities. A large fraction
of state budgets goes to cover committed or non-discretionary expenditures on
wages, pensions, and interest. Subsidies are large and poorly targeted. Due to
the need to compress expenditures, state policies are depriving public
infrastructure and important social services of funds. As a result, the quality of
state services is suffering.
2.

Revenue Assignments and Policies

In India, tax assignments among the tiers of government are based on the
constitutional principle of separation of bases. The inability of the states to tax
non-agricultural income and services has hindered their ability to access broadbased and more buoyant taxes. The state sales tax regime is highly distortionary;
other taxes remain unexploited (e.g., the property tax, professions tax, and the
like); and there is very low cost recovery rates from economic services provided
by the states (e.g., irrigation, power, and transportation).
3.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System

The high transfer dependency of the states has weakened accountability and
fiscal discipline. The transfer system is very complex and lacks coordination
among the three current institutions in charge of implementing transfers, which
together produce a cycle of distorting incentives. The transfer formulae are also
complex and lack clearly defined objectives, such as reducing horizontal fiscal
imbalances. In particular, centrally sponsored schemes are non-transparent, and
they compromise the expenditure autonomy of the states.
4.

Revenue Deficits and Debt

The Centre has not fully exercised hierarchical control over state borrowing. The
states have been able to avert the Centre’s constitutional debt controls through
off-budget borrowings and guarantees. Market borrowings of the states do not
reflect creditworthiness, which contributes to the lack of fiscal discipline among
the states. Further, the states are operating under soft budget constraints which
foster fiscal profligacy as well.
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5.

Economic Reforms

State owned enterprises lack a commercial orientation; user fees are set well
below cost recovery in many cases; and rates of return on public investments are
low or negative, especially in the power sector. The current political economy of
state owned enterprises does not favour privatisation.
6.

Local Governments

Decentralisation has not gone far beyond the states, contributing to low levels of
efficiency and accountability, poor monitoring, and low quality of local public
services. In many cases, local bodies have not been empowered with adequate
revenue sources by the State Finance Commissions, which are assigned this
task in the Constitution.
Section II.
Lessons from International Experience
In this section, we draw upon international experience to provide a set of reform
options that address the foregoing issues confronting India’s intergovernmental
fiscal system.
1.

Expenditure Assignments and Policies

International experience shows that transparency, accountability, and efficiency
are enhanced when sub-national governments are assigned exclusive
expenditure responsibilities. Fiscal rules including expenditure limits, expenditure
floors on capital investment, formal deficit and debt rules, and transparency rules
have proven effective in controlling sub-national fiscal profligacy as long as the
rules are reasonable and strictly enforced. Countries have pursued a variety of
different approaches to pension reform, but most of them are moving in the
direction of full-funding and price indexation. Experiences in Latin America and
elsewhere show that devolving some sub-functions related to education and
health care delivery to lower levels of government and even down to the
institutions themselves improves access, accountability, monitoring, and
performance.
2.

Revenue Assignments and Policies

International experience demonstrates the benefits of providing sub-national
governments with substantial revenue autonomy, particularly rate setting
authority. Multiple-use of the same tax bases and piggyback arrangements, if
properly coordinated, are proven ways to simplify tax administration, reduce
compliance costs, and provide sub-national governments with access to buoyant
sources of revenue. Many federal countries allow sub-national governments to
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levy piggyback income taxes as well as special excise taxes on beverage
alcohol, transportation fuels, and tobacco products. Additionally, property taxes,
betterment levies, a vehicle tax of some sort, and user fees are proven sources
of local government revenue.
3.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System

Most federal countries use equalisation grants to address horizontal fiscal
disparities among jurisdictions. Equalisation transfers typically are unconditional,
formula-based, and include criteria to measure differences in expenditure needs
and fiscal capacity. Special purpose grants are used in many countries to
promote national priorities and address inter-jurisdictional spillovers. The current
trend is to have a small number of conditional block grants to avoid over
burdening the administrative capacity of sub-national governments and to
provide them with more discretion in the use of these funds.
4.

Deficits and Debt

Australia, Canada, and the U.S. are federal countries that have generally
achieved a high degree of fiscal discipline without federally imposed borrowing
limits on sub-national governments. These countries generally rely on market
discipline to control borrowing by sub-national governments. Other countries,
particularly in the developing world that lack deep and sophisticated financial
markets, may achieve fiscal discipline through a combination of rules, statutory
limits, and intergovernmental coordination. A third strategy for limiting subnational fiscal indiscipline includes direct hierarchical controls. The reliance on
one approach to the exclusion of the other two has generally not proven to be
successful.
5.

Economic Reforms

Governments have taken many actions to address the problems of state owned
enterprises, including reforms that promote competition and commercialisation as
well as reforms addressing corporate governance; restructuring of management,
organisation, and operations; and privatisation. Privatisation reforms are not
limited to full transfer of ownership but include a public/private combination of
ownership, management, and contracting-out of certain sub-functions. Generally
speaking, the international trend is toward creating an arms-length relationship
between government and state owned enterprises; operating state owned
enterprises on a commercial basis; and subjecting them to hard budget
constraints.
6.

Local Governments

The trend in federal countries is to devolve functions to local bodies according to
administrative capacity. Large and diverse countries have opted for asymmetric
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decentralisation, such as separate devolutions to urban and rural bodies. Local
governments can be empowered with significant and stable tax assignments,
including property taxes, user charges, betterment levies, vehicle levies, and so
on. Transfers to local governments are generally formula based, providing for
high local autonomy. International experience shows that there are effective
ways to constrain local governments to responsible borrowing, avoiding the
associated moral hazard problems that arise in this context. Municipal bonds are
used only with significant local data disclosure, monitoring, and developed
market discipline.
Section III.
Recommendations for Reform of India’s Intergovernmental Fiscal System
There is no one magic, simple way to optimally reform India’s intergovernmental
fiscal system. The best intergovernmental fiscal reform for India depends on a
clear statement of what government most wants to accomplish. As such, a
reform process should begin with a set of general goals or objectives. We offer
the following five general reform objectives:
A. Improve the quality of public services
B. Impose aggregate fiscal discipline on the states
C. Extend decentralisation to the local government level
D. Get the intergovernmental system in synch with the economic reforms
E. Redesign institutions to match the new realities of Indian federalism.
The challenges facing India’s decentralised system of finance run wide and deep.
Many of the key problems with the current system have their roots in the
Constitution and legal system. These problems will be difficult but necessary to
address. Other problems can be addressed by fine tuning current institutions and
processes. The Government of India should begin the reform process by
developing a policy stance on the overall goals of intergovernmental fiscal
reform.
We offer the following set of recommendations for reform of the
intergovernmental fiscal system for the consideration of Indian policy-makers.
1. Expenditure Assignments and Policies
Recommendation 1:
The Government of India should make it mandatory that
no new centrally sponsored scheme be introduced unless approved by the
National Development Council, after proposal, discussion, and comment of the
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public in this respect. Cost-benefit analysis should be done for each existing
centrally sponsored scheme and approval of National Development Council
sought for the same. Existing centrally sponsored schemes should be
consolidated into a small number of them, reflecting major national priorities as
conditional block grants and periodically reviewed for continued relevance.
Recommendation 2:
The Government of India should encourage the states to
pass balanced budget laws and the golden rule for capital expenditures, by using
the leverage and incentives provided by the Twelfth Finance Commission and
exercising its authority under Article 293 to impose borrowing ceilings. Fiscal
Responsibility Laws should have procedures and penalties that discourage the
practice of passing budgets with unrealistic forecasts of expenditures and
revenues.
Recommendation 3:
New employees should adopt a defined contribution
scheme or a multi-pillar scheme, with full set apart funding of defined benefits
based on annual actuarial evaluation. If a satisfactory assessment of the accrued
rights is done, it should be possible to require existing employees whose term of
service does not exceed a certain number of years to move over to the defined
contribution scheme for the remaining term of their employment. For existing
pensioners, there should be exclusively price indexation, and no further wage
indexation should be provided.
Recommendation 4:
There should be transparency in the state of affairs of the
state owned enterprises. Privatise profitable state owned enterprises that are
producing private goods in competitive industries. In the case of loss-making
state owned enterprises, it is better to close them down as soon as private
provision of such services is ensured. In the meantime, such public sector
enterprises should be managed with full cost recovery to prepare them for
privatisation. There should be better targeting of subsidies for public sector
enterprises providing merit services. Accordingly, state budgets should clearly
show the amount of each subsidy, the intended beneficiaries, and the economic
and/or social rational for each subsidy. There is no alternative to public financing
of public goods. The Government should be concentrating on efficient
management of such enterprises and ensure delivery of quality services.
Recommendation 5:
States should adopt the golden rule. Allow the states to
decide their capital expenditures. Do not limit the opportunities for creative
financing. Where the assets are revenue producing, the better course is to issue
revenue bonds or specific loan financing. In the case of non-revenue producing
projects, use of general obligation bonds should continue as at present.
2. Revenue Assignments and Policies
Recommendation 6:
International experience suggests that a centralised
goods and services tax/value-added tax (GST/VAT) with a portion shared with
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the states based on a formula is the most simple, prevalent, and successful
model for indirect taxation. Given the constitutional position and processes at
work presently in India, however it would be advisable for all states to switch over
to a uniform value-added tax using the platform provided by the Empowered VAT
Committee and for the Centre to fully integrate manufacturing stage VAT and
services tax into a Central goods and services tax, with the objective of
integrating the two in a national GST with a common tax base with both Centre
and the states levying taxation thereon along the lines suggested by the Kelkar
Report .
Recommendation 7:
The states may not be fully using available taxing
authority because available tax assignments are poorly conceived. In addition,
the lack of a hard budget constraint undermines the incentives for states to utilise
fully their own tax revenue raising authority. The Government of India also should
examine the taxing powers of the states in terms of revenue sufficiency.
However, this examination must take place in the light of analysis of the desired
vertical gap and the transfer system. The states should be encouraged to use
their existing taxes optimally. The Government of India can help to reform these
taxes as well as enhancing their yields. An optimal way to enhance the revenue
autonomy of the states is through a piggyback personal income tax. The states
would use the same base as the Union’s personal income tax, but each state
would choose a flat rate between a minimum and maximum set in the federal
law.
Recommendation 8:
It is recommended that the authority to levy and
administer the property tax to be truly decentralised to local bodies. The urban
and rural areas should be assisted in developing the capacity to develop and
administer a modern real estate tax. The Government of India and the states
should provide technical assistance, especially to rural local bodies, to improve
administration of a simplified property tax.
Recommendation 9:
It is recommended that the states be encouraged to do a
critical analysis of all merit and private goods delivered by them departmentally
and the present rate of recoveries for such services. The states should then take
up a well-designed and publicly shared programme to manage the costs of
delivering these services and levy user charges at appropriate levels and
gradually close the cost-recovery gap. Similarly, the states should critically
examine the returns accruing to them from their investments. Investments must
be made to perform and yield market returns, or they should be written off.
3. Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System
Recommendation 10: Equalisation should be exclusively pursued by an
improved and explicitly dedicated equalisation grant system by merging the
present tax share, Finance Commission’s grants, and Planning Commission’s
normal central assistance. The equalisation grant would be funded by a stable
formula as a share of dedicated central government revenues. The measurement
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of expenditure needs would be based on a weighted index of need proxies, and
fiscal capacity would be measured by a modified representative revenue system
that takes into account the revenue potential of the taxes assigned to the states.
The Finance Commission should be entrusted with this job, and the Ministry of
Finance would be responsible for implementation. It may be necessary to make
the Finance Commission a regular body in order to implement this
recommendation.
Recommendation 11: The existing centrally sponsored schemes should be
rationalised and simplified into a small number of specific purpose conditional
grants. The Centre should indicate the broad mandate and objective of these
grants, rather than issuing detailed guidelines which micro-manages state affairs
and uses a one size fits all approach among the states with different on the
ground realities. The states should be free to design their programmes and
projects consistent with the objectives of the grant. The Centre should focus on
evaluating the efficacy of these state programmes and projects as well as the
sufficiency and timeliness of funding.
Recommendation 12: The Government of India should establish conditional
matching grants for capital infrastructure purposes, after assessing the viability
gap by way of grants (i.e. without any borrowing component). These grants
would be distributed to the states according to a formula based on population,
land area, and an index of infrastructure deprivation. These transfers could be
administered by the Ministry of Finance.
Recommendation 13: The Planning Commission should be given a new set of
responsibilities that is consistent with the economic and intergovernmental
reforms currently underway in India. These new responsibilities could include
appraisal, evaluation, and monitoring of the programmes and the schemes;
evaluating the creditworthiness of the states; and reporting to the nation about
the success or failure of projects. The distribution of block grants by the Planning
Commission in the form of normal central assistance should be transferred to the
Finance Commission.
4. Revenue Deficit and Debt
Recommendation 14:
States should be encouraged to adopt fiscal
responsibility laws imposing a strict fiscal constraint. The Centre should
simultaneously use its authority under Article 293(3) for imposing prudent
borrowing control. Following recommendations of the Twelfth Finance
Commission, loans from the Centre should be discontinued. Gradually all
borrowing from special sources (required holdings of state government bonds by
commercial banks, borrowing from pension funds, and shares of rural small
savings, and so on) should also be eliminated.
Recommendation 15: Establish a clear set of policies regarding the
circumstances under which debt forgiveness will be granted to a state in the case
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of fiscal insolvency. It may be advisable to bring a law under the financial
emergency provision of the Constitution to define the conditions under which a
state may be declared to be in financial emergency and rules for its resolution
mandating states to undertake politically difficult reforms, such as restructuring
and privatising state owned enterprises, eliminating subsidies, cutting down on
salaries, and pension reforms to name just a few.
5. Economic Reforms
Recommendation 16: The states should be required either to privatise or
establish an arms-length relationship with state owned enterprises producing
private goods/services. The Union Government should agree with the states to
develop state owned enterprise rationalisation and/or privatisation plans, which
would be executed over a period of years. Incentives and significant penalties
should be attached to these agreements. In the meantime, the state owned
enterprises should be required to maintain a separate and proper set of books
that are subject to annual audits by an independent body or private firm. Any
subsidy from the state to state owned enterprises, implicit or otherwise, should
be explicit in state budgets, clearly documenting their cost, intended recipients,
and economic and/or social rationale.
6. Local Governments
Recommendation 17: The Government of India could legislate a much more
defined structure for the relationship between the states and the local
governments. Recognising the diversity of local governments and their variations
in scale, tax bases, poverty levels, and administrative capacity, India could take
an asymmetric decentralisation approach to local governments as far as
categorising them to determine spending, tax, and borrowing authority as well as
reporting requirements.
Recommendation 18: Designate
exclusive
sub-function
expenditure
assignments and insofar as is possible develop a minimum set of revenue
assignments and develop the administrative capacity of local governments.
Recommendation 19: Provide urban local governments with revenue raising
autonomy by allowing them to levy a modern real estate property tax, introduce
betterment or improvement levies, and introduce some form of tax on motor
vehicles.
Recommendation 20: Reform the system of state-local government transfers by
phasing out the state-based schemes in favour of block grants and allocate them
according to formulae. The central government should monitor and evaluate the
performance of the State Finance Commissions.
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Recommendation 21: The Centre and/or states should provide conditional
grants to local governments for their capital projects. Local bodies should be
authorised on an application basis, subject to statutory limits, to borrow funds on
a creditworthiness basis subject to the following two conditions: (i) the local body
has the revenue capacity to repay the loan and (ii) the local body has sufficient
administrative capacity to monitor the proper disposition, management, and
repayment of the loan funds.
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SECTION I
CURRENT ISSUES IN SUB-NATIONAL FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFER SYSTEM OF INDIA

Overview
India is a Union of 28 States, two Union Territories with legislatures and
five Union Territories without legislatures. Like many federal countries, India’s
Constitution assigns substantial tax and expenditure assignments to the state
level. More specifically, the 7th Schedule of the Constitution provides for a
separate State List, which enumerates exclusive legislative and executive
authority that lies with state governments. States can also exercise legislative
and executive authority for subjects enumerated in the concurrent list of the 7th
Schedule as long as there is no Union law to the contrary on that subject.
The State List entrusts the states with major responsibilities in the areas of
human and physical development. These responsibilities require major
expenditures by the states. The tax revenues of the states are not sufficient to
meet these expenditure responsibilities. The resulting fiscal imbalances of the
states are addressed through a complex system of intergovernmental transfers in
various forms and through various channels.
Over the years, the States of India have sought to finance their increasing
needs for expenditures through different forms of transfers from the Union
Government and by loans, rather than by raising additional tax revenues and/or
charging for services delivered. This has led to the states running large revenue
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and fiscal deficits and accumulating unsustainable debt burdens. In this process
most states have compromised budgetary discipline, resorted to off-budget forms
of borrowings, and accumulated large contingent liabilities, with attendant risks of
default.
Due to the deteriorating fiscal situation of the states, the Government of
India (GoI) has taken several initiatives, including the creation of a Fiscal Reform
Facility, which sought to provide financial-grant incentives to the states in order to
encourage a movement toward budget balance over the five year period
coinciding with the implementation period of the Eleventh Finance Commission
(EFC). The largely unsuccessful experience with the implementation of the
Facility has made it necessary to explore other policy alternatives. In particular,
to examine what lessons international experience offers in managing subnational fiscal crises and improving fiscal management of sub-national
governments. The purpose of this report is to undertake that task.
This report, first, reviews the key issues responsible for the current fiscal
crisis of the States of India. Second, it provides an analysis of relevant
international experience in this respect. Third, it evaluates various options for
reform in India suggested by lessons from international experience. Finally, it
provides a set of recommendations for the consideration of Indian policy makers.
Before taking stock of the major issues and challenges facing the states,
we provide a snap-shot of the condition of state finances and the
intergovernmental fiscal system. The major trends in Centre and state finances
are summarised in the Data Appendix at the end of this volume.
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The Condition of State Finances
During the ten year period beginning in the mid-1980s, there was a slow
but steady deterioration in the revenue deficits of the states. Starting in 1997-98,
however, this steady decline turned into a sharp deterioration. More specifically,
state revenue deficits averaged 0.8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)
between 1987-88 and 1996-97, and 2.8 per cent of GDP from 1997-98 to 200001. Then, in both 2001-02 and 2002-03, the states made some progress in
reducing their revenue deficits. However, the revised estimates for 2003-04 show
another sharp deterioration in state fiscal balances. The states are financing
these deficits through borrowings. Consequently, the total debt of the states has
increased from the already high level of 20.7 per cent of GDP in 1987-88 to 35
per cent of GDP in 2004-05 (Budget Estimates).

Figure I.1 shows the obvious fact that the growth in state revenue deficits
is attributable to the failure of revenue receipts to keep pace with the growth in
revenue expenditures. From 1998-99 to 2002-03, revenue expenditures as a
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share of GDP grew by 13 per cent. Meanwhile, the total revenue receipts of the
states as a share of GDP increased by only 8 per cent. Absent a matching
increase in revenue receipts, the fiscal shock represented by the large wage and
pension increases by the states in 1997-98 has led the way to large and
persistent revenue deficits and growing state debt burdens as a share of GDP.
In addition to the growing debt burdens of the states, the composition of
state expenditures is a source of serious concern. In 2003-04 (Revised
Estimates), for example, state expenditures on wages, pensions, and interest on
debt were approximately 76 per cent of the total revenue receipts of the states.
Since these are largely committed or non-discretionary expenditures, many
states are severely constrained in their ability to compress revenue expenditures
as a means of balancing their revenue accounts.

Figure I.2 shows that state expenditures on interest and pensions have
overtaken the share of GDP spent by the states on economic services and
capital expenditures and is rapidly approaching the share of GDP that states are
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now spending on social services. Although capital expenditures as a share of
GDP are beginning to recover to the levels of the early 1990s, they are still
substantially lower as a share of GDP than in the early 1980s. The share of GDP
spent on economic services has declined sharply as well. Expenditures on the
operation and maintenance of capital assets used in each of these sectors have
declined, while explicit and implicit subsidies to irrigation, power, and transport
have increased.
Table I.1 provides information on three indicators of fiscal imbalance:
revenue deficit, fiscal deficit, and primary deficit. The revenue deficit indicates the
extent to which current receipts are not able to cover revenue expenditures
necessitating borrowing to finance current, non-asset building, expenditure. It
represents government consumption expenditures that are financed by capital
receipts. Capital receipts, apart from a small portion of non-debt capital receipts,
consist of net borrowing, which is called the fiscal deficit. The fiscal deficit
represents the net inflow of borrowed funds. The primary deficit is equal to the
fiscal deficit minus interest payments, which represent outflows in the form of
transfers. Primary deficits accumulate into debt unless offset by an excess of
GDP growth rate over the interest rate.
Table I.1 shows the aggregate trends in state deficits, including the steady
but persistent revenue deficits in the early to mid-1990s and the sharp
deterioration in revenue deficits beginning in 1998-99. The most persistent
deterioration is observed in the ratio of revenue deficit to fiscal deficit, which
indicates the extent to which borrowed funds are used to finance current
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expenditures. In 1993-94, this ratio was about 19 per cent. It has increased
steadily to approximately 58 per cent by 2002-03. Finally, we see the
accumulation of state debt, which was approximately 22 per cent of GDP in
1993-94, and, as of 2002-03, stands at 31.15 per cent of GDP.
Table I.1:
Aggregate State Finances: Alternative Deficit Indicators
(per cent of GDP)
Year
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
1993-96 [A]
2000-3 [B]
[B]-[A]

Revenue
Revenue Fiscal Primary
Deficit/ Fiscal Debt/GDP
Deficit Deficit Deficit
Deficit
0.45
2.35
0.52
19.05
21.79
0.69
2.72
0.79
25.55
21.40
0.73
2.59
0.76
28.06
21.00
1.31
2.77
0.90
47.37
21.00
1.23
2.94
0.93
42.01
21.73
2.61
4.31
2.24
60.48
23.02
2.82
4.64
2.34
60.87
25.20
2.61
4.16
1.69
62.60
27.42
2.68
4.09
1.41
65.49
29.37
2.29
3.94
1.14
58.09
31.15
0.62
2.53
1.90

Averages:
2.55
0.69
4.07
1.41
1.51
0.72

24.22
62.06
37.84

21.79
31.15
9.36

Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (2005).

A Brief Summary of Aggregate Trends in State Finances
The main trends relating to aggregate state finances, comparing the
average over 1993-96 with that of 2000-03 may be summarised as follows
(Twelfth Finance Commission Report, 2005):
1. The revenue deficit of the states rose from 0.62 per cent of GDP in 199396 to 2.53 per cent in 2000-03, implying an increase of 1.9 percentage
points.

India: Fiscal Condition of the States, International Experience,
and Options for Reform (Vol I).

7

2. The fiscal deficit of the states increased from 2.55 per cent during 1993-96
on average to about 4 per cent of GDP, implying an increase of about 1.5
percentage points.
3. During the period from 1996-97 to 2002-03, the debt-GDP ratio of the
states increased by a massive margin of about 9 percentage points of
GDP, rising from 21.8 per cent of GDP in 1996-97 to 31.2 per cent in
2002-03.
4. The own tax revenues of the states showed an increase from 5.3 per cent
of GDP during 1993-96 on average to 5.5 per cent during 2000-03. But
own non-tax revenues as also the central transfers relative to GDP fell
during this period. The fall in transfers was mainly on account of nonFinance Commission transfers.

Table I.2
Aggregate State Finances: Main Fiscal Indicators
(per cent of GDP)
Own NonFinance
Non-Finance
Own Tax
Tax
Commission Commission
Year
Revenues
Revenues
Transfers
Transfers
1993-94
5.30
1.59
3.05
2.02
1994-95
5.31
1.55
2.86
1.55
1995-96
5.20
1.51
2.90
1.30
1996-97
5.01
1.47
2.94
1.29
1997-98
5.14
1.43
2.90
1.33
1998-99
4.93
1.26
2.44
1.17
1999-00
5.09
1.38
2.50
1.29
2000-01
5.46
1.37
3.02
1.20
2001-02
5.32
1.19
2.84
1.28
2002-03
5.52
1.23
2.80
1.22
Averages
1993-96 [A]
5.27
1.55
2.94
1.62
2000-3 [B]
5.44
1.26
2.88
1.23
[B] - [A]
0.17
-0.29
-0.05
-0.39
Source (Basic Data): State Finance Accounts

Total
Revenue
11.96
11.27
10.91
10.71
10.80
9.31
10.26
11.04
10.63
10.77
11.38
10.81
-0.57

5. On the expenditure side, interest payments and pensions increased. In the
case of interest payments, the rise amounted to 0.79 percentage points,
rising from 1.86 during 1993-96 to 2.65 during 2000-03. In fact, if only end
years 1993-94 and 2002-03 are compared, the increase is a clear one
percentage point of GDP. Pensions rose by 0.62 percentage points
comparing the averages for the two periods under review.
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India’s Intergovernmental Fiscal System
India has an elaborate multi-channel, intergovernmental fiscal system. The
GoI has been sharing central taxes with the states and has been providing
conditional and unconditional grants and loans to the states. These transfers are
substantial. Shared taxes and grants from the Centre to the states represent over
4.5 per cent of GDP. The Centre also transfers close to 1 per cent of GDP in the
form of loans to the states. These resources constitute over one-third of the
aggregate fiscal resources available to the states. Major trends in state revenues
are summarised in Table I.2.
Major Challenges and Issues with India’s Sub-national Fiscal Reforms
I. Expenditure Assignments and Policies
A. Structural issues
1. Unclear expenditure assignments: The 7th Schedule seeks to make
expenditure assignments explicitly divisible between the Centre and the
states. The Concurrent List provides for over-lapping competencies. The
Concurrent List is expanding. For example, education, earlier part of the
State List, is now part of the Concurrent List. Nevertheless, the fiscal
inadequacy of the states and the desire of the Centre to spend on subjects
reserved for the states have resulted in the Centre designing and
implementing over 200 centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs). Many
central ministries, like agriculture, rural development, urban development
and employment, and so on are handling competencies that are listed as
exclusively those of the states. The pre-dominance of centrally sponsored
schemes in these areas has made the role of the states quite unclear in
practice. Expansion of the Centre into these areas has resulted in the
states not being fully accountable to their constituencies for these
activities.
2. Inflexible budgets: The revenue expenditures of the states are dominated
by committed expenditures, specifically on wages, pensions, and interest.
This has made it extremely difficult for the states to compress
expenditures in response to persistent revenue deficits.
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B. Policy challenges
1. Personnel: The civil service in India is smaller in comparison to OECD
countries and most developing countries, yet the wage bill of the states is
too large relative to total revenue expenditures. As expenditure on salaries
and wages is not directly relatable to the development outcomes and
services received by the public, there is a widespread perception that
expenditure on personnel is unproductive as well.
2. Pensions:
The states are spending a growing share of total revenue
receipts on pension payments, in aggregate constituting over 10 per cent
of their entire expenditures. The states also are facing substantial
unfunded future pension liabilities which are not yet assessed. Several
parametric aspects of civil service pensions like the commutation discount
rate, the commutation factor, the definition of last pay, and so on are also
very generous.
3. Interest: The states have to pay a large and growing share of total
revenue receipts to meet debt-servicing obligations, which averaged more
than 25 per cent of their revenue receipts in 2003-04, with this ratio
exceeding 35 per cent in the case of three states. Despite the Debt Swap
Scheme sponsored by the Centre, the share of state budgets that goes to
interest on debt is likely to continue to grow, particularly if the states
continue to run large revenue deficits.
4. Subsidies to state owned enterprises: Subsidies to state owned
enterprises are poorly targeted and regressive, especially in the power
sector. Aggregate losses in the power sector exceed 1 per cent of GDP,
part of which is paid for by cross-subsidisation or explicit subsidies from
the states. However, a good part still remains uncovered in the accounts
of the utilities. There is a lack of transparency in public sector
undertakings and an increasing amount of implicit subsidies. The losses
that result from low cost-recovery are financed by borrowing that is
guaranteed by the states and accumulation of arrears.
5. Other subsidies: The implicit subsidies to higher education and primary
health care are high, even those who can afford to pay for social services
are charged very little or nothing. As a result of budget pressures, the
quality of important social services is deteriorating due to low cost
recovery. As a result the growing middle class is increasingly using private
sector alternatives rather than state offerings.
6. Capital outlays: State borrowings, ostensibly to finance infrastructure
development, are diverted to finance persistent state revenue account
deficits. Consequently, expenditures on important infrastructure
investments have declined relative to the share of GDP devoted by the
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states to economic development in the early 1980s. Furthermore, capital
outlays are poorly targeted, and the projects often take too long to
complete. Expenditures on maintenance and repair of infrastructure are
inadequate. Therefore, the states are living off of depreciation of existing
assets. Given the long time horizons required to replace existing
infrastructure and put new infrastructure investments into place,
addressing this issue should be a high priority.
7. Health and education: The quality of state social services is very low,
which results in high illiteracy rates, high rates of infant mortality and
malnutrition, and the like. Furthermore, the wage bill as a share of total
expenditures on health and education are too high. As a result, clinics and
schools lack vital supplies and equipment further compromising the quality
of important social services provided by the states. There is high
absenteeism and shirking by skilled employees in these sectors, despite
high public sector compensation relative to comparable jobs in the private
sector. Clearly, the low quality of critical public services is not just a matter
of the lack of fiscal resources but also mismanagement and inefficient use
of existing resources.
II. Revenue Assignments and Policies
A. Structural issues
1. Separation of tax powers: India has clearly demarcated taxation powers.
While this gives the states complete authority within the demarcated
boundaries to choose the tax structure best suited to the state, India’s
States have not been able to take advantage of the revenue buoyancy
and cost savings associated with piggyback arrangements on central
taxes. The structure of indirect taxes has become very complicated due to
the division of taxation powers between the GoI and the states related to
goods at various stages of production. The lack of a clear arrangement for
the taxation of services has added further complexities. While the tax on
manufactured goods is levied by the central government, taxes on the
sales of goods are levied by the states. Power to levy taxes on services,
except some specific services like entertainment or electricity, has been
assumed by the Centre by the current interpretation of the Constitution.
2. Vertical fiscal imbalance: There is an imbalance by design between state
revenue assignments relative to their expenditure assignments. As a
result, the states are highly dependent on the Centre for resource
transfers. High transfer dependency breaks the Wicksellian connection
between the costs and benefits of state services. This, in turn, leads to a
mentality of dependency, a lack of fiscal transparency, lack of
accountability, fiscal profligacy, and inefficient fiscal policies.

India: Fiscal Condition of the States, International Experience,
and Options for Reform (Vol I).

11

3. Inadequate local revenue assignments: Local governments are dependent
upon the state governments to give them taxation powers, as local bodies
have no direct constitutional authority for taxing any tax base. The states
need to pass laws to delegate taxation powers to the local governments.
Local governments have not been empowered with clearly defined own
source revenues, detracting from their overall efficiency and accountability
to their constituencies. Often, transfers to local governments are only
sufficient to cover the costs of electricity used by local bodies.
4. Unexploited taxes: There are taxes that states can levy but that have
remained unexploited or under exploited (i.e., agricultural income tax,
profession tax, urban property tax, etc). The states are clearly unwilling to
take the political risks of levying additional taxes when they can simply use
loan funds. The fact that there are unexploited taxes when state budgets
are in such bad shape points to the perverse incentives that are created
by the existing soft budget constraint at the sub-national level.
B. Policy challenges
1. Sales Tax:
a.) The system of sales tax prevailing in India is a form of restricted
cascading type origin tax. This system hinders the smooth flow of
inter-state trade and the growth of a common market. The central
sales tax (CST) treatment of state exports enables them to extend
their sales tax jurisdiction beyond their territories and thereby raise
revenues from citizens of other states. The ability of the states to
export taxes on to those who do not enjoy the benefits of state
services breaks the Wicksellian connection between the costs and
benefits of government expenditures. Breaking this connection
leads to inefficient expenditure policies.
b.) The lack of harmonisation in the state sales tax structures results in
tax competition, which in turn results in low tax to Gross State
Domestic Product (GSDP) ratios and undermines budgetary
balances. The complexity of the state sales tax systems also
burdens taxpayers and tax administration.
c.) Taxing at the first point of sale narrows the sales tax base. States,
in addition, are conferred with the authority to levy tax only on
select services like entertainment, electricity, and transportation. As
a result, sales tax rates have to be higher on taxable commodities
in order to raise a given level of revenue thus making the sales tax
more distortionary and inefficient.
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d.) Driven by pressures to raise more and more revenue from a
relatively narrow and inelastic sales tax base, many states levy
turnover taxes on all transactions (9 states), surcharges on the
basic sales tax liability and additional sales tax (14 states), and
entry taxes (6 states).
e.) The states decided to adopt uniform floor rates in 1999 and 21 of
28 states have implemented a destination based VAT starting April
1, 2005. The Union Government has made a commitment to the
states to compensate for the loss of their revenues to the extent of
100 per cent of the loss in the first year, 75 per cent of the loss in
the second year, and 50 per cent of the loss in the third year.
f.) There is a proposal for an integrated goods and services tax (GST),
with a common tax base and joint administration, with the Centre
levying 12 per cent and states another 8 per cent.
2. Property Tax:
a.) Property taxes are within the jurisdiction of the states, although
most of the states have conferred powers to levy property taxes on
the municipalities. The current property tax systems of the states
are characterised by the lack of professionally-trained assessors,
subjective assessments in a corruption-prone administrative
environment, scope for excessive use of discretionary powers for
individual assessments, absence of records of landownership,
absence of tax mapping initiatives, defective rate structures
whereby higher valuation properties get away with lower tax
burdens, and proportionately more cases involving appeals and
litigation.
b.) It is not uncommon for the assessment of comparable properties to
differ by occupant (old versus new tenants in the same premises),
different apartments in the same building (some on the same floor
with identical use, old versus new structures for identical uses, in
the same vicinities), and between different geographic areas in the
city (high-priced inner-city area versus the newly-developed areas
and suburbs). The assessment of property tax is linked to rent
control.
c.) Despite these problems, over the last five years the revenue from
property taxes has been growing both as a share of state total
revenue receipts and relative to GDP. However, major deficiencies
remain in the administration of this tax.
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3. Other taxes:
a.) Electricity taxes are levied by the states on consumption of
electricity. This is a major source of tax revenues for the states.
However, as this tax is collected though power utilities in the state
sector and the power utilities are running large losses, the revenues
collected are used by the electricity boards/utilities as partial
payment of the states' obligations to provide subsidies to cover the
operating losses of the power utilities.
b.) Entertainment taxes are levied mostly on the cinema going public.
However, there are exceptions for multiplexes. This tax is a
stagnant source of revenues. Although this tax has all the features
of a local tax, it is levied and collected by the state government in
most states.
c.) Luxury tax is imposed in some of the states on consumer items
imported into the states, such as tobacco, gutka, tobacco mixed
pan-masala, and expensive fabrics (e.g., silk and woolens). The
luxury tax may be justified by the desire to introduce greater
progressivity into the tax system. However, generally speaking,
sub-national governments should leave redistributive taxes to the
Centre. Most importantly, like many other consumption taxes levied
by the states, the luxury tax often appears to be designed to protect
domestic producers rather than as a source of revenue. These
taxes also provide sub-national governments with the ability to levy
taxes that interfere with inter-state trade.
d.) Professional tax can be levied on professions, trades, callings, or
employment at a rate not to exceed Rs. 2,500 per taxpayer per
year. Many states either do not levy it or levy it at low rates. This
tax has been assigned to local bodies in only a handful of states.
The absolute ceiling is presently fixed in the Constitution and
changing it would require a constitutional amendment.
e.) Transportation taxes like taxes on vehicles and transportation of
goods and passengers are also complex in India. While there has
been a conversion of taxes on vehicles as a one time levy, taxes on
transportation of goods and services is beset with problems of
issuing permits and collection of the tax.
f.) Stamps and registration represent the third or fourth largest source
of own revenues to the states. However, rates of conveyance
duties are very steep in India, discouraging registration of
conveyances at full value. Stamp duties on many other documents
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are also very high, discouraging adoption of many new instruments
like mortgage based debt, securitisation instruments, and the like.
The tax regime for stamps and registration has not been
overhauled for quite some time.
4. Non-tax revenue: User charges, interest, and royalties are not regularly
updated; they tend to be highly politicised; and they are used for providing
high rates of subsidisation. This has meant low rates of cost recovery
across many economic and social services. The resulting operating losses
tend to be financed by borrowed funds that are guaranteed by the states.
Low cost recovery in the power sector impedes private investment in this
sector and has led to low quality supply.
III. Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System
A. Structural issues
1. Multiplicity of transfer channels: India has a very elaborate and complex
system of resource transfers from the Centre to the states. All three types
of resources (taxes, grants, and loans) are shared with or transferred to
the states. There are several hundred types of conditional grants mostly
delivered through the line Ministries. In addition, there are unconditional
grants implemented through the Planning Commission for development
purposes. The Finance Commission recommends a system of
unconditional transfers for equalisation purposes, which are implemented
by the Ministry of Finance (MoF).
2. High transfer dependency: The high transfer dependency of the states
breaks the Wicksellian link between costs and benefits for citizens, which
weakens accountability and fiscal discipline. In practice, the recurrence to
transfers to finance increased expenditure needs has softened the budget
constraints of the states.
3. Lack of coordination: There is a lack of coordination among the three
current institutions in charge of implementing transfers. The development
grants implemented by the Planning Commission create future non-plan
expenditure liabilities for the states (i.e., debt service liabilities,
infrastructure maintenance costs, and personnel costs). It is implicit in the
gap filling of the grants-in-aid (GIA) approach that larger plan outlays
financed by larger borrowing create larger state liabilities, which, in turn,
generate larger claims for additional fiscal transfer from the Finance
Commissions. Furthermore, the Planning Commission often receives
pressure from the Centre and the states to accept that the states will be
able to generate additional resources. Based on such arguments, the
Planning Commission then authorises the states to borrow additional
amounts. Thus, there is a cycle of distorting incentives due to the fact that
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the decision process is fragmented, without any single institution being
responsible for looking at the system of transfers as a whole.
4. Transfer formulae:
Finance Commission
a.) The formula used for tax devolution by the EFC (2000-2005) mixed
variables pertaining to fiscal capacity and expenditure needs, but it
did not differentiate in a transparent way between these two
fundamental means of equalisation.
b.) The criteria of population, land area, and infrastructure index
measure expenditure needs. But there is more to the measurement
of expenditure need that is not covered by these indices, in
particular the poverty rate, the unemployment rate, age structure,
and the like.
c.) The only criterion for fiscal capacity, although with a weight of 62.5
per cent, is income disparity. However, there are more direct
methods to measure fiscal capacity, such as the size of tax bases
and their potential yield. The Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) is
actually moving in this direction.
d.) The EFC formula is pursuing more than an equalisation objective
because tax effort and fiscal discipline are in the formula. While
these are worthwhile objectives, it is far from clear that they should
be pursued within the framework of an equalisation formula. The
states also are unlikely to respond to these incentives due to their
small weights in the formula. In many ways, the Finance
Commission formula is not part of an equalisation grant system but
rather part of general or unconditional funding, which has
equalisation grant features.
e.) The TFC has tried to bring in the equalisation principle for certain
specific grants for education and health on the expenditure side.
Although equalisation should be pursued mostly, if not exclusively,
by the equalisation grant system in order to free up other grant
instruments to pursue other objectives, this is a temporary positive
move given the present need for more equalisation in the system.
Planning Commission
f.) The Planning Commission’s formula, better known as the Gadgil
formula, is also a mixture of expenditure need and fiscal capacity
elements, which are again mixed with other objectives (i.e. tax
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effort, fiscal management, national objectives, and special
problems). The Finance Commission’s transfers are much more
equalising than the Planning Commission’s because the criterion of
per capita income disparities is much more equalising than the
population criterion. The Finance Commission’s formula weights
income disparities much more heavily than the Planning
Commission’s formula (62.5 versus 25 per cent, respectively); and
the Planning Commission weights population more heavily than the
Finance Commission (60 versus 10 per cent, respectively).
g.) The Gadgil formula is applied for allocation of only what is known
as normal central assistance (NCA). There are several schematic
allocations going through the state plan channel, which has
different bases for resource allocation.
h.) There is a loan and grant mix in the Planning Commission
transfers. There are various kinds of models ranging from 100 per
cent grants to 100 per cent loans.
B. Policy challenges
1. Tax transfer: The tax transfer is not sufficiently equalising, as a result
some states get too much revenue relative to their tax capacity, and the
low-income states get too little. As all the tax sources of the Centre are
now shared, the states share in the buoyancy, or lack of it, of the central
taxes. While the states stand to gain when the central taxes are buoyant,
the reverse happened in the first few years of the EFC period, when
central taxes did not grow as expected.
2. Grants-in-aid: The Finance Commission grants are specific purpose as
well as unconditional to cover the assessed resource gap of the states.
The assessed revenue deficit grant, which acquires the character of gapfilling grants, discourage fiscal discipline.
3. Loan transfers: The Planning Commission’s Gadgil formula [i.e., 70:30
(10:90) loan-grant mix] is out-dated and creates incentives for the states to
make irresponsible and unsustainable borrowing decisions, especially
because the grant cannot be taken without the loan transfer. Furthermore,
the states are using plan borrowings to finance their revenue deficits. Plan
borrowings are meant to finance economic development. This is extremely
short-sighted and, if allowed to continue, will jeopardise the ability of
India’s economy to sustain robust economic growth.
4. Centrally sponsored schemes: The CSSs are not transparent; there are
too many of them; and they compromise the expenditure autonomy of the
states.
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IV. Revenue Deficit and Debt
A. Structural issues
1. Centre encourages excessive borrowing: The Gadgil formula and the
small savings scheme encourage autonomous borrowing by the states.
Such policies compromise the ability of the Centre to make a credible
commitment to a no bailout policy. While there does not seem to be
evidence of government borrowing crowding-out private investment at this
time, the low rate of return on government investment is a very serious
problem for the short-run and long-run vitality of India’s economy. The low
rate of return on government investment is due to the long time that it
takes to complete a project.
2. No bailout policy lacks credibility: In the past, the Centre has rescheduled
state debt and granted waivers of interest and principle, usually on the
basis of recommendations of the Finance Commissions. The TFC has
again recommended major debt-rescheduling with a lower rate of interest
and a debt-waiver scheme. However, this has been linked to states
adopting fiscal responsibility legislation and also to eliminating revenue
deficits over a five year period. Nevertheless, such waivers may create
expectations that the Centre will bailout the states in the event of a future
fiscal crisis. In which case, the states lack incentives to behave in a fiscally
prudent manner.
3. Hierarchical controls are not used: The Centre is not fully exercising ex
ante control over state borrowing, although a move in this direction has
been made in the last two years. The Centre is not exercising ex post
control over states that divert plan borrowing to finance revenue deficits. In
fact, state plan borrowings are routinely diverted to finance persistent state
revenue account deficits. This policy softens state budget constraints and
enables them to pursue inefficient, non-transparent, and profligate fiscal
policies without having to make greater use of their own tax and non-tax
revenues.
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B. Policy challenges
1. Debt financing through central government: Central government loans
primarily include plan loans. In addition, the net collections of small
savings in a state are invested in the securities of that state government of
the national small savings fund (NSSF). Central plan loans are tied to a
grant, and states did not have the option of taking the grant without the
loan. NSSF loans to states have become relatively costlier in view of
higher rate of interest paid on savings instruments and the cost of
collections, making this source of loan relatively costlier than other
sources, without the states having the option of not taking these loans.
The central government is not imposing aggregate controls on state
borrowing, and as a result there is excess debt accumulation by the
states. However, the GoI has recently decided to do away with providing
plan loans to the states. It will be a major challenge to implement this
important decision.
2. Debt financing through market borrowings: Banks are mandated by the
central legislation to invest 25 per cent of their time and demand deposits
in loans approved for this purpose. State market borrowings are also
approved for this purpose. Other financial institutions also subscribe to
state paper. A few years back, the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) was much
higher and the banks, who may not have otherwise subscribed to this
paper, in a way were forced to lend to the states. However, for the last few
years, the situation has changed. There is no longer pressure on banks to
subscribe to these papers. In any case, current bank holding of SLR paper
is much more than the statutory requirement. As most of the state paper
is issued as Tap issues, market rates do not reflect the creditworthiness of
the state. Therefore, market borrowings are not creating market discipline
by allowing interest rates to reflect creditworthiness or ration credit.
3. Debt financing through financial institutions: The states negotiate loans
with GoI owned financial institutions (i.e., insurance companies, etc.) Their
size is indicated at the time of the annual plan finalisation and there is
plenty of room for the discretionary allocation of these loans. In particular,
this practice does not help to discipline the borrowing activities of the
states, and it contributes to excess debt accumulation of this type by the
states.
4. Debt financing through other financing: Many states use off-budget
borrowings and accumulation of arrears. Various orders have been issued
by the GoI and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which would, if
implemented, bring off-budget borrowing to an end. These forms of debt
financing are not transparent and are harmful to budget discipline.
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V. Economic Reforms
A. Structural issues
Lack of commercial orientation by state owned enterprises: There is
insufficient autonomy and accountability in the management of public
enterprises. The pricing policies of state owned enterprises result in low cost
recovery. This lack of commercial orientation, as evidenced, for example, by
their pricing policies, accounts for the negative or at best very low rates of
return from public investments in power, irrigation, and transportation. The
return on public investments in these important economic sectors has not
been adequate to service the debt acquired to finance these projects.
Attempts at privatising and/or increasing the commercial orientation of state
owned enterprises have not been successful.
B. Policy challenges
1. Power sector reforms: Indian industry pays world-record prices for lowquality electricity. Indian farmers get very cheap power, but of very poor
quality. The non-price rationing regime of electricity in agriculture is
harmful to agriculture and the environment. Indian agriculture is stuck in a
low-price, low-quality electricity supply trap. The low rate of return on
investments in this sector puts considerable pressure on state budgets.
Power subsidies are not under the control of finance departments. The
political-economy of state owned enterprises does not favour privatisation,
at least in the short-run.
2. Transport sector reforms: Generally speaking there is a lack of
commercial orientation in state owned enterprises in the transport sector;
fares are set below cost recovery; there is low or negative return on
investment; there is a lack of investment; and maintenance and repair are
neglected. The quality of the service is very poor, as the age and condition
of bus fleets make abundantly clear.
VI. Local Governments
A. Structural issues
1. Lack of genuine decentralisation to local bodies: Expenditure assignments
for local public goods (e.g., water, sanitation, and primary education)
have, in general, not been transferred to local bodies. Local governments
have better knowledge of local preferences, local problems, and
alternative production technologies. Given the population size distribution
of the States of India, the lack of genuine decentralisation to local bodies
has led to low accountability, poor monitoring, and low quality of local
public services.
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2. Local bodies lack revenue autonomy: Local bodies lack revenue
autonomy, which is essential if local leaders and constituents are going to
internalise the costs of locally provided services. Property and many other
taxes (e.g., electricity tax, entertainment tax, hotel tax, and taxes on
vehicles), which are currently assigned to the states, are more
appropriately local taxes.
B. Policy challenges
1. Central to local government transfers: The GoI does not transfer funds
directly to local bodies, except for implementation of some specific
programmes of rural development, health, and education. In many of
these cases, funds are transferred to specially created institutions and
district level societies. These societies are not politically responsible to
local government institutions.
2. State to local government transfers: State to local transfers are inadequate
for local bodies to carry out their responsibilities, and instead the states
are passing plan borrowings on to local bodies.
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SECTION II
LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Overview
As we have seen in Section I, there are a number of structural problems
with the design of India’s intergovernmental system. For space reasons those
problems will not be repeated here, but it should suffice to note here that the
majority of India’s States are running large revenue and fiscal deficits and
accumulating what soon may become unsustainable debt burdens. The causes
of the current problems are complex, and the solutions are not immediate.
However, other countries around the world have experienced, at some point in
time, similar problems, and/or they have been able to devise institutions that
have sufficiently addressed these problems. The purpose of this section is to
draw upon international experience to extract lessons to address the difficult
issues currently confronting India’s intergovernmental fiscal system. The analysis
draws from many countries but pays special attention to the experiences of a set
of federal countries visited over the course of the last two years (Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Russia and the United States). This section follows the same issues
identified in Section I.
I.

Expenditure Assignments and Policies

Issue 1:

Concurrent List of Expenditure Assignments

Federal countries have long dealt with instability, lack of clarity, and
controversy in the practice of the assignment of competencies and expenditure
obligations at different levels of government. A major problem has been the
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failure to recognise that the assignment of any expenditure responsibility also
implies responsibility for a multi-dimensional array of attributes, including: (i)
actually producing a good or delivering a service, (ii) providing or administering
the service, (iii) financing a service, and (iv) setting standards, regulations, and
policies guiding the provision of government services. While there is no problem,
with assigning competencies over these attributes in the case of exclusive
assignments, there is a need to be explicit about their assignment in the case of
concurrent expenditure assignments. In short, there are important issues in India
concerning the concurrent list of responsibilities between the Centre and the
states and the states and local bodies. In the latter case, all responsibilities are
concurrent.
A.

International experience

1.
In Brazil and the Russian Federation, there is still a lack of exclusive
responsibilities to sub-national governments and a lack of clarity regarding who is
responsible for what in the case of many overlapping functions. As is the case in
India, the lack of clarity in assignments is more acute in the division of
responsibilities between the intermediate level and local governments. In the
Russian Federation, for example, the lack of clarity in the assignment of
responsibility for primary and secondary education between the regional and
local levels of government has meant that in some regions teacher salaries
simply went unpaid as different government levels argued about who was
responsible for paying teacher salaries.
2.
Highly decentralised and successful federations such as Canada and the
United States (U.S.) have taken years of friction and disputes to reach their
current distribution of responsibility across levels of government. Thus practice
can substitute for explicit assignments in the law, but relatively younger
federations may avoid these costly transactions through more explicit and clear
assignments. This is precisely what the Russian Federation attempted to do in
the comprehensive Budget Code of 2002, although it fell short of achieving this
aim.
3.
Besides clarifying the assignments of attributes for concurrent
responsibilities, the best way to deal with the lack of clarity is to seek ways to
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assign exclusive responsibilities wherever this is possible. Practically in all
decentralised countries, and this is certainly true of Australia, Brazil, Canada, the
Russian Federation, and the U.S., there are a number of responsibilities that are
exclusively assigned to local governments. This is even true in countries like
Canada and the U.S. where the local governments are ”creatures” of the states.
4.
The fact that the devolution of expenditure functions often involves several
levels of government emphasises the need for intergovernmental cooperation in
order to assure the successful implementation of decentralisation reforms. This is
especially necessary in some priority sectors, such as education and health.
When multiple levels of government are involved in the same sector,
governments need broad and formal coordinating institutions. In Germany’s
“cooperative federalism” all decisions are coordinated through an extensive net
of multilevel committees. In the U.S., the pattern of assigning responsibilities
varies widely from sector to sector and state to state, so sectoral coordination is
done by technocrats in some areas where there is a clear need, such as
highways and law enforcement. Somewhere in between the German and U.S.
models are the practices of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, countries that
use periodic formal meetings of elected officials and bureaucrats to discuss
mutually important fiscal issues. For example, Canada has two organisations for
coordination, dialog, and conflict resolution: (i) functional federalism, ministers
and officials from federal and provincial departments meet to discuss issues of
policy coordination and programme delivery mechanisms; (ii) summit federalism,
where first ministers meet for negotiations of difficult “horizontal” problems, that is
problems of one specific government department. Similarly, in Australia, the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) initiates, develops, and monitors the
implementation of policy reforms that are of national significance and which
require cooperative action by Australian governments (CoA, 2001).
5.
Other problems with expenditure assignments are apparent in
international experience. Some central governments play a larger direct role in
service provision than theory and international best practice would suggest. In
Brazil, for example, the central government has found it difficult to withdraw from
some purely local functions such as public markets, local schools, and local
bridges after more than a decade since adoption of the 1988 Constitution which
assigned these functions to local governments (Shah and Thompson, 2004).
Another type of problem is unfunded expenditure mandates. These were very
common in the Russian Federation, until the approval of the Budget Code in
2002 that made them an illegal practice and forced the federal government to
provide targeted transfers for each mandate. In Canada, local governments have
complained of provincial abuse due to unfunded mandates, and in the U.S. there
is still an ongoing debate between the federal and state authorities on this issue.
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B.

Lessons for India

1.
International experience shows that the best practice is to assign
exclusive expenditure responsibilities to all three levels of government wherever
possible. Wherever the assignment of concurrent responsibilities is needed, it is
desirable to have clearly stated assignments of sub-functions for regulation,
financing, provision, and service delivery across the different tiers of government.
2.
The constitution may not be the best vehicle for achieving this level of
specificity in concurrent expenditure assignments. It is advisable to elaborate the
concurrent list in terms of sub-functions through national laws passed by
parliament.
3.
Institutions for cooperation and dialog should be strengthened and have
regular periodic meetings to help clarify many other issues associated with
concurrent responsibilities. These institutions should have the participation of
representatives from each level of sub-national government.
Issue 2:

Compression of Expenditures

Although the level and composition of expenditures vary considerably
between the low and high income States of India, most states have shown
worrisome trends. Increasing budget shares go to pay salaries, interest on debt,
and pensions. In addition, many states are behaving in a fiscally irresponsible
manner by running large deficits and routinely borrowing to finance current
expenditures. International experience is rich with examples of countries that
have gone through similar situations.
A.

International experience

1.
Formal deficit and debt rules. An increasing number of countries, federal
and unitary, have recently adopted formal fiscal rules, such as a balanced-budget
rules that limit discretionary fiscal policy, and new budget procedures, such as
new multiyear frameworks to impose controls on government spending.1 The

1

Other public expenditure management reforms, including mechanisms to strengthen budgetary
procedures and to enhance flexibility while strengthening expenditure control, have contributed
significantly to expenditure restraint. Among these measures are ex ante and ex post program
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proponents of rules contend that the commitment to these rules makes it easier
for fiscal authorities to withstand pressures for higher spending. The good news
is that most countries adopting such rules have experienced substantial fiscal
consolidation. The approaches followed exhibit considerable variety regarding
the choice of target, degree of flexibility, and so on. Such institutional reforms can
be classified into three broad groups, which are sometimes used alone or in
combination. Regardless of how they are introduced, however, they often seem
to have an ameliorative effect on expenditure trends (Brumby and Cangiano,
2001).2
2.
Expenditure limits. Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.S. have
emphasised expenditure limits, supported by procedural requirements, whereby
proposals resulting in overruns in certain expenditure areas must be
accompanied by offsetting expenditure cuts elsewhere or by revenue increases.
Expenditure rules typically impose ceilings on specific areas of expenditure or for
particular programmes. The advantage of capping expenditure is that the
process is well understood by players in budget negotiations and the wider
public, and it tackles deficit bias by addressing the principal source of rising
deficits. In addition, governments are made accountable for what they can control
most directly, in contrast with deficit limits. A disadvantage of an expenditure limit
is that it does not necessarily correct a tendency toward excessive deficits, for
instance through large tax cuts or the systematic over prediction of revenues. To
overcome this deficit risk, the expenditure rule can be combined with a mediumterm target for budget balance as is the case in Sweden.
3.
Transparency. New Zealand pioneered an approach to fiscal management
that places primary and explicit emphasis on transparency with the Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1994. Australia and the U.K. have since adopted similar
approaches, as has Brazil and other countries in Latin America.
4.
These three approaches are sometimes combined. For example,
Australia, New Zealand, and the U.K. combine legally mandated transparency
with rules or objectives for deficits and debt levels. In contrast, the Netherlands
uses expenditure and revenue rules to meet its requirements under the Stability
and Growth Pact. By and large these approaches have worked. In Australia, for
example, the new framework contributed to a decline in the deficit from about 4
per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to a surplus of 2 per cent of GDP in 1999-00.
Spending has increased only slightly, and the tax burden has remained constant.
In addition, transparency improved as a result of new reporting requirements
(Daban et al, 2003).
evaluation in Australia, creating responsibility centres in France, and performance agreements in
New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Brumby and Cangiano, 2001).
2

It is important to note that many studies have found that fiscal consolidation associated with
expenditure restraint, particularly reductions in primary current expenditure have proved more
durable. See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995); Alesina and Ardagna (1998); Perotti et al
(1998); and von Hagen et al (2001).
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5.
Brazil has also combined all three types of policies (formal deficit and debt
rules, expenditure limits, and transparency) into one fiscal responsibility
legislation. The Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) provides for the following: (i)
defined ceilings for payroll expenses; (ii) defined sub-ceilings for the same
expenses by branch of government; (iii) fixed limits on official actions, with
certain restrictions in election years; (iv) transparency rules for reporting public
sector accounts; and (v) prohibits new refinancing of the debt of sub-national
states by federal authorities. Regarding expenditure ceilings, the FRL provides
targets for a limit on wages. The FRL states that expenditures on personnel
should not exceed 60 per cent of the net current revenue of the state, and
similarly 60 per cent for municipalities. While some states have proven to be
successful at containing committed expenditures, others have turned to virtually
zero investment.
6.
In Canada, the Fiscal Spending Control Act of 1992 established a nominal
expenditure limit for the period 1992 to 1996. In addition, since 1994 the
government introduced several policy rules that were not formally legislated. The
main objective was to control public expenditure growth, reduce fiscal
imbalances, and stop the increase in public debt. The deficit of 5 per cent of GDP
in 1995 became a surplus of more than 1 per cent of GDP by 1999, and the ratio
of net public debt to GDP was reduced from around 70 per cent in 1995 to 52 per
cent in 2000. (Daban et al, 2003).
7.
In the U.S., many studies have concluded that the specific expenditure
ceilings embodied in the Budget Enforcement Act have played a significant role
in reducing expenditure. This approach may have been better suited to the U.S.
budget process than the earlier deficit reduction targets contained in the GrammRudman-Hollings Act, which provided for automatic spending cuts to take effect if
the president and Congress failed to reach established targets; the U.S.
comptroller general was given the right to order spending cuts.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
International experience shows that fiscal consolidation associated with
expenditure restraint, particularly reductions in primary current expenditure have
proved more durable historically. The advantage of capping expenditure is that
the process is well understood by players in budget negotiations and the wider
public, and it tackles deficit bias by addressing the principal source of rising
deficits.
2.
Fiscal responsibility legislation at all levels of government should provide
for expenditure limits, formal deficit and debt rules, and transparency.
Transparency, in particular, is important for monitoring sub-national government
progress and fostering greater accountability of political leaders to their
constituents.

India: Fiscal Condition of the States, International Experience,
and Options for Reform (Vol I).

27

3.
Fiscal rules are a proven way to control sub-national fiscal profligacy, if the
rules are reasonable and enforced. However, expenditure limits may lead subnational governments to neglect the quality of public expenditure.
Issue 3:

Pension Reform

Pensions are a major expenditure item in India’s State budgets. On
average nearly 11 per cent of revenue receipts go to this expenditure item. The
annual average increase in pension spending was 30 per cent between 1995-96
and 2000-01, making pensions the fastest growing expenditure item in state
budgets (World Bank, 2004). This implies that reforming the current pension
system is crucial to the fiscal sustainability of the states. The crux of the issue is
that the current practice in most states of unfunded non-contributory defined
benefit (DB) schemes is no longer fiscally sustainable.
Consequently, two types of reforms are in progress. First structural
reforms are being pursued to enable the states to shift to a cheaper and less
fiscally-risky defined contribution (DC) schemes. Second, parametric reforms are
being pursued to contain the cost of the current non-contributory DB schemes.3
In 2003, the GoI approved the introduction of a restructured DC scheme for new
civil servants to replace the existing DB scheme, but this reform has been limited
to the Centre. Although the scheme is open to interested states on a voluntary
basis, only a few have initiated measures to introduce a DC scheme, namely,
Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu (World Bank,
2004). While the proposed new DC scheme will have transitional fiscal costs, it

3

The term PAYGO system in India is also used for the unfunded pension non-contributory
schemes where current (state) revenues fund pension benefits.
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has the potential to deliver major fiscal gains. However, if restricted to new civil
servants only, the shift to a DC scheme will not have a positive fiscal impact for
another 30 years or more. Thus, parametric changes in the current DB pension
scheme for both the existing employees and pensioners have become
unavoidable.4
To be sure, existing pension schemes across states have many common
features, but there are certain variations. For example, while pension schemes
cover state government employees in all the states, some of them have accepted
the entire burden of salary and pension expenditure of employees of grant-in-aid
(GIA) institutions and local bodies. There are also variations in terms of eligibility,
computation, family pension, commutation, gratuities, and non-pension benefits.
Given that there are significant inter-state differences relating to pension
payments, more than one policy approach to address pension issues at the state
level will be needed.
A.

International experience

1.
Pension reforms undertaken by a large number of countries have led to a
variety of pension systems ranging from DB pensions that may or may not be
integrated with the national social security system; plans that may or may not be
contributory; and plans that may or may not be funded. Most industrialised
countries separate civil servant pensions from the national social insurance
schemes. Other countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Peru, and many East
European countries have moved towards complete integration of the civil service
pension plan with the national social insurance plan. A recent survey by the
World Bank indicates that out of 128 countries, 46 countries have fully integrated
civil service schemes, while 82 have separate schemes (RBI, 2003b).

4

Some of these include the elimination of the fixing of pensions on the basis of only one-month’s
pay or the elimination of wage indexation of pensions (RBI, 2003a).
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2.
Regarding pension scheme structures, several countries have adopted a
multi-pillar approach in recent years, consisting of an unfunded mandatory pillar,
a funded mandatory pillar, and a voluntary private pillar. At one end is the Latin
American experience of the individual account model with only one DC pillar as
established in Chile in 1980 (see below) and later followed by Argentina, Bolivia,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. This has made the Latin American
experience with privatisation in pension reform a model to learn from for many
other countries. The second model is the OECD employer sponsored model
adopted in Australia, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. A feature
of this model is that the employer and/or union trustees choose the investment
manager for the company or occupational group as a whole. The third model is
the notional defined contribution system which originated in Sweden and was
adopted in Italy, Latvia, and Poland. This scheme is a type of DC scheme where
the individual has an account in which his contributions are credited but no funds
are deposited. The account is periodically revalued-upwards based on the index
adopted.
3.
In Chile, the pension reform of 1980 created a new system known as the
AFP (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones) system which completely
replaced the government run PAYGO social security system with an investmentbased private system of individual retirement accounts. The new pension system
gives workers covered by the scheme the choice between different forms of
payout after their retirement. Workers who were already in the labour force were
given the option of staying in the old system or moving to the new system. Those
who stayed in the old system had their pension rights guaranteed under the new
law. The main characteristics of the Chilean system are as follows:
(i) Contributions are capitalised in individual accounts, and the rate of
contribution is defined in the law as a proportion of the wage;
(ii) The value of old-age pensions depends on the balance accumulated in
the personal account of each worker;
(iii) Disability and survivorship pensions are defined benefits with a value
proportional to the taxable wage of the member;
(iv) The worker is free to choose among different registered, singlepurpose pension management institutions (the AFPs);
(v) AFPs are private and competitive firms whose purpose is to invest the
funds in the capital market on behalf of its members;
(vi) At retirement, the worker can choose among three different ways in
which he can receive the pension; and
(vii) The State plays mainly a subsidiary role manifested in its
responsibility to regulate and supervise the system, finance minimum
pensions, and provide certain guarantees.
4.
Some drawbacks of this system include high administrative costs, lack of
portfolio choice, and a high number of switchovers from one fund to another.
More importantly, since the system is a pure DC scheme the employees are
exposed to the risk of volatility in the market prices of the investment assets, and
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the system may not provide security in old age. This risk may be reduced by
using a mixture of DB and DC plans, which is the rationale for a multi-pillar
system.
5.
In the U.S., in 1983, all new employees were introduced to a new system,
the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). FERS provides for a threetier retirement plan consisting of (general) social security, a DB plan, and the
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), which is a DC plan. FERS’ retirement income is
similar to that provided by large employers in the private sector. The TPS is
administered by an independent agency which operates the plan prudently and
solely in the interest of the participants and their beneficiaries. The reform in the
U.S. has achieved the following: it integrated the newly recruited civil servants
under the social security system; it provided a retirement system comparable to
those for private sector workers; it raised the minimum retirement age by two
years; it partially privatised federal government retirement by instituting a funded
DC plan with some private sector investments; and it has improved portability for
federal government employees. In addition, the state governments in the U.S.
have begun shifting public employee pensions towards DC plans: 3 states have
or are phasing in a system based on a DC plan only; 6 states have, or are
phasing in, a system allowing state employees and/or school teachers the
freedom to choose to substitute a DC plan for the old DB plan. Three states have
hybrid DB/DC plans, 48 states allow workers to choose a supplemental DC plan
in addition to the main DB or DC plan, and 49 states offer at least some workers
some DC plan.
6.
In Brazil, other than at the federal level, each of the 27 states have their
own PAYGO pension system The growing pressure of pensions on state
expenditures has led to proposals to reform the pension system, but no
significant structural changes have been achieved. Brazil has encountered
significant legal and political obstacles to reforming the pension system. State
governments faced with tight budgets have taken initiatives for reform. The most
common has been to create a pre-funded component to guarantee existing
benefits. These funds have been generally financed by privatisation receipts
and/or increased contribution rates. However, these pre-funded systems are not
actuarially balanced, and they merely provide temporary relief to State
government accounts rather than a permanent solution.
7.
Some countries have approached pension reform from another angle.
Canada and Japan have reformed their existing pre-funding arrangements, and
New Zealand has taken initiatives to build pension reserves.
8.
Canada: The Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) was founded in 1966 as a
PAYGO scheme, indexed to inflation. The scheme requires mandatory
contributions by all employees and employers. The Federal and Provincial
Governments of Canada have no liability towards the CPP. However,
governments make matching contributions like other employers. The ratio of the
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number of employees to pensioners is expected to decline sharply in the future.
Thus a number of measures have been taken, as follows: (i.) increasing the
current employer contribution rate from 6 per cent to 9.9 per cent, (ii.) creating an
independent corporation to manage reserves, the CPP Investment Board, (iii.)
allowing the CPP, which previously only could be invested in Provincial
government securities, to invest in capital markets and even foreign markets; and
(iv.) requiring CPP to disclose quarterly financial results.
9.
Japan: Major reforms to the pension system have been introduced in the
past decade with the aim of reducing benefit levels. Demography and reliance on
public pensions implies that Japan has the largest unfunded pension liabilities in
the world. A new pension reform went into effect in 2001, including a reduction in
the accrual rate, an increase in the normal retirement age, and a switchover from
wage to price indexation. Before the reform, pension reserves were borrowed by
the central government in the form of non-marketable government bonds, and a
small portion was invested in the capital market. After the reforms, funds are
increasingly invested in non-government loans.
10.
New Zealand: The pension scheme is a universal flat benefit financed by
general revenues. In view of a large increase in pension expenditures, the
government introduced measures toward pre-funding the pension scheme in
2001. The reform provides for a partial pre-funding target through annual
contributions from the budget and for setting up the New Zealand
Superannuation Fund (NZSF). Withdrawals from the fund are not allowed until
2020, and the governance is entrusted to a public corporation run by a board,
which is responsible for investing the funds on a prudent commercial basis.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
One size does not fit all. Countries with different circumstances and
different pension system histories have undertaken different reforms which are
working for them. Given the variety of circumstances in the States of India,
different pension scheme reforms may be needed to adapt to the situation of
each state. The range of potential reforms include a pure DC scheme for new
employees, hybrid DC-DB schemes, or a two-tier scheme for new employees
with a DC-DB tier supplemented with a mandatory DC scheme. The reforms
should be mandatory for new employees, but incentives may be provided to
existing employees to choose the new scheme. Pension fund management can
be the responsibility of an independent institution based on established
guidelines. During the transition period, it may be necessary to introduce
parametric changes to benefits/contributions. Good data and information systems
are critical to studying the options and arriving at sound policy prescriptions.
2.
Most countries have moved away from wage indexation in favour of price
indexation. As the States of India provide for both wage and price indexation,
they should move to price indexation only.
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3.
The pension burdens of other public institution employees (for example,
new GIA and local bodies in India) may not be similar to state employees and
should be paid for by the respective institutions/bodies.
Issue 4:

Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises

At the state level, power subsidies have represented a long-standing
problem as they are considered inefficient, regressive, and highly political. In
addition, poor cost recovery and theft have contributed to power sector losses
which have been financed through cross-subsidisation mainly by industrial and
commercial consumers and also via subventions from state governments (RBI,
2004). Thus, not only are explicit subsidies a drain on state budgets, but the lack
of transparency in implicit subsidies and the resulting contingent liabilities
contribute to the financial risks borne by the states. Previous efforts by state and
central governments to take coordinated action to raise tariffs and to phase out
agricultural subsidies have failed, as have previous efforts at privatisation. We
proceed with a discussion of international experience in addressing the issue of
subsidies.
A.

International experience

1.
Eliminate the subsidy. The most obvious means to improve economic
efficiency would be to curtail all subsidies. While politically this may be difficult to
achieve, it has been done in some countries. Russia, for example, has had a
long history of poorly targeted subsidies of various goods and services including
utilities, housing, food, and transportation. Reforms included the devolution of
subsidy responsibility to lower levels of government (i.e., regional and local
levels) in the form of unfunded mandates under the assumption that lower level
government have more information to better target subsidies. However, provided
that regional and local governments were unable to finance these subsidies,
these were eventually phased out.
2.
Target the subsidy. Subsidies can be trimmed by restraining the number
of individuals or companies who are eligible for a subsidy. Ideally, they should be
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directly targeted to the needy. Targeting subsidies in other countries include the
design of direct subsidies for the poor. This approach was first used in water
sector reforms in Chile in the early 1990s as an alternative to the practice of
paying subsidies directly to utilities often allowing the price to fall below economic
costs indiscriminately. In this scheme, government funds are used to cover part
of the cost of subsistence consumption for households that meet certain povertyrelated criteria. This makes subsidies more transparent and explicit and
minimises distortions in the behaviour of water utilities and their customers. The
main drawbacks of direct subsidies are higher administrative costs and the
difficulty of designing suitable eligibility criteria (World Bank, 2000a).
3.
Market the resource. Tariff policies should be based on the principle of full
cost recovery. To start with power and water must be appropriately priced. This
would release resources for public investment in infrastructure projects and to
maintain existing facilities. User charges shift the burden of financing goods and
services from taxpayers generally to those who benefit directly. Less than full
recovery amounts to an implicit subsidy to users at the expense of taxpayers.
Although most countries make much less use of user charges than desirable,
countries such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. heavily rely on user
charges. Generally, charges are set at competitive private levels, with no tax or
subsidy element included, or the subsidy element, if present, is accounted for
separately.
4.
Privatise the resource. The most dramatic reform would be to transfer the
provision of some subsidised goods to private firms. Many countries have
adopted privatisation programmes as part of structural reforms and to alleviate
budget problems.5
B.

Lessons for India

1.
The deepest reform would be the privatisation or closure of SOEs
providing private goods. Absent privitisation, tariff policies should still be based
on the principle of full cost recovery in order to shift the burden of financing
services from taxpayers generally to service users.
2.
In the case of merit goods, tariff policies should still be based on the
principle of full cost recovery. Any subsidies to protect the poor should be explicit
and targeted.
3.
The biggest challenge in targeting subsidies is the design of direct
subsidies for the poor. Generally recognisable criteria may be used as opposed

5

The issue of privatisation of state owned enterprises is discussed in greater detail later in this
section under economic reforms.
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to more complex income or means testing. For example, the irrigation subsidy
may be targeted to small family farmers.
4.
The provision of implicit subsidies is a practice to be avoided. If subsidies
are kept at the enterprise level, these subsidies should be made explicit, with
transparent resource transfers from the sub-national government to the
enterprise explicitly shown in state budgets.
5.
Whenever efficiency gains are possible provision may be contracted out to
the private sector.
Issue 5:

Declining Expenditures on Capital Outlays

Sub-national government capital outlays in India have been declining as a
share of GDP. State borrowings, presumably to finance infrastructure
development, are being diverted to finance persistent state revenue deficits.
Additionally, capital outlays are poorly targeted, and the projects often take too
long to complete. Expenditures on maintenance and repair of infrastructure are
also inadequate. Furthermore, there are inappropriate incentives and control
systems and poor planning which has resulted in poor performance by a number
of investment projects.
A.

International experience

1.
The U.K. put in place a policy framework in the Finance Act 1998 and in
the Code for Fiscal Stability to tackle problems similar to those now being
experienced in India. The two key fiscal rules, which mostly affect public
investment, are the following:
(i)
Golden rule: over the economic cycle, the government will borrow only
to invest and not to fund current spending; and
(ii)
Sustainable investment rule: public sector net debt as a proportion of
GDP will be held over the economic cycle at a stable and prudent level
(currently 40 per cent of GDP).
2.
Other countries also practise the golden rule at the sub-national level
(e.g., Brazil, Canada, Germany, South Africa, and the U.S.). However, by itself
the golden rule does not guarantee sound and sustainable public investment. To
address this issue the U.K. government has also introduced a new control regime
for public expenditure which checks on the quality of investment. This is known
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as the Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report (EFSR), which, among other things,
requires that capital expenditures are planned separately from current
expenditure and protected through separate capital budgets within each
department’s expenditure limit. This aims at ensuring that worthwhile capital
investment projects are not sacrificed to meet short-term pressures. In addition,
departments are allowed to re-invest any savings they make in their projects and
are allowed to carry over unspent reserves from year to year. The new
framework introduced in the U.K. brings together a strategy for raising quantity,
quality, and stability of public investment (HTM, 1998). Although it is still too early
to evaluate the success at this reform, the Report of Accounts for 2002-03
indicates a nominal 12 per cent increase in public investment from the previous
year, reflecting the government’s determination to address the historical under
investment in public services (HMT, 2003).
3.
There are also unsuccessful experiences that provide lessons. Brazilian
States suffer from inflexible budgets because committed expenditures to
pension, interest, and wages represent most of their current expenditure. In an
effort to tackle the fiscal distress in the country, the Government introduced the
Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000 which includes rules and limits for government
debt, wage bill, golden rule, and other fiscal indicators. The limit for personnel
expenditure for the states is 60 per cent of net revenues, and 13 per cent on
interest payments. However, in an effort to tackle the issue of high committed
expenditures and debt, there has been a negative impact on capital investment,
namely public infrastructure. While most states have been successful at meeting
limits on committed expenditures and the golden rule, they have achieved this
success by sacrificing important public investments. The challenge for Brazil will
be for the states to provide the necessary public investment. One possible
strategy would be setting a floor on capital expenditures in the FRL that is
consistent with other fiscal rules such as the golden rule.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
To protect capital investment in needed infrastructure, it is necessary to
adopt the golden rule. However, the golden rule does not in and of itself
guarantee sound and sustainable public investment. Capital expenditure may
need to be planned separately from current expenditure and, more importantly,
protected through separate capital budgets.
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Issue 6:

Low Quality of Social Services

The quality of social services in India is rather low, resulting in poor
performance indicators in many states, namely, high illiteracy rates, high infant
mortality rates and malnutrition, and low access to education. In some parts of
India, government schools lack textbooks, other school supplies, and teachers
(or the teachers fail to show up to work); schools do not provide access to proper
toilets for students and teachers, which is known to affect attendance particularly
among female students; health clinics lack medicines and doctors (or they fail to
show up to work); clean water is very often unreliable or unavailable; and roads
and transport are inaccessible to many areas.6 In summary, the delivery of most
economic and social services is fraught with all sorts of problems, which are
compounded by limited accountability for performance and poor management.
We proceed by briefly reviewing the success stories of other countries at
improving the quality and management of social services. Given the breadth of
issues, the discussion focuses mainly on the delivery of education services.
A.

International Experience

1.
Re-assignment of expenditure responsibility and decision-making: Most
countries have taken decentralisation to lower level bodies under the assumption
that these arrangements lead to a closer match between services and the needs
and preferences of the beneficiaries; increase accountability of local decisionmakers; and use localised information in decision-making. Decentralisation of
education and health services has characteristically proceeded through the
devolution/delegation of key functions or responsibilities to different government
levels, including institutions (i.e., schools and hospitals), rather than
decentralisation of the whole set of functions to sub-national governments or to a
facility. In fact, countries such as Canada, Germany, Spain, and the U.S. among
others have devolved most functions in education and health to the local and

6

See Peters (2000), Kremer et al (2004), Ferro et al. (2002), Filmer (2001), and Keefer and
Khemani (2004).
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institutional level, especially those related to personnel management (i.e.,
compensation, hiring, firing, etc).
2.
School-based management (SBM): the most radical form of educational
decentralisation involves the transfer of decision-making to the school level.
Variations of SBM generally are defined by which stakeholder group holds
decision-making authority. Generally there are four distinct forms of SBM:
principal control, professional control (teacher majority), community control
(community majority), and balanced control (teacher and community equally
represented). SBM reforms have been implemented in a variety of countries,
such as autonomous schools in Nicaragua, community-managed schools
(EDUCO) in El Salvador, self-managed schools in New Zealand, the District
Primary Education Programme (DPEP) in India, and local school council in
Chicago.7 These reforms have contributed to improvements in access to
education, for example in El Salvador and Nicaragua; student learning, again in
El Salvador and Nicaragua; student attendance in India and Chicago; teacher
attendance in El Salvador, India, and Nicaragua; and parental involvement (all
cases).
3.
Nicaragua’s autonomous school (AS) model offers an interesting lesson.
In contrast to reforms in New Zealand and Chicago, Nicaragua’s AS reform has
been implemented gradually, starting with those schools that have the strongest
capacity. To become an AS school, teachers at the school must vote in favour of
AS status. Then, the principal files an application with the municipality. The
application is then reviewed and approved by the Ministry of Education (MoE),
which evaluates the capacity of the applicant to undertake the responsibility of
being an AS. AS schools are required to establish self-governing councils
composed of the school director, teachers, and parents. The council has broad
authority over a wide range of school issues, including hiring and firing school
staff; salary incentives, and training support; setting student fees; and
establishing and administering school budgets. In the AS model, rural schools
use a different decentralisation structure. The new rural model involves the
creation of a cluster of schools (Núcleos Educativos Rurales Autónomos) in
which the largest one acts as the nucleus. The group acts as one autonomous
school with a shared school director and local school council (Consejos
Directivos), which is based at the largest school. This means that urban school
councils operate at the school level, whereas in rural areas they operate at the
municipal level (King and Ozler, 1998).
4.
School grants have been used in countries such as Chile, Guinea,
Indonesia, and Nigeria as a means to improve efficiency, quality, and equity.
School grants are transfers of decision-making authority and financial resources
from governments to schools or small networks of schools. These can be
managed by an individual or organisation with the legal authority to receive and
spend public funds, usually the school director, a governing board council of the
7

See Jimenez and Sawada (2000), Pandey (2000) and World Bank (2000b).
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school, or a parent-teacher association. School grants are used in numerous
developing countries and are often supported by education development
projects, such as community-managed schools and school-based management
(discussed below). The scope of a grant’s activities include, among other things,
training of teachers and administrative staff, new organisation of school
management with community and teacher participation, and integration of
children with special needs into the educational process.
5.
Corporatisation and/or privatisation reforms of hospitals are being
implemented in different countries in order to improve performance of publicly run
health services. This allows hospitals to be operated by a variety of public and
private organisations, based on hospital specific contracts that would define each
hospital’s mission, guarantee public funding, and ensure accountability. Reforms
include various degrees of autonomy of ownership (i.e., fully public to fully private
ownership), and management functions (i.e., governance, management, and
financing) of hospitals. These reforms have recently been implemented to
various degrees in California, Denmark, France, Holland, Italy, New Zealand, and
the U.K. and among developing countries in Indonesia, several Latin American
countries, the Philippines, and Singapore. While there are mixed results, most
success stories relate to increased accountability, lower staff absenteeism, and
better allocation of funds towards materials and equipment (Chawla et al, 1996).
B.

Lessons for India

1.
According to India’s Constitution, education and health are primarily state
responsibilities. The international best experience suggests that devolving more
functions related to education and health care delivery to local bodies and
institutions can substantially improve access, accountability, and quality
monitoring.
2.
Many case studies involving devolution of decision-making power to local
bodies, communities, and schools provide evidence of improvements in access,
enrolment, and attendance. In particular case studies regarding devolution of
personnel management decisions (i.e., compensation, hiring, and firing) report a
decline in teacher absenteeism.
3.
Nicaragua’s AS reforms provide an example of a decentralisation strategy
where local bodies and schools may be empowered according to administrative
capacity and providing an option for greater autonomy to rural schools, too. One
of the advantages of this reform is that it provides an incentive for schools to
improve their administrative and technical capacities in order to obtain
autonomous status.
4.
School grant designs in other countries provide good examples that
complement reforms involving the devolution of decision-making attributes. The
international experience suggests that school grants should feature sufficient
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flexibility for the schools to spend the funds. A well-designed transfer can be
helpful in the implementation of minimum national standards, providing incentives
for local effort, and improving accountability.
II.

Revenue Assignments and Policies
It seems clear that the States of India need to augment revenues due to

the large share of committed expenditures and persistent revenue deficits. This
can be accomplished in any number of ways, including increasing own source
revenues, improved tax administration, and increasing intergovernmental
transfers. Enhancing the revenue autonomy of sub-national governments would
have the added advantage of tightening the Wicksellian link between costs and
benefits which would help foster greater fiscal discipline. We begin with an
evaluation of India’s proposed sub-national VAT in light of international
experience. Then, we turn to a discussion of sub-national revenue assignments
in other federal countries.
Issue 1:

India’s Proposed Sub-National Value-Added Tax

India’s current reform agenda includes a proposal to introduce a subnational VAT and abolish the existing system of state sales taxes. The problems
with the state sales taxes are well-known and will not be repeated here. The
State of Haryana has already implemented a VAT with good results in terms of
revenue growth. On April 1, 2005, as this report was nearing completion, 21 of
India’s 28 States implemented a VAT. We proceed below by briefly reviewing
international experience with VATs.
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International experience

1.
Generally speaking, the VAT is a major source of revenue in many
countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Russia, and the member countries
of the European Union (“EU”) among others. It is considered to be an efficient
and buoyant source of revenue when properly designed and administered.
2.
Brazil’s dual VAT most resembles the system of consumption tax currently
underway in India, although some contend that the resemblance is superficial
because there is no rebate of Central Sales Tax paid in the importing state.
Brazil’s federal VAT (IPI) applies to industrial goods; the state VAT (ICMS) taxes
the circulation of goods in general and some services (i.e., interstate and intermunicipal transportation and communication services); and municipalities levy
charges (ISS) on a specified list of services. It is noteworthy that the IPI is fully
creditable against the ICMS.
3.
Although the States of Brazil obtain nearly 85 per cent of their own-source
revenues from the ICMS, there are a number of complex, technical, and
administrative problems concerning the application of different VATs in different
states. In addition, the tax bases of these three taxes overlap, leading to
confusion and inefficiency. A detailed description of Brazil’s VAT system is
provided in the Appendix to this report for the interested reader.
4.
Generally speaking, the ICMS is a poorly conceived and inefficient tax.
The major problems with this tax include the following: (i) complexity of each of
the 27 states having its own VAT law, resulting in more than 40 rates and
different rules for assessing tax credits; (ii) evasion associated with the
complexity and treatment of inter-state trade; and (iii) fiscal wars, with states
offering tax exemptions and refunds. Current proposals to reform the ICMS are
currently under consideration. Among the proposals being considered is a
national VAT (Goncalves, 2004).
5.
In Canada, there is a federal VAT that is imposed throughout the country.
In contrast to Brazil, the provinces of Canada levy a variety of consumption
taxes. Quebec levies a VAT and administers both the federal VAT and the
provincial VAT. In three other provinces, the federal government administers a
joint federal-provincial VAT, which is levied at a uniform rate. Alberta does not
have a broad-based consumption tax, and the remaining five provinces apply
some form of final retail sales tax (RST). As in Brazil, Canada’s VAT is fully
creditable. A detailed description of Canada’s consumption tax system is
provided in the Appendix to this report for the interested reader.
6.
Although the Canadian system is complicated, lacks clarity, and violates
some efficiency and administrative criteria of a good VAT; it works. Canada is an
example of a federal country where greater harmonisation of VAT between the
Centre and states has been achieved (Bird and Gendron, 2000).
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7.
For illustrative purposes, the EU can be regarded as a federation running
state-level VATs by the member countries. Coverage of the VAT includes both
goods and services. Broad guidelines have been established (i.e., common set of
rules, exemptions, and definitions), and there is a main floor rate of 15 per cent.
Despite the efforts to harmonise rates, actual rates vary among member
countries from 15 to 25 per cent. The EU requires that any country wishing to be
part of the Union adopt a VAT and must refrain from levying any effective tax on
intra-community transactions. Thus sales between member states are zero-rated.
Although this arrangement was intended as a transitional arrangement,
agreement on alternative regimes for tackling inter-state trade still continues
(World Bank, 2004; Howes et al, 2003; and GoI, 2005).
Table II.1: Comparison of Sales Tax Regimes
Canada
Canada
GSTBrazil
Argentina
HST
QST
Good federal VAT
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes by
(part of
Federal VAT revenue to
revenue
No
No
general
states
sharing
revenueformula
sharing)
State taxes on destination
basis
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
(except
State rate setting
Yes
No
for
Yes
autonomy
interstate
trade)
Good administration
Yes
Yes
No
No
Good cooperation
between
central and state
governments
Yes
Yes
No
No

India
No
Yes
(CST)

No

Yes

No

No

Source: Bird and Gendron (2000)

8.
In Australia, there is a federal VAT levied throughout the country, which is
distributed to the states through an equalisation grant. This arrangement greatly
simplifies or eliminates many of the complexities surrounding the design and
administration of sub-national VATs, such as harmonisation of tax rates, the
need for border adjustments on inter-state trade, and administration of tax credits
for input tax paid and zero-rating of international exports.
9.
As part of Australia’s tax reform of 2000, the federal government
introduced a goods and services tax (GST) or a VAT. The proceeds from the
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GST are used to fund a Centre-state equalisation grant pool. In return for giving
the states access to a more buoyant source of transfers, the Commonwealth
abolished financial assistance grants and revenue replacement payments to the
states and reduced federal income tax rates. For their part, the states agreed to
give up a range of state taxes and to reduce tax rates on gambling. This political
bargain has proven to be very popular with the states and the public.
10.
As a transition measure, the Commonwealth was required to provide
‘budget balancing assistance’ for a number of years to ensure that no state was
financially worse off under the GST-related changes. Due to the moral hazard of
allowing the Commonwealth to collect a tax from which they receive no revenue,
the VAT arrangements are subject to overview by a federal-state ministerial
council. The council ensures proper administration of the VAT by the
Commonwealth, and the council must unanimously approve any rate changes.
11.
The experiences of Australia and other federal countries, such as
Argentina, Germany, Mexico, Russia, and Spain, show that international best
practice is a national VAT administered by the central government and shared, if
so desired, with regional governments on a formula basis (e.g., population or
estimates of consumption shares). This arrangement avoids various complexities
common to sub-national VAT designs, such as tax rate harmonisation, unifying
the taxation of domestic trade, reducing administrative and compliance costs,
and tax enforcement.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
India’s sub-national VAT is likely to be a more efficient and buoyant
source of revenue than the system of state sales taxes. It is likely to be less
costly to administer and enforce, as well. Taken together, these advantages
recommend India’s sub-national VAT relative to the system of state sales taxes
and the surcharges, entry tax, turn-over tax, and the like that have cropped up
over the years.
2.
To prevent tax competition and reduce administrative and compliance
costs with a VAT requires tax rate harmonisation. This means that the States of
India should coordinate on tax rate setting.
3.
Canada’s experience and, indeed, India’s more limited but nonetheless
successful experience in the State of Haryana demonstrate that a dual VAT can
accommodate states that do not even levy VAT as well as some differences in
VAT bases with respect to both zero-rating final services and crediting input tax
paid. In other words, these experiences show that tax rate and tax base harmony
are not required to operate a buoyant VAT.
4.
Regarding transition relief, Australia and Canada’s experiences show the
importance of providing compensatory budgetary assistance to states (provinces)
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that experience revenue losses during the transition period of a major structural
reform of the tax system. Such assistance helps allay the concerns of policymakers regarding the uncertainty about projected revenues under the regime. It
also helps states get through the difficult period of learning to administer a new
tax. Finally, such assistance insures that states will not have to cut back on
essential services due to unexpected revenue short falls or experience a further
deterioration in their fiscal condition.
5.
All case studies of sub-national VATs present lessons on inter-state trade,
but none of the arrangements in place are regarded as fully satisfactory. Brazil’s
system is open to manipulation, and it benefits the better-off states. The Quebec
and EU zero-rating systems have the advantage of preserving a common
market, but they break the VAT chain and give incentives to evade by making
intra-state sales appear to be inter-state sales, which are zero rated in these
systems. Although various suggestions have been offered to solve these
problems (i.e. clearing house proposal, CVAT, VIVAT, prepaid destination VAT),
these mechanisms have their own drawbacks.
6.
The experience with the dual VAT in Brazil suggests that the cure can be
worse than the disease. The EU experience suggests that agreements on floor
rates are more stable than agreements to harmonise rates.
7.
India’s sub-national VAT certainly has advantages over the current state
sales tax system. International experience would suggest that the sooner India
moves to the Kelkar Proposal the better.
Issue 2:

Enhance Own-Source Tax Revenue of the States

A distinctive feature of India’s intergovernmental fiscal system is the
adherence to the constitutional principle of separation of tax bases in the
assignment of revenues. Some federal countries allow at least some concurrent
taxes. For example, many countries allow sub-national governments, regional
and local, to levy taxes on income. International practice shows that the
arrangement of concurrent tax bases has more advantages than disadvantages,
in contrast to the exclusivity principle. We turn now to international experience
with piggyback income taxes as a prime example of how to enhance tax
autonomy at the state level.
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International experience

1.
Several levels of government often levy tax on exactly the same tax base.
Multiple use of the same base, if properly coordinated, is found to simplify
administration and reduce compliance costs. Canada, the U.S., and many
European countries have concurrent powers to levy income taxes at the federal,
provincial/state, and local levels.
2.
In Australia, the federal government has retained the exclusive power to
tax income. Although this arrangement has ensured that the tax system has a
high degree of uniformity in tax rates and tax bases, there is a high rate of
transfer dependency in Australia. In Australia, however, this high transfer
dependency has not led to fiscal profligacy, in part, perhaps because there is a
remarkable consensus on the need to maintain fiscal discipline at all levels of
government. Further, the States of Australia face hard budget constraints.
3.
In Canada, tax collection agreements between the federal and provincial
governments provide for joint use of the same income tax base. The provinces,
with the exception of Quebec and Ontario, set their own personal and corporate
income tax rates as a proportion of the rate charged by the Centre. The taxes are
collected by the central government and then remitted directly to the provinces in
a piggyback approach. In most Canadian provinces, a local surcharge is levied at
a flat, locally-established rate as a percentage of the national tax liability rather
than the national tax base, and collected by the central government. This
arrangement is known as “tax supplementation.” Similarly, in Switzerland, most
cantons allow local governments to levy surcharges at locally-established rates
on the cantonal income taxes.
4.
In the U.S., many states piggyback on the federal income tax, but the
piggybacking does not extend to central collection, only to reliance by states, if
they wish, on federal tax definitions, structures, and reported amounts. Most
states levy income taxes separate from, but coordinated with, the federal income
tax. There are two major coordination mechanisms in the U.S. These
mechanisms are complementary not mutually exclusive. First, states may choose
to cooperate on tax administration with the higher level government through a
regular exchange of information. Work by one level of government can generate
revenue for another level at little or no additional cost. For example, at the federal
level, the Internal Revenue Service may inform a state of an audit finding
regarding an individual residing in that state. Second, states may choose to
coordinate their tax base with the higher level government. For example, several
U.S. states levy their state individual income tax on a taxpayer’s amount of
federal adjusted gross income, so that the state income tax form simply begins
with a number extracted from the federal income tax form. Coordinating tax
bases reduces administration and compliance costs and fosters greater
coordination on tax enforcement between levels of government.
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Table II.2: Sub-National Government Personal Income Taxes
Sub-national Government’s
Tax Rate Schedule
Country

Canada
(excluding
Quebec)

Japan

Tax Base

Central gov't
income tax
paid before
allowance
Centre's tax
base
and separate
tax relief
structure

Tax base
between
localities

Assessment
and Collection

Single Rate*

Separate
progressive
rate schedule

38.5 - 59.0
(Av = 47)

-

Residence

Central Gov't

-

4 to 18
+ fixed
amount

Residence

Local Gov't

Spain
(excluding
Extremadura,
Castilla-La
Macha, and
Andalucia)

Centre's tax
base
and separate
tax relief
structure

Not available

-

Not
available

Central Gov't

Sweden

Centre's tax
base
and separate
tax relief
structure

26.4 - 33.2
(Av = 30)

-

Residence

Central Gov't

Switzerland

Separate base
in each canton

-

5 to 34

Residence

Canton

Separate tax
base in most
2 to 14
Residence
States
states
Source: Timofeev (2002).
Notes: * Minimum and maximum rates levied among sub-national governments. Although a given
sub-national government uses a single rate, sub-national governments are free to levy different
rates. That different rates are applied by different sub-national governments in a given country
illustrates the advantage of greater revenue autonomy that can be achieved with a piggyback
income tax.
United States

5.
Other examples of countries with piggyback income taxes include
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Spain, and Sweden (CoA, 2001; Timofeev, 2002).
Piggybacking arrangements provide sub-national governments with considerable
revenue autonomy because they can set the tax rate, administer the tax, and
even limit the ability to define the base. Piggybacking arrangements allow the
states and the Centre to exchange information which can increase the
effectiveness of enforcement activities. A drawback of piggybacking
arrangements is that there are fiscal externalities across different levels of
government; a simple form of fiscal externality is that state revenues may change
whenever the federal government changes the income tax base.
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B.

Lessons for India

1.
Several levels of government often levy tax on exactly the same tax base,
such as the personal income tax. Providing rate setting authority on a broadbased tax is an efficient way to provide sub-national governments with a buoyant
source of revenue and adequate revenue autonomy.
2.
Multiple use of the same base, if properly coordinated, is found to simplify
administration and reduce compliance costs. Coordinating tax bases reduces
administration and compliance costs and fosters greater coordination of tax
enforcement among levels of government.
3.
A drawback to sharing tax bases across different levels of government is
the existence of fiscal externalities. For example, some piggybacking
arrangements changes sub-national revenues whenever the federal tax base is
changed.
Issue 3:

The Assignment of the Property Tax

For reasons that are not well understood, Asian countries tend to collect
less revenue from property taxes as a share of GDP than countries in other
regions of the world, particularly European and North American countries. In
India, the low revenue yield of the property tax appears to be largely due to
problems with tax administration. The property tax is a difficult tax to administer
and often meets with considerable resistance from taxpayers. To the extent that
states have retained administration of the property tax, India is out of step with
current international best practice. Re-assigning the property tax to local bodies
has several advantages, which are discussed below.
A.

International experience

1.
In Australia, Canada, Brazil, Germany, Russia, and the U.S. the property
tax is assigned to local governments. There are several reasons for assigning
taxes on land and buildings to the local level. First, if local governments are going
to play a meaningful role and adjust expenditures to local preferences, then they
need a reliable source of own-tax revenue. Given the mobility of capital,
employment, and consumption, local governments have very few viable options.
Since land is immobile, though the improvements clearly are not, the value of
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unimproved land is generally believed to be a good revenue source for local
governments. Second, it is believed that there may be advantages to local
administration of the property tax because local officials have better knowledge
of local conditions and the ownership of properties. Therefore, assignment of
property taxes to local government is likely to lower the costs of administration.
2.
Since the administration of property taxes is difficult, the assessment and
billing of the tax may be charged to a regional or even central tax administration
until local capacity is developed. This is the approach currently taken in Russia.
But local governments can retain the right to change the tax rates even if the
administration and collections are performed by a different level of government.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
Property taxes are the most obvious candidate for providing local
governments with their own significant source of revenues. Besides being stable
sources of revenue, generally non-exportable, and non-distortionary, property
taxes provide a significant Wicksellian link between services received and taxes
paid. The accountability of local elected officials to their constituencies also tends
to be enhanced through property taxation. If local governments provide services
that are valued by residents of the jurisdiction, then property values should
increase, which in turn increases the tax base. Thus, the property tax creates an
incentive for local government officials to behave in a manner that is consistent
with the interests of the residents.
Issue 4:

Disuse of other Taxes

The States of India have access to a number of other taxes, including
electricity tax, entertainment and hotel tax, luxury tax, professional tax, and
transportation taxes. In many cases, the states do not fully utilise the taxes at
their disposal. In part, this may be symptomatic of a soft budget constraint, which
is discussed in greater detail below. Another contributing factor may be
inappropriate tax assignments. We review other taxes, in addition to the three
discussed above (consumption, income, and property taxes), that are commonly
assigned to state and local governments, according to international best practice.
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International experience

1.
In most countries, special excise taxes are levied on all manner of
transportation fuels, beverage alcohol, tobacco products, vehicle registration, and
automobile tires. In Australia, these special excises are levied by both the
Commonwealth and the states. In Brazil, there are no special excise taxes on
these products, except for a tax on vehicle property which is levied at the state
level. In Germany, there are special excises levied on tobacco, coffee, tea, salt,
petroleum products, and beverage alcohol, excepting beer, by the federal
government. The States of Germany levy special excises on motor vehicles,
gambling establishments, and beer; local governments levy taxes on beverage
alcohol. In Canada, the federal and provincial governments levy taxes
concurrently on all manner of transportation fuels, beverage alcohol, and tobacco
products. The provincial governments levy a tax for motor vehicle registration. In
the U.S., the federal and state governments levy taxes concurrently on all
manner of transportation fuels, beverage alcohol, and tobacco products. In
addition, the states and local governments levy vehicle registration fees.
2.
Special excises are a reliable source of revenue because the demand for
these commodities is typically relatively inelastic. In developing countries, high
income people may spend a greater share of their income on these luxury items,
and therefore these taxes may increase the progressivity of the tax system.
These taxes can be used to discourage the consumption of harmful commodities
(i.e., tobacco products and alcoholic beverage), and polluting commodities like
transportation fuels. Often the revenues from transportation fuels, tires, and the
like are earmarked for building and repairing transportation infrastructure (e.g.,
airports, railroads, highways, and urban transportation). Similarly, taxes on
tobacco products and beverage alcohol can offset the added burdens that heavy
consumers of these commodities often place on the health system.
3.
In the U.S., entertainment and hotel taxes, electricity taxes, and
transportation taxes are assigned to local governments. In the case of
entertainment, hotel taxes, and rental car taxes, these are viewed as a means to
get tourists to help pay for the costs that they impose on local governments.
Similarly, electricity and transportation taxes may be levied by states and/or local
governments. Tolls, bus fares, and levies on the transportation of goods are often
used to finance transportation infrastructure in Australia, Canada, and the U.S.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
In addition to being a source of significant revenue, special excise taxes or
sales tax on beverage alcohol, transportation fuels, tobacco products, and
vehicles can play an important regulatory function. Special excise taxes can be
used as quasi-user fees, especially in the case of transportation fuels. They can
also be used to compensate the government for the added health care costs that
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consumers of beverage alcohol and tobacco put on the public sector. This
practice is already being used by the GoI and some of the states.
III.

Intergovernmental Transfer System
Generally speaking, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are used to correct

for vertical and horizontal imbalances, inter-jurisdictional spillovers, and promote
national objectives. Most federal countries, the U.S. appears to be the lone
exception, use equalisation grants to address horizontal fiscal disparities among
jurisdictions. All countries, the U.S. included, use special purpose grants of one
type or another to promote national priorities and address inter-jurisdictional
spillovers. Equalisation grants and special purpose transfers also help reduce
vertical imbalances or the mismatch between expenditure responsibilities and
own sources of revenues for sub-national governments. Often different forms of
revenue sharing, in themselves a type of transfer, are used to address vertical
imbalances. However, the only fail proof way to address vertical imbalances is to
provide sub-national governments with an adequate level of revenue autonomy.
In summary, a system of transfers is needed for many good reasons, but it can
easily be misused, and transfers are not a substitute for a healthy degree of tax
autonomy. We proceed with a discussion of international experience with transfer
dependency; then we discuss international experience with equalisation grants,
special purpose grants, and capital grants.
Issue 1:

High Transfer Dependency

The size of a country’s vertical imbalance is largely a function of
expenditure and revenue assignments. Generally speaking, central governments
retain control over the most productive tax bases because they have an inherent
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advantage in administering broad based taxes on income and consumption.
Consequently, it is common for there to be an imbalance between the
expenditure responsibilities of sub-national governments and their revenue
assignments. India is not unusual in this regard, however, high transfer
dependency may be contributing to fiscal profligacy among the States of India.
A.

International experience

1.
There is no best way to measure the vertical gap. One approximation is to
compute the percent of total expenditures of sub-national governments that are
not financed with own revenues: taxes and others sources of revenue over which
sub-national governments have discretion. An important caveat with this
approach is that the revenue statistics reflect actual receipts, and not the
potential yield of the assigned revenue autonomy to local governments. At any
rate, this measure indicates that countries like Canada and the U.S. have
relatively small vertical gaps; countries like Australia, India, and Russia have
larger ones.
2.
The smaller vertical gap in Canada, for example, can be attributed to the
fact that the Provinces of Canada have access to all the major broad-based
taxes: there are no constitutional rules on exclusive use of certain bases by
different levels of government. The provinces are also able to set their own rates.
Currently, provinces raise most of their funds from own-source revenues, and
overall federal transfers account for only 13 per cent of total revenues of the
provinces. However, transfer dependency varies greatly among the provinces,
from 10-12 per cent in the high-income provinces to nearly 40 per cent in the lowincome provinces.
3.
There is no consensus on the optimal vertical gap. On the one hand,
economic intuition suggests that allocative decisions are likely to be more
efficient if sub-national governments internalise the full costs of providing
services. The result of a greater reliance on own revenues, at least at the margin,
is greater accountability to local residents, improved creditworthiness, and so on.
The surest way to make sub-national governments internalise costs is to give
sub-national governments as much revenue autonomy as feasible and make
them responsible for raising the necessary revenue to fund services, especially
at the margin. Also the surest way to reduce vertical gaps is to assign subnational governments with adequate revenue autonomy. Brazil, Canada, and the
U.S. provide sub-national governments with considerable revenue autonomy. In
Brazil, increasing revenue autonomy and decreasing transfer dependency is
seen as an important means of fostering greater fiscal discipline among subnational governments. However, tax autonomy is not a sufficient condition for

India: Fiscal Condition of the States, International Experience,
and Options for Reform (Vol I).

51

reducing the vertical gap. Sub-national governments have to feel the need to use
the provided revenue autonomy. For this to happen, sub-national governments
need to operate under a hard budget constraint. For example, the conventional
vertical fiscal gap is quite pronounced in Spain despite the fact that sub-national
governments have been provided with substantial revenue autonomy. The
problem in Spain is that sub-national governments have been able to convince
the central government to increase their revenue sharing any time they have
needed more revenues; i.e., they have been operating under a soft budget
constraint. Elected officials, of course, find it much more attractive to receive
transfers than to tax their own constituencies.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
There is no consensus on the optimal vertical gap. On the one hand,
economic experience suggests that allocative decisions are likely to be more
efficient if sub-national governments internalise the full costs of providing
services. The surest way to make sub-national governments internalise costs is
to give sub-national governments as much revenue autonomy as feasible and
make them responsible for raising the necessary revenue to fund services,
especially at the margin.
2.
Tax autonomy is not a sufficient condition for reducing vertical imbalances.
Sub-national governments have to feel the need to use the assigned revenue
autonomy. For this to happen, sub-national governments need to operate under
a hard budget constraint.
Issue 2:

Lack of Adequate Equalisation

Requiring sub-national governments to rely too heavily on own revenues
to close vertical imbalances may give rise to economically and/or politically
unacceptable differences in the quality and quantity of critical social and
economic services among jurisdictions. However, a well-designed equalisation
grant is often used in many countries to reduce horizontal fiscal disparities
among sub-national governments arising from differences in expenditure needs
and fiscal capacity. However, in practice countries differ in how, and if, they use
measures of expenditure needs and/or fiscal capacity in their equalisation
formulae (See Tables II.3 and II.4).
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International experience

1.
Australia, Germany, and Russia have chosen to use equalisation grants to
close vertical imbalances and reduce horizontal fiscal disparities among subnational governments. Germany, in particular, achieves considerable uniformity
of service levels among the states, but German States have exhibited signs of
fiscal profligacy. In fact, Germany recently had to bailout two states that were in
fiscal distress. The initial signs of fiscal indiscipline are attributed to design flaws
in Germany’s intergovernmental fiscal system, specifically the combination of
high transfer dependency, high expenditure autonomy, low revenue autonomy,
extremely high levels of equalisation, and finally high borrowing autonomy of subnational governments. Like Germany, Australia also achieves a considerable
degree of uniformity in sub-national service levels; but, unlike Germany, the
States of Australia show no signs of fiscal profligacy. In fact, the States of
Australia are in outstanding financial condition. One reason may be a better
designed transfer system. Finally, Russia is making progress in fostering greater
fiscal discipline at the sub-national level. Australia and Russia show that transfer
dependency and equalisation need not give rise to fiscal profligacy, but the key
may be a well designed transfer system.
2.
In Australia, the gap between state own-revenue and spending is filled by
Commonwealth grants in the form of general purpose payments and specific
purpose payments (SPPs). The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC)
allocates transfers to the States of Australia based on a calculation of revenue
capacity and expenditure needs from comparisons of 18 revenue categories and
41 expenditure categories. Since 2000, the equalisation fund has been financed
by receipts from the central government’s GST. The transfers from this fund are
based on relativities or disabilities (differences in the costs of service provision,
higher incidence of dependent populations, etc.), which are used to achieve
greater horizontal equalisation. To put things another way, the equalisation
transfers are meant to provide the states with the means to achieve greater
uniformity of service levels, though there is no requirement that they actually
provide a uniform level of service delivery. The Australians are very keen on
making this distinction. More specifically, equalisation transfers provide states
with the means to provide uniform service levels, though there is no mandate that
they do so. In contrast, Germany creates mechanisms to ensure that resource
transfers have the intended result: more uniform service levels.
3.
In Brazil, the equalisation transfer represents a very large allocation of
resources. These include the State and Municipal Participation Funds (FPE and
FPM, respectively), which are funded from centrally collected income taxes and
the national VAT (IPI), with 21.5 and 22.5 per cent, respectively, going into these
funds in aggregate. The distribution of state participation funds (state share of
three major federal taxes) is based on a participation coefficient for each state.
The formula for calculating the participation coefficient is based primarily on
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equalisation or redistributive criteria. As a result, 85 per cent of the fund goes to
low-income jurisdictions in the North, Northeast, and West.
4.
The primary goal of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in the Canadian
system is to maintain minimum national standards in provincial-local public
services, thus compensating for vertical and horizontal imbalances between
provinces. Accordingly, unconditional block transfers are made to low-income
provinces to provide a minimum national standard of public services. The major
two are the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) and Equalisation
Transfer. While the equalisation programme focuses on horizontal imbalances,
the CHST is the primary means for closing the vertical fiscal gap. The
Equalisation Transfer is based exclusively on tax capacity: Canada does not take
into account differences in expenditure needs in the equalisation grant. As such,
the equalisation formula is based on the province’s tax base relative to the
national average, which provides an incentive to provinces to design policies that
affect the tax base to attract more equalisation transfers. The CHST is provided
to fund health, post-secondary education, and social services according to
provincial priorities. Equalisation transfers are under constitutional provision, and
they are aimed at reducing the horizontal imbalances among provinces; thus,
only the low-income provinces are eligible to receive them based on tax capacity.
5.
In Germany, the fiscal equalisation scheme is rather complex. We review
Germany’s transfer system in some detail in order to illustrate the potential perils
of too much of a good thing. Fiscal equalisation of tax receipts among the
German States proceeds in three stages. At the first stage up to 25 per cent of
the value-added tax receipts of the states is redistributed in favour of the states
which are endowed with relatively low-tax revenues on a per capita basis after
the primary tax allocation. Equalisation at the second stage is conditional on the
states’ revenue allocation after stage one, including half of its local government
revenues. For each state, the resulting revenues per capita are compared to
average revenues per capita. Revenues are redistributed from states whose
revenues per capita or ‘financial endowment’ exceed average per capita revenue
or ‘financial need’ to the states with revenue per capita below the average.8 For
contributing states, the surplus of financial endowment over financial needs is
transferred to the receiving states at a progressive rate which increases up to 80
per cent. At this stage the financially weaker states reach 95 per cent of their
‘financial needs.’ At the third stage of the horizontal equalisation system, the
fiscal endowment of the financially weaker states is lifted up to at least 99.5 per
cent of their ‘financial needs’ by supplementary grants of the federal government.
In addition, there are supplementary grants to compensate states for special
burdens: new states due to unification, small states to compensate for higher
administrative costs per capita, and western states to compensate for the fiscal
burden of unification. Finally, two states receive special supplementary transfers

8

The effective population is regarded as 35 per cent higher for than actual population for the
three city-states: Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin.
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as federal aid for their debt servicing obligations, which is discussed in greater
detail below.

Table II.3: Equalisation Goals and Allocation Factors
Goals
Factors
Expenditure needs indicators:
Population, school-aged
children, elderly, illiteracy,
poverty, infant mortality, and
Enable similar levels of
land area.
service affordability
OR

Enable similar levels of
fiscal resource availability

India
Italy
Spain

National expenditure standards
Fiscal capacity indicators:
Gross Regional Product per
capita.
Canada
OR
Representative revenue system.
Fiscal gap

Enable similar levels of
service at similar levels of
taxation

Country Examples

OR
Some other combination of need
and capacity

Australia, China
Germany, Japan,
Korea, Latvia,
Russia, and the
United Kingdom

Distribution on an equal
per capita basis

Population

Some transfers in
Canada, Ecuador,
England, Estonia,
Germany, and
Hungary.

Filling the budget gap

Transfer is the difference
between budget expenditures as
determined by norms and the
sum of own and shared
revenues.

Some countries of
the former Soviet
Union and Eastern
Europe

Source: Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004).

6.
The fiscal equalisation system in Germany produces rather strange
incentives. First, states that run a sound fiscal policy leading to an increase in the
tax base (tax rates are fixed by the federal government) lose a considerable
share of any additional tax revenue due to the fraternal (also known as “Robin
Hood”) rule for funding equalisation: contributions or negative transfers from
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states with excess fiscal capacity to states with weak fiscal capacity, as
discussed above. In fact, the highest marginal rate is 80 per cent. For individual
states, an additional DM 1 million in income tax receipts – either personal or
corporate – generates only between DM 80,000 and DM 290,000 in extra tax
revenue, depending on the state. The remainder is allocated to the Centre due to
revenue sharing, and the other states due to horizontal fiscal equalisation
transfers. Second, the fiscal equalisation system yields a substantial
redistribution of income in favour of the financially weaker states. For example, in
1996, the per capita tax revenues of the poorest states, including local
governments, amounted to 80.1 per cent of the average prior to redistribution.
After redistribution and supplementary transfers, it exceeded the average by 8.7
per cent. By design the horizontal fiscal equalisation system should leave the
ranking of the states by per capita revenues unchanged. After taking into account
special transfers, however, Germany’s transfer system changes the ranking of
states in terms of per capita revenues.9 For example, in 1996, the State of North
Rhine-Westphalia had the highest revenue per capita prior to redistribution (DM
5,132), excluding the City-State of Hamburg, but fell to 8th place after
redistribution (DM 4,753). The high marginal rate on additional revenue in
financially strong states and substantial redistribution through fiscal equalisation
kills any incentive for a state to run a growth oriented economic policy. Low rates
of tax auditing by the states, which administer the joint taxes, may also be
attributable to the fact that although they bear the cost of administration, only a
small fraction of additional tax revenues accrue to them, so that it hardly pays for
the individual states to strengthen audits. Indeed, tax competition, driven by the
political incentive to seek to increase employment, could take the form of
differential enforcement of the tax code by individual states.
8.
In the Russian Federation, the equalisation transfer (Fund for the Financial
Support for the Regions) is based on an index of expenditure needs which is
used to normalise or adjust per capita potential revenues. Potential revenues are
estimated using a modified representative revenue system. The formula assigns
equalising transfers to regions for which the normalised per capita potential
revenue falls below some threshold. Starting in 2005, the index of expenditure
needs is calculated as the weighted sum of three sub-indices for relative
differences in wages, housing, utility costs, and the price level. Each of the three
sub-indices is calculated as an additive and/or multiplicative aggregation of 3-4
different indicators. The current system does a decent job in preserving
incentives for tax effort at the regional level and for discouraging inefficient
expenditure policies, such as, hoarding unused infrastructure capacity, which had
been a problem in Russia in past years. After the practical elimination of ad hoc
non-budgeted transfers to the regions (known as “mutual settlements”), Russia
has considerably hardened the budget constraints of sub-national governments,
enhancing fiscally responsible behaviour.

9

Germany’s Supreme Court recently ruled unconstitutional any transfer system that changes the
rankings across the states in terms of resources per capita before and after the transfers.
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Table II.4.
Summary of Equalisation Arrangements in 6 Federal Countries
Since 2000, a stand-alone federal equalisation transfer is based on application
of relativities of expenditure needs (18 categories) and revenue capacity (41
categories). The size and source of the fund is based on revenues from the
Australia
centrally administered Goods and Services Tax (GST). The Commonwealth
Grants Commission is charged with designing the grant formula. There is a
body of state representatives that monitors the efficiency and efficacy of GCT
administration.
Distribution of state participation fund (state share of three major federal taxes)
is based on a participation coefficient for each state. The formula for
Brazil
calculating the participation coefficient is based on primarily on redistributive
criteria. As a result, 85 per cent of the fund goes to the low-income regions in
the North, Northeast, and West.
A stand-alone federal equalisation transfer is based on assessing provincial
revenue capacity in terms of 33 provincial tax and non-tax revenue sources
Canada
against a middle range five-province standard. This transfer is unconditional
and represents approximately 42 per cent of all transfers.
The equalisation transfer is primarily based on inter-state transfers (62 per
cent). High-income Länder contribute and low-income Länder draw according
Germany
to a formula; plus federal transfers (38 per cent) of 1.5 per cent of VAT
receipts; and the distribution of the VAT on a per capita basis also has an
equalising effect.
Equalisation transfer is based on normalised potential revenues. Revenues are
Russia
normalised according to three composite indices of expenditure need.
There is no generalised equalisation scheme. Some equalisation occurs from
United States
cumulative effect of provisions in specific federal grants-in-aid schemes as
approved by Congress.
Source: Watts (2004).

B.

Lessons for India

1.
An effective equalisation grant system is a key element in the design and
performance of a decentralised system. Providing sub-national governments with
revenue autonomy is only admissible if there is an equalisation system that
corrects for the differences in fiscal capacities across jurisdictions. Equalisation
formulae in general should attempt to equalise differences in fiscal capacity and
also disparities in expenditure needs. The definition and quantification of
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity must avoid the introduction of perverse
incentives in the equalisation formula, for example, to exercise low tax effort or
conduct inefficient expenditure policies.
2.
Equalisation grant systems should in general pursue the single objective
of achieving the desired level of equalisation taking into account all other
elements of the fiscal system (expenditure assignments, revenue assignments,
and other transfers). Other objectives should be pursued with different tools for
example, conditional grants.
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Centrally Sponsored Schemes Curb State Autonomy

Centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) are an important source of revenue
for the States of India, and they are justified on the same bases as conditional
grants are in other countries: addressing externalities, pursuing national
objectives, and so on. It is generally recognised, however, that there are too
many schemes in India. In other countries, the problems associated with the
proliferation of conditional grants generally has led to calls for (or effective)
simplification and consolidation into a much smaller number of block grants. In
India, in contrast, the trend has been in the opposite direction with a continued
growth in the number of schemes. These schemes provide a backdoor for the
federal government to micro-manage decisions that are ostensibly the
responsibility of the states. Thus, CSSs burden the administrative capacity of the
states and distort state decision-making and priorities. Furthermore, these
schemes blur the lines of responsibility, particularly in the minds of voters.
A.

International experience

1.
In Australia, the current system identifies over 120 separate specific
purpose payments (SPPs), many of which contain sub-programmes. Concerns
are raised about the efficiency of maintaining a large number of small SPPs, and
the involvement of the Commonwealth in determining priority areas where the
states have exclusive responsibility under the constitution.
2.
In Brazil, revenue is transferred to the states and municipalities by specific
purpose transfers. There are five types, and three of them have no horizontal
redistributive effects.10 The first two revenue transfers represent the centrally
collected taxes that the federal government gives back to the states as
devolution, or for taxes that could have been collected as compensation. In these
transfers, states are mainly compensated for the exemption of VAT from exports
(states receive 75 per cent and municipalities 25 per cent). The third type is an
intra-state redistribution of resources with criteria different than revenue
10

Horizontal redistribution refers to the purpose of equalising revenues of richer and poorer
states.
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collection capacity; thus they are horizontally neutral. Part of this transfer is the
Education Fund (FUNDEF), which is ICMS revenue sent to the federal
government and transferred to municipalities to invest in basic education and
teachers training. The last type of transfer is a federal grant to states and
municipalities for specific purposes. These discretionary transfers are not
regulated by law and have generally been negotiated between governments.
Thus, they are often provided to the most politically powerful and the wealthiest
states.
3.
In Canada, there is the Health and Social Transfer (CHST) scheme, which
may be likened to India’s CSSs. The CHST is a conditional transfer, as they
require that certain conditions be met. Any province is eligible to receive them,
and they allow the federal government to influence expenditure responsibilities
assigned to the provinces and outside the federal government’s constitutional
jurisdiction. There is ongoing debate on the future of the CHST. Provinces fund
the bulk of services from their revenues, and particularly face rising health care
costs. Yet, this is the area where the most stringent CHST standards apply, and
the only one with a financial penalty mechanism applicable to the use of
provincial user fees and the threat of withholding CHST for non-compliance.
4.
In the U.S., there are a plethora of federal-state conditional grants,
although their number has been greatly reduced in the last twenty years. These
grants influence the level and composition of spending by the recipient
governments, and they are the main mechanism by which federal and state
governments influence actions of lower level governments. There are federal
grants to states and cities for primary education, low income health care, housing
assistance for the poor, and so. Empirical research has found that matching
grants stimulate more spending than non-matching grants, suggesting that
intergovernmental transfers are important in determining the level and the mix of
public provision of goods and services in the U.S.11
5.
A large portion of federal grants are transferred to local governments
through the states, in addition to state own grants to local governments. While
there is no system in place to equalise fiscal capacity across states, horizontal
fiscal equalisation occurs only indirectly and partially via grant-in-aid
programmes. Conditional grants can be block grants for health, social services,
and other areas, while categorical grants require states to apply them to
particular narrower areas of expenditure. These categorical grants act as federal
mandates on the states receiving the federal assistance.
6.
The federal government uses these specific purpose grants, although
containing equalisation factors in their formulas, to ensure minimum standards of
service provision. The criteria of distribution include measures of need of the
community, capacity of providing services, cost of providing services, and tax
effort. The formulaes can be very simple or very complicated, but they are
11

See Craig and Inman (1982, 1986) and Stotsky (1991).
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generally related to population and per capita income. Formula grants include
matching and non-matching grants. Medicaid is the largest matching programme,
and its distribution varies across states. Although the federal government has
made efforts to decrease the number of grant programmes in the past, there are
still over 500 matching grants. Most of these grants are for education, social
services, health, transportation, pollution abatement, and regional development.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
The international trend is to streamline the number of special grants into a
small number of special purpose grants. In this manner the Centre does not over
burden the administrative capacity of sub-national governments or implicitly
assume responsibility for the competencies of sub-national governments.
2.
A smaller number of block grants also allow the Centre to establish a clear
set of national priorities, more easily monitor the disposition of the funds, and
gauge state progress in achieving goals.
3.
There is a growing practice of channelling funds outside the vertical
structures of the states and local bodies directly to parastatals and nongovernmental organisations. This practice weakens representative institutions
and should be avoided.
Issue 4:

Planning Commission’s Transfers Aggravate Fiscal Problems

The Planning Commission in India is charged with the responsibility of
enhancing productive public investments in the country. Increased public
investments can contribute to the growth of the country’s economy, the growth in
productivity of existing investments, or both. However, the Planning Commission,
under pressure from the Centre and State Governments, promotes increasing
public investments even though they may be fiscally unsustainable. As a result,
the Planning Commission pitches for higher 'Gross Budgetary Support' for plan,
irrespective of the level of national or state indebtedness. The inability of the
states to rein in revenue expenditure and an increasingly higher proportion of
revenue expenditure component of their plans has contributed to the states
running very high and persistent revenue deficits. This is aggravated by the
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selection of plan schemes for states by the Planning Commission. Increasingly,
most of the schemes financed from the central assistance recommended by the
Planning Commission are revenue expenditure schemes. A stage has come
where most of the borrowings undertaken by the states for plan are going for
funding the non-plan or revenue component of the plan schemes.
The central assistance released through the Planning Commission is also
in loan and grant form. The Gadgil formula 70-30 (10-90 in the case of special
category states) loan-grant transfers create incentives for the states to assume
debt in order to get the grant even though they otherwise may not have borrowed
the funds because of their very high debt levels and for other reasons. The
Planning Commission's development projects create budgetary obligations on
the states (debt service, maintenance and operation costs, and personnel costs)
that are many times now shifted to the non-plan side as the states in their
misconceived interest continue to treat these as plan expenditure, which
prevents the Finance Commission from taking these into account when they
make their recommendations.
The present process tends to generate low rates of return on investments
because there is a bias in favour of taking up new projects while projects that are
underway are not fully funded and allowed to languish and remain unfinished for
long periods of time. The longer periods for completion lower the rate of return on
projects. Besides, the states are under funding maintenance and the current
process does not provide any incentives to prevent this, which results in the
faster deterioration in public infrastructure, and further lowering the rate of return.
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Finally, the existing procedures allow the states to divert Planning Commission
loans to finance revenue deficits, which in part explains the decline in the share
of GSDP that is going to capital investment activities.
A.

International experience

1.
Capital transfers should address externalities across local governments,
assist with financing constraints for lumpy capital, ameliorate significantly
different infrastructure endowments when these are not the result of voluntary
decisions, and pursue sectoral objectives. Two major policy biases need to be
openly addressed. First, the belief by some central authorities that capital
expenditures are always more efficient than recurrent expenditures and second,
the lack of maintenance of existing infrastructure. Conditional matching grant
arrangements can help sub-national governments to take ownership and more
properly maintain infrastructure.
2.
Capital grants vary by the degree of flexibility in the use of the funds. They
can either be specific project-based grants, which tend to be closely administered
and monitored by line ministries, and categorical or block grants. Capital grants
also vary by the way funds are allocated. The approaches include ad hoc
decisions and negotiations, use of a pre-established formula, and competition
processes with defined application procedures. There is no single best approach
to the design of capital transfers, but non-transparent, highly detailed, and
discretionary procedures should be avoided. Formulas based on needs and
clients are often quite feasible. In Australia, for example, funding for school
buildings based on the number of students is available.
3.
Although a few countries use a loan and grant combination for the
implementation of capital grants, the vast majority of countries just use a grant
formula often accompanied by matching arrangements. Matching arrangements
can raise some liquidity problems for low income sub-national governments, but
the matching rate can also be adjusted for fiscal capacity.
4.
The institutional set up for the implementation of capital transfers varies
across countries, but there has been a significant trend to remove the
implementation of capital grants and capital budgeting from ministries of planning
or economy and to integrate them with the rest of the budget process in
ministries of finance. This has been an imperative result from the need to
coordinate all aspects of budgeting. Despite that trend, countries often retain the
vehicle of a PIP (Public Investment Programme) but integrated into a Medium
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) or multi-year budget that covers the entire
budget.
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B.

Lessons for India

1.
Although many countries make a distinction between development and
non-development budgets, most of these countries have done away with this
distinction. Very few countries classify their budgets into plan and non-plan as is
the practice in India.
2.

No federal country attaches a loan component to transfers.

IV.

Revenue Deficit and Debt
The States of India have been running persistent revenue deficits since

the mid-1980s. This has led to unsustainable debt accumulation and a growing
share of expenditures committed to debt service. Diverting Plan Commission
loans to cover revenue deficits has also led to a decline in the share of state
government resources available for investment in economic development and
social infrastructure. We turn now to a brief discussion of soft budget constraints
before turning to a discussion of international experience with a variety of
strategies for hardening sub-national budget constraints.
Issue 1:

Soft Budget Constraint

Sub-national governments may engage in unrestrained spending and
undisciplined borrowing when policy-makers fail to internalise the true resource
costs of government programmes. For example, financing sub-national
government through intergovernmental

transfers and loans

breaks the

Wicksellian link between the costs and benefits of government services.
Furthermore, sub-national governments may believe that the central government
will bail them out of a fiscal crisis. In which case, sub-national governments have
no incentive to restrain spending or control borrowing. Soft budget constraints, as
this set of problems is often called, typically arise when the intergovernmental
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fiscal system is characterised by high transfer dependency, low sub-national
revenue

autonomy,

high

sub-national

borrowing

autonomy,

and

weak

commitment to a no bailout policy by the central government.
Generally speaking, countries control sub-national borrowing through a
mix of rule-based controls, administrative controls, and market discipline. In
developing countries, fiscal rules are increasingly used as a key policy instrument
in fostering fiscal discipline. Such rules can be an effective policy instrument
when they are well-designed and strictly enforced (Braun and Tommasi, 2002).
Latin American countries, in particular, have recently implemented fiscal rules
both at the national and sub-national levels. Although their experience is not
sufficiently long to draw certain conclusions, preliminary evidence from these
countries suggest that fiscal rules may help overcome problems with coordinating
fiscal policy at different levels of government and improving budget management
and transparency (Webb, 2004). Now, we turn to an evaluation of strategies to
harden sub-national budget constraints.
A.

International experience

1.
Formal deficit and debt rules: The main examples of deficit and debt rules
come from the countries of the EU which are bound by the Maastricht Treaty and
the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).

Balanced budget or deficit rules:
(i)
Balance between government revenue and expenditure (i.e.,
prohibition on government borrowing), or limit on government
deficit as a proportion of GDP;
(ii)
Balance between structural (or cyclically adjusted) revenue and
expenditure, or limit on structural (or cyclically adjusted) deficit as a
proportion of GDP; and
(iii)
Balance between recurrent revenue and expenditures (i.e.,
borrowing permitted only to finance capital expenditure).
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Debt or reserve rules:
(i)
Limit on stock of gross (or net) government liabilities as a
proportion of GDP; and
(ii)
Target stock of reserves of extra budgetary contingency funds (e.g.,
social security funds) as a proportion of annual benefit payments.
2.
Facing a deteriorating budget balance and growing debt payments,
Argentina enacted a Fiscal Solvency Law in 1999. Besides aiming at achieving
budget balance by 2003, the law limited the growth of expenditures, stipulated
the adoption of plur-annual budgeting, created a countercyclical fiscal fund, and
implemented transparency measures regarding public finances. However, the
deficit ceilings for the non-financial public sector were broken every year. The
Fiscal Solvency Law was modified by the Budgetary Law in 2001, which relaxed
the deficit ceilings and extended the achievement of budget balance until 2005.
Given the strong constitutional rights of Argentina’s provinces, the law did not
include conditions for sub-national governments. However, it encouraged the
provinces to enact fiscal responsibility laws themselves. The long history of the
national government bailing out provincial governments in fiscal distress
emphasises the importance of provinces adopting fiscal responsibility laws.
Nevertheless, 10 out of 24 provinces have not passed a fiscal responsibility law,
including Buenos Aires and other large provinces representing over half of the
nation’s economy (Webb, 2004). In 2000, only 5 provinces that promised to
achieve budget balance by that time actually fulfilled their commitment. Argentina
has a long tradition of not respecting rules. In fact, 16 of 24 provinces have limits
on public borrowing in their constitutions; yet only 10 of the 16 provinces
complied with these limits in 2000. Many analysts believe that Argentina would
not have solved their fiscal problems, even with stronger enforcement of the
fiscal responsibility laws, given the weak institutional framework within which the
states are operating. They contend that the few provinces that passed their own
fiscal rules, the lack of compliance by those that passed them, and the
inadequate institutional design contributed to the inability of fiscal rules to foster
greater fiscal discipline among sub-national governments (Braunn and Tommasi,
2002; Webb, 2004).
3.
In Australia, the states do not have any rules that prohibit them from
running deficits. However, there is a broad political consensus that states should
maintain fiscal balance. Such gentlemen’s agreements provide the necessary
flexibility for the states to run deficits during hard times. In the U.S., in contrast,
state governments must compress expenditures and/or raise taxes during
economic recessions when arguably states should cut taxes and increase
expenditures on social services. On the other hand, it is generally agreed among
fiscal experts that macroeconomic stabilisation should be exclusively assigned to
the central government. In short, the issue of using fiscal policy for
macroeconomic stabilisation speaks to the need, especially in federal countries,
for the various levels of government to coordinate on fiscal policy.
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4.
During the 1980s, Australia prohibited sub-national governments from
accessing capital markets and centralised all loans through the Australian
Commonwealth’s Loan Council. This system of direct control was not effective as
states started to utilise semi-government or local government authorities to
effectively borrow on their behalf. In fact, some of the resulting loan funds
appeared as revenues in the consolidated accounts of the states, which is similar
to the situation with contingent liabilities among the States of India. This brought
about an increase in off-programme-borrowing activities at all levels of
government.
5.
The Loan Council was reconstituted in 1993, and operates largely under
voluntarily agreed upon arrangements rather than legislated provisions of the
earlier agreement. States are now able to operate with more flexibility by the
issuance of securities in their own name, and the greater reliance upon the
market has diminished the Council’s role and influence. Under the agreement,
the Commonwealth would not only cease borrowing on behalf of the states, but
the states would make accelerated sinking fund contributions such that all federal
debt outstanding to the states would be fully redeemed by 2005-06 (James,
1994). The Loan Council traditionally meets annually in March to consider a
jurisdiction’s Loan Council allocation nominations for the forthcoming year. As
part of these arrangements, the Loan Council considers these nominations,
having regard to each jurisdiction’s fiscal position and the macroeconomic
implications of the aggregate figure. The Loan Council Allocation is a headline
measure of a government’s call on financial markets.
6.
As part of the reform, jurisdictions are also required to improve the
frequency and openness of their financial reporting, not only to permit monitoring
of their financial activities but also to provide more reliable information to the
financial markets. For example, the State of Victoria requires that the State
Treasurer include a statement of risks in its annual and semi-annual budget
reviews presented to parliament and the public. This statement describes the
factors that could have a significant impact on the fiscal outcome of the state.
7.
Many states have greatly reduced their levels of general government net
debt over the past decade. Aggregate, general state government net debt is
forecast to be -1.7 per cent of GDP by 2006-07. An increasing number of states
are expected to be in a positive net financial asset position by 2006-07 (CoA,
2001).
8.
In Austria, the SGP requires that all levels agree to internally allocate the
Maastricht Treaty deficit limit. It also established proportional contribution of the
federal and state governments to sanction payment in case of an excessive
deficit. Local governments in a state would collectively share the responsibility for
the deficit, which would be deducted from their share of federal revenues. The
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monitoring and enforcement system includes fines subject to unanimous decision
of all interested parties.
9.
Brazil is an interesting case, which we describe in some detail. Brazil
enacted an FRL (2000) after a history of repeated fiscal crises and a long history
of the federal government bailing out sub-national governments. Brazil’s fiscal
responsibility law sets a general framework for budgetary planning, execution,
and reporting for the three levels of government, all under one law. The law calls
for sustaining the structural adjustment of public finances and constraining public
indebtedness. It comprises three basic rules: (1) general targets and limits for
selected fiscal indicators; (2) a corrective institutional mechanism in case of noncompliance; and (3) institutional sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, Brazil’s
fiscal responsibility law applies ex ante rules and legal penalties to enforce fiscal
prudence upon politically powerful governors.
10.
More specifically, Brazil’s fiscal responsibility law includes the following
provisions:
(i) Limits on spending: outlays on payroll (including social security
benefits, pensions, and payments to subcontractors) cannot exceed 50
per cent of net revenues of the federal government and 60 per cent in
the case of sub-national governments. Separate sub-ceilings apply to
personnel outlays in the executive, legislature, and the judiciary.
(ii) Ceilings on borrowing: the actual ratios are set by the Senate for each
level of government in a separate piece of legislation. The current
ceiling for expenditures on debt service is 13 per cent of total state and
municipal revenues. The net debt ceiling is 1.2 times net revenue for
local governments, and two times net revenue for state governments. If
local governments exceed this ceiling, they are obligated to repay the
portion above the ceiling within one year. Authorisation for sub-national
borrowing is required by the Senate, subject to prior technical approval
by the Central Bank. Borrowing is banned in the 180-day period before
the end of the incumbent’s mandate. The ban applies to all subnational jurisdictions, including the Federal District.
11.
Brazil’s fiscal responsibility law also requires multi-year budgets with
three-year targets for revenues, expenditures, and indebtedness. The law does
not set these limits. Rather, they are set by the Senate. However, it governs the
procedures for monitoring compliance and sanctioning of noncompliant
jurisdictions. Civil society participation is required in the budget process at all
levels of government. Additional provisions include ceilings for borrowing in
relation to the total capital expenditures approved by the budget law. Additional
ceilings are also required by the law, subject to complementary legislation on
debt service and outstanding debt stock in relation to revenues. The annual
budget of each sub-national government has to be consistent with its multi-year
budget plan and with the federal fiscal and monetary programme. Finally, debt
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and labour contracts in violation of the fiscal responsibility law are not legally
valid.
12.
There are five types of sanctions available for enforcement of the fiscal
responsibility law: mollifications, fines, impeachment, and prison terms. These
are provided in an accompanying Fiscal Criminal Law. The law has sanctions
both at the institutional and individual levels. A State that does not comply with
the law may be subject to limits on new credit operations, discretionary transfers,
and federal guarantees. These apply to jurisdictions that fail to comply with
personnel ceilings, debt ceilings, and transparency requirements. Nullifications
apply to contracts or administrative decisions that violate the fiscal responsibility
law, such as exceeding debt ceilings established by the Senate. At the individual
level, a government official may be subject to fines. For example, exceeding
mandated ceilings on borrowing or personnel expenditures may result in a fine
equal to 30 per cent of the annual salary of the responsible official. Other
violations may subject a governor or mayor to impeachment. He/she can also
lose the right to hold a public sector position for 5 years, and even be arrested
and fined. Such criminal sanctions apply to violations of debt ceilings. Any
violation of these laws, especially in regards to the hiring and firing of personnel,
can result in prison terms for periods ranging from 3 months to 4 years (Guardia
and Sonder, 2004).
13.
Despite all the important fiscal changes promoted in Brazil through the
Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), arguably one of the most important is the
prohibition against future bailouts of state and local governments by the Centre.
This strategy has forced sub-national governments into a fiscal consolidation
programme. According to the law, if debt repayment exceeds 13 per cent of net
revenue, state and local government finances must be balanced. After four years
of implementation, the FRL seems to have contributed to fiscal adjustment in
Brazil, as evidenced by declining debt and deficit ratios (Webb, 2004). By 2001,
only 21 out of 27 states are out of compliance with their deficit ratios, and most of
them have made major efforts to adjust their personnel expenditures, including
pensions. However, the pressure on the states to compress expenditures is
having a negative impact on infrastructure and social investments in some states
because of the high committed expenditures on personnel expenditures. Despite
these weaknesses, Brazil’s FRL is expected to increase fiscal prudence among
the states and municipalities.
14.
Countries that have adopted the euro have to commit themselves to
prudent fiscal policy. The Maastricht Treaty specifies that countries must keep
general government deficits within 3 per cent of GDP, except for exceptional and
temporary reasons, and gross general government debt must be below 60 per
cent of GDP. Countries joining the European Monetary Union with debt above
the threshold must first make substantial progress in reducing their debt.
Countries that violate the Maastricht Treaty ceilings may be subject to pecuniary
sanctions. Successive council regulations and resolutions have further
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strengthened the treaty by committing members to a fiscal position “close to
balance or in surplus” in the medium term and establishing monitoring
procedures (SGP). As part of the monitoring mechanism, countries must present
their fiscal policy plans each year for the subsequent 4 years to the Council of
Ministers of the European Union (ECOFIN). The council issues an opinion on
whether the plans are consistent with the SGP and with sound public finance.
These programmes contain only indicative targets and sometimes few specifics.
For instance, they may not specify how the path of the balance breaks down
between revenues and expenditures. In contrast with the Maastricht Treaty, there
is no process to sanction deviations from the “close to balance or in surplus”
target. Within the boundaries of both the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, a
country can set fiscal policy according to its own national framework. However,
the SGP has been under attack during the last two years because some large
countries (e.g., France and Germany) hope to get exceptions or to ease the
rules.
15.
In Germany, the Internal Stability Pact (ISP) reinforces the role of the
Financial Planning Council. The ISP specifies that all levels of government are
responsible for avoiding the excessive deficit procedures and proclaims the
overall aim of deficit reduction to meet the close-to-balance target. However,
there is a lack of sanctions for a government’s non-compliance with the Financial
Planning Council’s recommendations.
16.
In Italy, an ISP was introduced in 1999 requiring regional and local
governments to reduce their deficits and debt. The three-year total adjustment
was divided among the different levels of sub-national governments – regions,
provinces, and municipalities -- in proportion to their respective levels of total
expenditure. A previous ceiling of debt service payment not more than 25 per
cent of own revenues remained in place. Finally, it established that if Italy were
sanctioned under the Maastricht Treaty, fines would be levied on entities failing
to meet their targets.
17.
Mexico is a case of a federal country that has managed to achieve a
higher degree of sub-national fiscal discipline without resorting to fiscal
responsibility laws. The States of Mexico, as with sub-national governments in
Argentina, Australia, Canada, India and the U.S., have strong constitutionally
based guarantees of independence from central government control. These
constitutional guarantees prevent Mexico’s central government from imposing
top-down fiscal responsibility laws, as was done in Brazil for example. Thus,
Mexico uses financial sector regulations to achieve state-level fiscal discipline
and has issued public decrees regarding federal-level fiscal procedures which
are monitored through a politically autonomous congress (Webb, 2004).
18.
Following the financial crisis of 1995 and several episodes of sub-national
bailouts, Mexico passed legislation to limit bailouts of sub-national governments
by the national government. In 2000, the administration established ex ante
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market-based mechanisms in order to prevent excessive sub-national borrowing,
while at the same time, conveying credible no bailout signals.
19.
Mexico’s financial regulatory framework as it applies to state borrowing
has four key components: (i) elimination of discretionary transfers from the
federal government, at least those at the discretion of the executive; (ii)
elimination of the federal government’s role in securing debt with payments from
the revenue sharing arrangement, thus requiring the states and their creditors to
assume the financial risks for collateralisation of debt; (iii) sub-national debt is
subject to normal credit exposure ceilings limiting the extent of financial-sector
damage that can occur when a single state cannot meet its debt service
obligations, thus signalling that state debt must be evaluated on a similar basis
as other debt; and (iv) a bank’s capital-risk weighting of loans to sub-national
governments is linked to international ratings of creditworthiness, giving
commercial and development banks ex ante signals about the financial risk
borne by particular states.
20.
To the extent that it is enforceable, Mexico’s approach seems to provide
ex ante and ex post controls. Although Mexico does not have a top-down fiscal
responsibility law, state governments now have an incentive to make their
balance sheets and budgets attractive to credit rating agencies, lenders, and
voters. This is similar to the measures expected of an effective top-down fiscal
responsibility law. Even so, such features as transparency and medium-term
fiscal management of a fiscal responsibility law would benefit all levels of
government in Mexico.
21.
In Spain, the new Law on Budgetary Stability first implemented in 2003
requires that all levels of government formulate, approve, and execute a budget
in balance or in surplus. It also strengthens reporting requirements, especially at
the regional level.
22.
In the U.S., there are several different types of laws requiring balanced
budgets among the various states. Some states require that the governor submit
a balanced budget to the legislature; some states require the legislature to pass
a balanced budget; and some states require a balanced budget at the end of the
fiscal year. Those states that require ex post balance show greater fiscal
discipline and faster fiscal adjustment than those that only impose some form of
ex ante balance.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
Some countries impose fiscal discipline through the market; others impose
fiscal discipline through fiscal rules; and others combine market discipline and
fiscal rules. The advantage of market discipline is that self-interest compels
jurisdictions to comply and lenders to enforce discipline. However, market
discipline requires relatively sophisticated and well-regulated financial markets.
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Issue 2:

Sub-National Government Debt Bailouts

International experience shows that bailouts are often used to resolve
fiscal crises at the sub-national level. In fact, bailouts have occurred in developed
countries such as Australia, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden as well as
emerging countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
A.

International experience

1.
In Argentina, provincial authorities behaved as if they anticipated the ex
post assistance from national sources. Over-represented provinces have
benefited from irregular transfers, debt assumption by national government, and
exporting of overspending via provincially owned-banks (Wibbels, 2003). In
Brazil, states have relied on state owned banks for deficit financing where the
federal government has ultimately assumed the debt of failing banks. In
Germany, two states in fiscal crisis received transfers to reduce their debt
burdens. However, analysis shows that in the German case the states did not
reduce their debt; they simply increased expenditures in response to the transfer
of resources intended for debt relief. In Russia, the federal government rewards
the regions with the most vociferous separatist claims with preferential fiscal
agreements. Thus, examples of bailout in federations and the recent significant
reforms in the past decade suggest that addressing soft budget constraints is
indeed a challenge.
2.
According to analysis, bailout expectations can arise from a variety of
conditions such as lack of limits on borrowing, low revenue autonomy couped
with high expenditure autonomy, unclear allocation of spending responsibilities,
lack of rule-based grants, sub-national governments that are too weak or too
strong, undisciplined state political parties, and lack of central government
commitment to a no bailout policy (Lago-Peñas, 2004). The above show that
bailout cases are attributable to the lack of a well-designed intergovernmental
system and the need for a rule-based approach to enforce political discipline and
a credible no bailout law. Bailout expectations often create incentives for subnational governments to engage in profligate spending and borrowing in the
belief that in the event of a fiscal crisis, the central government will bail them out.
3.
One approach to bailout policy is to make the terms and conditions of a
bailout so onerous that sub-national governments will not pursue it, except in the
most difficult of circumstances. During the fiscal crisis in New York City in the
early 1980s, for example, an administrative board was appointed by the
Governor of New York. This administrative board had broad powers to make tax
and spending decisions on behalf of the state. In this manner, the State of New
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York, which guaranteed the debt of New York City (no bailout was given during
this episode) was able to guarantee that the City took the necessary steps to put
its fiscal house in order.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
Bailout expectations can arise from a variety of conditions, such as lack of
limits on borrowing, lack of revenue autonomy coupled with high expenditure
autonomy, unclear allocation of spending responsibilities, lack of rule-based
grants, sub-national governments that are too weak or too strong, undisciplined
state political parties, and lack of central government commitment to a no bailout
policy.
2.
An approach to bailout policy is to make the terms and conditions for a
bailout so onerous that sub-national governments will not pursue a bailout,
except in the most difficult of circumstances. This provides an opportunity for the
Centre to restructure state finances, through privatisation of state owned
enterprises, eliminating subsides, and other measures that are politically
unpopular at the state level.
V.

Economic Reforms
In many Indian States, the economic and financial performance of many

SOEs is poor, especially in the power and transportation sectors. These SOEs
often incur losses, and even when profitable the rates of returns are usually very
low. In addition, there is lack of commercial orientation, lack of competition, lack
of autonomy and accountability, low cost recovery, and the quality of services is
very poor. Although various state governments have initiated actions to establish
regulatory commissions in the power sector, the progress achieved so far is not
satisfactory.
Issue 1:

Poor Performance of State Owned Enterprises

Studies of SOEs in developing countries generally show similar issues as
those of India. There is a wide array of international experiences regarding SOE
reforms.
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International experience

1.
Governments have taken many actions to address the problems of SOEs,
including external environment reforms to provide the right incentives by
promoting competition and commercialisation; corporate governance;
restructuring of organisation and operations; some privatisation without changing
SOE ownership; and transferring of ownership through privatisation (Kennedy
and Jones, 2003).
2.
Tariff policies based on the principle of full cost recovery are a way to lead
towards commercialisation and prepare the ground for privatisation. Services
provided by SOEs (e.g., power, water, and transportation) should be
appropriately priced through user charges. In Argentina, for example, municipal
governments are restricted to imposing fees for services as their most important
source of revenue. In Australia, Canada, and the U.S., user charges and cost
recovery are used to finance all locally-provided services to identifiable agents
ranging from public utility charges to admission charges to recreational facilities
(Bird, 2001).
3.
International experience with corporatisation of functions calls for
establishing an appropriate governance structure, contracting out management,
and providing autonomy to exercise their managerial skills. Certain functions and
responsibilities have been transferred to generating companies, transmission
companies, and distribution companies in the case of the power sector.
4.
International experience shows that governments have moved control of
state enterprises to the private sector. The global wave of privatisation started in
the United Kingdom in 1979 with the privatisation of major state enterprises in
gas, petroleum, power, telecommunications, transportation, and water. Other
countries have emulated the British model of privatisation including Argentina,
Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and Spain. The U.K. offers
a case study of power industry restructuring, privatisation, and regulatory reform.
It was one of the first countries to embark on privatisation of its power utilities,
and a growing number of countries have privatised electricity or are currently
undertaking such efforts (e.g., Australia, Argentina, and Brazil).
5.
Privatisation among countries has taken many forms, including the
transfer of ownership of an SOE to private owners, public/private combination of
ownership and management, and contracting out certain functions. Evaluations
of privatisation of SOEs in Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and the U.K. indicate that
there are significant gains in efficiency.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
The States of India should evolve a reform programme keeping in mind
the specific characteristics and developmental needs of its power supply industry
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as well as the policies of the government. While such exercises are already
underway. For example Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, and Orissa have already
enacted legislation outlining a reform plan for their power sectors; other states
should also design reform programmes best suited to their requirements.
2.
As international experience suggests, states should take steps to
corporatise and commercialise generating companies, transmission companies,
and distribution companies so that they are able to operate on commercial
principles, generate the required fiscal resources, and ensure availability of
reasonably priced power. Various segments of the power sector should be run by
smaller, more manageable, and commercially oriented entities to prepare the
way for privatisation.
3.
In view of the urgent need to reduce transmission and distribution losses,
facilitate higher investments in system improvement, and ensure availability of
reliable power to consumers, reforms in the distribution sector need to be
initiated by establishing distribution companies in different regions of each state.
The entry of private investors should be encouraged, wherever, feasible.
4.
International experience shows that tariff rationalisation is a key element
of economic reform. Tariff rationalisation should be based on full cost recovery,
progressively reflecting the cost of supply, while safeguarding consumer interests
and reducing cross-subsidisation as well as encouraging competitive, efficient,
and economical use of resources.
VI.

Local Governments
International experience shows that most countries around the world, (i.e.,

developed, developing, transition, federal, unitary) are involved in some type of
decentralisation to local governments, or at least are considering it. The
fundamental reason is that these countries expect that decentralisation leads to a
closer match between services provided and the preferences and needs of
service beneficiaries or greater allocative efficiency. Decentralisation permits
localised information to be used in the decision-making process, thus increasing
efficiency and accountability of local decision-makers. The modalities for local
government decentralisation differ depending on the heterogeneity of the
populations, differences in regional economic situations, differences in the sizes
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of large urban areas and small rural areas, and different administrative
capacities.
Given the population size of many of India’s States, the general lack of
effective decentralisation to local bodies is a serious shortcoming of the current
system, affecting the quality and level of services and overall accountability in the
system. However, the task ahead will not be an easy one. Two states, Karnataka
and Kerala, have moved forward with decentralisation to local governments, but
their experiences suggest that there is still a long way to go before local bodies
are self-functioning (World Bank, 2004).
Issue 1:

Lack of Full Decentralisation at the Local Level

Although decentralisation is no panacea, the experience of many
countries shows that moving political, fiscal, and administrative decision-making
closer to the people achieves efficiency gains, improves service delivery, and
increases political accountability. However, there is no consensus on the degree
of autonomy that should be devolved to local governments. The answer lies in
finding the right balance between devolution of responsibilities according to
economies of scale, the internalisation of costs, and available administrative
capacity. The available evidence also shows that the gains from decentralisation
can be significantly enhanced by decentralising authority to the actual units in
charge of delivering public services, such as schools and hospitals.12
A.

International experience

1.
In most federal and unitary but decentralised countries, decentralisation
reaches local governments quite fully, with these entities having different degrees
of revenue autonomy and exclusive responsibility for an array of functions and
12

See Burki et al (1999).
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services. This status for local governments is the result of explicit legislation in
unitary decentralised countries. In the case of mature federal systems, such as
Australia, Canada, and the U.S., local governments are creations of the states or
provinces, and local governments are not even mentioned in their constitutions.
However, through traditions of self-governance and practice, local governments
in these countries have achieved significant levels of autonomy and selfgovernance. It also is important to note that in these countries, although states
define and govern the local level, federal governments still have direct
programmes for local governments. In the case of other federal countries, such
as Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, state governments have been reluctant to
decentralise to the local level, which in turn has led federal governments to
intervene. In Brazil, for example, the political drive for decentralisation led to the
1988 Constitution granting municipalities constitutional status as a third tier of
government with equivalent status as the states. At present, therefore, states
cannot compel or prohibit actions of municipalities within their jurisdictions. In
Russia, several laws in the late 1990s, and very definitely the Budget Code of
2002, structured in the law many of the relationships between regional and local
governments. While the Budget Code provides exclusive expenditure
assignments to local governments, the Tax Code of 2002 also provides separate
revenue assignments to local governments.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
The two approaches to achieving meaningful administrative and fiscal
decentralisation among federations are as follows: (i) a voluntary approach,
letting the states do it; and (ii) legally forcing the states to do it or otherwise
removing them from this task. India needs to re-assess whether the voluntary
approach now present in the constitution is actually working. Otherwise, a
mandatory approach may be required. Although some action has taken place in
states such as Karnataka and Kerala, the pace toward meaningful
decentralisation to local governments has been slow.
Issue 2:

Asymmetrical Fiscal and Administrative Decentralisation

Many countries recognise the diversity of local governments and their
variations in scale, tax bases, poverty levels, and administrative capacity.
Accordingly, some countries have taken an asymmetric approach to local
governments in terms of differentiating among them in assigning spending,
taxing, and borrowing authority as well as reporting requirements. Asymmetric
approaches to decentralisation are relevant to India because the argument is
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often used that local governments lack the capacity, in the many different
dimensions of this word, to take on more responsibility and autonomy for service
delivery. In reality, however, capacity varies widely among local governments of
India. International experience with asymmetric decentralisation, namely those of
Colombia, the Russian Federation, and Spain are reviewed next.
A.

International experience

1.
International experience in Latin America demonstrates that when
responsibilities are not explicitly differentiated according to effective
fiscal/management capacities, de facto differentiation takes place, often in ad hoc
chaotic ways (Giugale et al, 2000). When differentiating between local units
according to capacity, it is important to categorise local units explicitly while
concurrently establishing the standards to move from one category to another.
Colombia has introduced a process of certification for municipalities which not
only categorises but also stimulates regional and local governments to qualify
themselves to assume responsibilities in education and health. In order to be
certified, departments (states) are required to demonstrate to the national
government that it is capable of assuming the new responsibilities in health and
education, through required capabilities in planning, financing, monitoring, and
reporting capacity. After a department (state) is certified, its municipalities may
apply to the department for certification.
2.
The comprehensive review of Russia’s fiscal federalism undertaken by the
Kozak Commission in 2002-03 resulted in a set of legal changes which, among
other things, introduced a rather comprehensive set of asymmetrical designs for
sub-national governments. In particular, separate packages of functions were
assigned to each tier and type of local government (i.e., rural, urban).
3.
In Spain, there are also large asymmetries on the expenditure side. There
is a “large responsibility” group of five regions that are assigned many more
responsibilities that the general “small responsibility” group of regions. Over the
past two decades Spain has gradually increased the number of responsibilities to
the rest of the regions with the goal that at some point all communities would
develop the same capacities and take on the same responsibilities.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
Regarding symmetric and asymmetric approaches, the international
experience is mixed. Both approaches are successfully used. India should take
note of it for their circumstances.
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Expenditure Responsibilities for Local Governments

Setting appropriate expenditure assignments for each tier of government
is a crucial component in any decentralisation policy, since the design of the
other important pieces of the system, notably revenue, transfers, and borrowing,
depends on it. Both theory and international experience suggests that it is
important to specify expenditure responsibilities as clearly as possible in order to
enhance accountability and reduce unproductive overlap and duplication of
authority. International best practice shows that empowering communities and
even institutions in the delivery of services increases accountability. In the
education sector, for example, there is evidence that community managed
schools lower teacher absenteeism, as is the case of the EDUCO programme in
El Salvador and Nicaragua’s SBM (Sawada, 2002; King and Ozler, 1998).
Madhya Pradesh, where the para-teacher scheme has been more widely used,
has one of the lowest teacher absence rates (Kremer et al, 2004). Whether the
low absenteeism rate in Madhya Pradesh is attributable to the fact that parateachers are employed and monitored locally is still to be evaluated. However, an
evaluation of Community Based Primary Schooling Initiatives in Madhya Pradesh
have already proven successful at providing the critical immediate inputs that
contribute to universal primary schooling as well as an increase in enrolment and
retention rates (Shrivastava,1998).
A.

International experience

1.
Local governance in some federal countries is reinforced by institutions
that facilitate the involvement of civil society in the delivery of public services. For
example, in Canada, Local Boards are not-for-profit, community-based
organisations comprised of volunteers from business, labour, education, and
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community groups which support local governments in a variety of ways. Similar
institutions exist in the U.S.
2.
Highly decentralised and successful federal countries such as Canada
and the U.S. have taken years to reach their current responsibility distribution
across different levels of government. For example, most local governments in
the U.S. have been devolved functions in provision of education, health, and
roads as well as exclusive local services such as drinking water, waste
management, public transportation, police and fire services, parks, and the like.
As previously discussed, other federations have long dealt with instability and
controversy in the practice of decentralised systems especially due to unclear
competencies and expenditure obligations of different levels of government. The
principle lesson from these varied experiences being the importance of clearly
delineating the exclusive competencies of each government tier and in the case
of concurrent assignments clearly delineating each tier’s area of competency:
establishing policies, financing, service deliver, and so on.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
To take full advantage of the benefits associated with decentralisation,
local governments need to be empowered with their own exclusive expenditure
responsibilities and where concurrent responsibilities are needed, it is very
helpful to clarify the attributes of different levels of government over regulation,
financing, provision, and production of the public service. This could be
accomplished through a revision of the 11th and 12th Schedules of the
Constitution.
Issue 4:

Revenue Autonomy

International experience suggests that local governments are more
efficient and effective in implementing their responsibilities when they are also
responsible for raising the revenues that they spend.13
A.

International experience

1.
Most federal systems provide local governments with their own sources of
revenue, with autonomy to change at the margin, tax rates or other elements of
the structure of the tax. A tentative list of the most widely used local taxes across
countries would include property taxes, user charges, business license fees,
permits and excise taxes, motor vehicle taxation, income taxes, and sales taxes.
In countries such as the U.S., revenues collected from the property tax using
13

Many examples of this exist, but a striking one is provided in Jimenez and Paqueo (1996) for
local financing of education in the Philippines: primary schools that rely more heavily on local
sources are more accountable to their constituents and operate more efficiently.
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modern appraisal and billing techniques represent a major source of revenue for
local governments. In Brazil, the property tax represents a substantial source of
revenue, although its application is through simplified forms of mass appraisal,
using a few readily observable and measurable characteristics of each property.
A piggyback, flat-rate income tax is a tax instrument with considerable potential,
as the experience of Canada and the U.S. demonstrate as well as the experience
of Japan and many European countries.
2.
User charges and fees play an important role at the local level in mature
federations. For example, local user charges in Australia, Canada, and the U.S.
include highway tolls, public transportation charges, park and recreation charges,
water provision, charges and so on. Besides creating a Wicksellian connection
between the costs and benefits of service delivery, user fees improve cost
recovery and provide strong incentives for conservation, not wasting supply of
the service, particularly in the case of water provision.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
Greater revenue autonomy must be considered an important reform in
putting decentralisation to work at the local level in India. It will not be an easy
task, but the various lessons from international experience show that it can be
done. Brazil’s approach to property taxation (i.e., field surveys, use of a highly
simplified form of mass appraisal, and use of construction cost data) can be
implemented by rural and urban governments to address the current weaknesses
of the administration of the property tax system in India.
2.
An asymmetric approach can be explored as a means to allow major cities
and other local governments with more developed capacity to introduce
piggyback income taxes and other forms of local tax autonomy.
3.
User charges can be more often updated and more widely used as in
other countries for highway tolls, parks and recreation centres, and the like. Local
bodies should be empowered to establish user charges in order to increase
accountability at the margin and to improve cost recovery of these services.
Issue 5:

Intergovernmental Transfers to Local Governments

The design of transfers is of critical importance for efficiency and equity of
local service provision, autonomy, and fiscal health of local governments. As in
the case of state governments, a transfer system to local governments is
designed to address vertical and horizontal disparities and allow upper level
governments to address externalities and pursue policy objectives of their own
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interest through local government activities and budgets. The fact is that even in
mature federations such as Australia, Canada, and the U.S., local governments
rely heavily on transfers from federal and state governments.
A.

International experience

1.
An ideal transfer system to local governments entails a combination of
general-purpose and specific-purpose transfers, and the composition of this
combination depends on the service mix provided by local governments. Local
governments in other federations rely heavily on general purpose grants with
relatively few conditions. Often, formula-driven systems are used to equalise
horizontal fiscal disparities at the local level. In Australia, for example, general
purpose, recurrent grants to local governments are determined using a
discretionary growth factor each year. Canadian Provinces use different
formulaes: (i) some provinces recognise needs and fiscal capacity; (ii) others just
recognise tax base deficiencies, in some cases just on the basis of property
taxes; (iii) others do it by classes of municipalities, (e.g., urban and rural); (iv)
others equalise on the basis of a few expenditure categories (i.e., mandatory
expenditures such as police, fire, water and sewer, leaving out expenditures such
as parks, culture, and recreation; and (v) others include all expenditure
categories. The U.S. emphasises conditional or categorical grants more than
other federations, where money is distributed according to factors to measure the
needs of the community, capacity to provide public services, cost of providing
public services, and tax effort made by the community to provide public services.
2.
In Australia, local governments receive financial assistance and SPPs
from the Commonwealth to cover both recurrent and capital expenditures. They
are generally passed through the states on the basis of recommendations of
independent State Grants Commissions on the basis of fiscal equalisation. They
help local governments to meet the general cost of major areas of service
delivery, realise service outcomes for the community beyond those that could
otherwise be achieved through other revenues, and support special assistance to
targeted groups. In Canada, conditional transfers to local governments vary
across the country but are generally used mainly for social services (where there
is a local role), roads and transport, and water and sewers. Specific purpose
grants are used in other federations to pursue national policy objectives. In the
U.S., the federal government transfers conditional funds to local governments,
sometimes directly and other times through state budgets, for a wide variety of
programmes.
3.
In Brazil, tax-sharing is the main source of revenue at the local level. The
states now transfer to municipalities more than they receive from the federal
government through revenue sharing. As a result, municipalities have been the
main beneficiaries of the ongoing revenue reforms. The federal government now
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transfers funds to municipalities for education, which until recently had been
transferred to the state government. In the Russian Federation, regional-local
government transfers are through the assignment of discretionary
intergovernmental transfers (as “regulated” revenue sharing or subventions) or
through long-term entitlements of local governments to a fixed portion of the yield
from regional taxes to equalise disparities across their local governments.
B.

Lessons for India

1.
Transfers to local governments should be clear, transparent, and formula
based. It is possible for the states to create clear and transparent methodologies
for transferring funds to urban and rural local governments. The methodologies
should be simple and use available measures, such as population and property
taxation. With time, as data on reliable developmental indicators are compiled,
transfers could also be related to other proxies of revenue capacity and
expenditure need. Given the types of services that are provided at the local level
(i.e., water supply, sanitation, and streetlights) a simple formula with population
could be initially used.
Issue 6:

Borrowing Policies for Local Governments

International experience suggests that local borrowing has the potential to
generate significant benefits for local governments by allowing them to finance
public capital projects. However, local government access to credit markets is
riddled with potential moral hazard problems. In some cases, federal intervention
in the form of a bailout has been required even in mature federations, such as
Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the U.S. To curb the moral hazard problem, the
U.S. has introduced explicit bankruptcy procedures through financial control
boards.14
A.

International experience

1.
Countries rely on different approaches to control local borrowing, and in
some cases a variety of approaches is employed. A typology of approaches
follows:
(i)
14

Market discipline: In this type of control, higher level governments

Following he conditional bailouts of the 1930s, the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937
revised in 1988, remains the norm for conditional bailouts today in the U.S. (Inman, 2000).
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typically stay out of any direct involvement with local borrowing, and
instead the system relies on market forces to ensure that local debt is
managed, controlled, and disciplined. For this system to operate well
certain conditions are required, including: free and open financial
markets, easy availability of information on local debt and repayment
capacity, and no bailout expectations. Countries that rely on this
approach include Finland, France, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S..
Nevertheless, some of these conditions are often not met in developing
countries
(ii)

Direct administrative controls: Higher level governments directly control
the borrowing of local governments with limitations on debt, restrictions
on external borrowing, and approval of specific investment projects.
This approach is found in developed countries, such as Austria,
Canada, Ireland, Japan, Spain, U.K., and many developing countries,
such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, and Mexico.
The advantage is that higher level governments have a better handle
on coordinating the overall country debt, including external borrowings.
The disadvantage is that this strategy diminishes local government
autonomy to make investment decisions according to local
circumstances.

(iii)

Cooperative controls: Limitations on local borrowing are negotiated
between higher level governments and local governments. An
agreement is reached regarding overall deficit targets, revenue and
expenditure growth, and controls on local government debt. Examples
include developed countries, like Canada where municipalities are
bound by provincially set rules and processes of approval administered
directly by a provincial ministry or agency. However, this requires
effective cooperation and fiscal discipline. In the absence of
cooperation and fiscal discipline, this approach is unable to prevent
excessive debt, as the experiences of Brazil and Colombia
demonstrate.

(iv)

Rule-based control: Actions of local governments are prescribed in
various rules written in the constitution, law, or regulations. These may
establish limits on the level of allowable debt, limits on debt-service
capacity, stipulate limitations on the type of borrowing (e.g. capital
projects), and the like. This approach is transparent, and it treats all
local governments equally. However, it gives local governments an
incentive to devise schemes that attempt to avoid or evade the rules,
such as reclassifying current expenditures as capital expenditures,
creating off-budget agencies and even government-owned enterprises,
and relying on payment via arrears. Its success depends on the ability
to monitor compliance with the rules.
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Table II.5. Local Borrowing Restrictions in Different Countries
Type of Restrictions
Description
Country
Ceilings on (i) debts
Affordability
Argentina, Brazil, Italy,
service/local revenues; (ii)
Formulae
Japan, Spain,
debt service/local current
Colombia
saving
Indebtedness
Limit on outstanding debt/net
Formulae
revenue
Brazil, Colombia, Italy
"Golden Rule"
Borrowing for capital
Brazil, Canada, USA,
Provision
expenditures
South Africa, India
Local councils required to
Balanced Budget
pass
Brazil, Canada,
balanced budgets
Germany, USA
Local councils required to
Local Approval
approve
loans for individual projects
Canada, USA
Higher level government
"No bailout"
does not
Brazil, Colombia,
Provision
guarantee local debt
Mexico
Source: Weist (2002)

2.
International experience also suggests that sole reliance on one of these
controls may not be sufficient. For example, in the U.S., all local governments
require balanced budgets, but the effective borrowing constraint imposed by such
requirements, even when written into the state’s constitution, is often limited.
Often the requirement only applies to the budget, excluding social security and
capital spending; in some cases, the requirement only refers ex ante to the
formulated rather than the realised budget; and there may be other escape
clauses, including extra budgetary sources of funds. Effectively, therefore,
market discipline plays an important role in achieving borrowing discipline (TerMinassian and Craig, 1997). In Germany, the budget laws specify the conditions
under which sub-national borrowing can be undertaken. Local authority
borrowing is limited to cash flow needs and is subject to approval by the Länder
(state) authorities. In practice, there are weaknesses in both the formulation and
application of the Länder laws. The investment requirements are specified ex
ante rather than ex post and the interpretation of what constitutes investment is
flexible. Spain is another example where multiple approaches are used to control
local borrowing, including a market approach, legal rules, and cooperative
controls. In addition, MoF approval is generally required for domestic borrowing,
but there are some exceptions, including for those local authorities covered by
Autonomous Communities.
3.
Besides the problem of controlling the demand for borrowing funds by
local governments, there is often a problem with the supply of available funds for
lending to local governments. International experience considers two models of
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fund supply: the bank lending model of Western Europe, and the municipal bond
model of North America (ADB, 1998).

B.

(i)

Municipal bank lending: This approach is founded on three principles:
(i) municipal banks establish lasting and stable relationships with the
local government, which is helpful to small municipalities that need
assistance with project preparation, financing, and implementation; (ii)
municipal banks perform the function of delegated monitoring,
however, this may be inefficient, except in the case of a large loan; and
(iii) municipal bank operations are characterised by bundled services
and bundled pricing. In some cases where municipal banks have had
little or no history of relationship banking, financial deregulation has
forced them to lend like commercial banks, and municipalities are
constrained to accessing short-term loans.

(ii)

Municipal bond market: This model contrasts the three principles of the
previous model, as follows: (i) instead of a banking relationship, this
model is based on competition. Each bond is subject to competitive
bidding which results in large savings for large and established
municipal issuers. However, this is deficient in serving the lending
needs of smaller and inexperienced local governments. Although credit
pooling has proven to be partially successful in meeting the financing
needs of less creditworthy local governments, such as the state bond
banks found in the U.S., where a special state intermediary with a
superior credit rating raises funds through bond issuances and onlends to local governments by purchasing their bonds. (ii) The
municipal bond model is based on public monitoring as opposed to
delegated monitoring. The creditworthiness depends on the public
disclosure of municipal financial information. (iii) The bundled services
received from a municipal bond are typically unbundled in a municipal
bond market. Municipalities can decide to receive advisory services
from various institutions other than the municipal bank. These can be
purchased on the basis of a competitive bid thereby lowering project
costs.
Lessons for India

1.
International experience suggests that a rules-based approach to local
borrowing with effective controls is a good way to avoid moral hazard problems.
These rules should include at a minimum a balanced budget rule, golden rule,
statutory limit on borrowings, ceilings on debt, a credible no bailout rule, and
provisions for non-compliance. However, international experience also shows
that it may be a good idea to rely on more than one type of control. Thus, in
states where local governments fall behind on reporting and repayment capacity,
borrowing rules can be complemented by hierarchical controls. The experience in
Spain with asymmetrical decentralisation of borrowing authority suggests that in
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states where local governments have better public disclosure of financial
information, especially urban local governments, a municipal bond market could
be developed. In addition, the experience of failing municipalities in the U.S.
suggests that municipal bankruptcy laws may be a good way to further curb
moral hazard issues.
2.
On the supply side, both the bank lending model and the municipal bond
model could be promoted. In the long-run, however, as local governments
develop the public monitoring and disclosure practices required for efficient bond
market operations, the municipal bond market model could become more
prominent. The advantage of this second model is that it will endogenously
generate transparency in local government finances.
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SECTION III
OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF INDIA’S SUB-NATIONAL
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL SYSTEM
Overview
The fiscal deterioration and imbalance of sub-national governments and
sub-optimality and design issues with India’s intergovernmental fiscal system
have been reviewed in Section I of this report. In this section, the group offers a
discussion of credible and serious reform options to address these problems
taking on board international experience reviewed in Section II. In making our
recommendations, we have not been constrained by major structural limitations
usually associated with implementing reforms of this kind, such as Constitutional
limits, difficulties of administration, political acceptability, and the like. We further
believe that a successful reform of this magnitude will have to be a joint effort of
the states and the Centre. Designing such a reform will be a great challenge. The
structure of the recommendations follows the structure and order of presentation
of the two previous sections of this report.
Objectives of the Reform
There is no one magic simple way to optimally reform India’s
intergovernmental fiscal system. GoI should begin the reform process by
developing a policy stance on the overall goals of its intergovernmental reform.
The best intergovernmental fiscal reform for India will depend on a clear
statement of what government most wants to accomplish. As such a reform
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process should begin with a set of general goals or objectives. The group offers
the following five general reform objectives.
1. Improve the Quality of Public Services
The basic objective of fiscal reform by the States of India and reform of India’s
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system is to improve the quality of public
services offered to the people. Clearly, a major element of the problem is
inadequate resources at the sub-national level, including local governments. GoI
transfers to state governments have fallen over the past two decades as revenue
mobilisation at the State level has flagged. The TFC has called for an increase in
the tax to GDP ratio to 17.6 percent. While many Indian States are poor, the level
and quality of services delivered to the public with the available budgets are well
below where they ought to be with the money spent. There is much evidence of
inefficiencies in delivering services.
A large share of sub-national government budgets is spent on employee salaries,
pensions, and interest charges which are uncontrollable in any given year. Preemption of revenues on payment of these costs results in non-provision or under
provision of operation and maintenance costs, consumables, and the like, which
adversely affect the quality of public services. In part, this situation is a result of
past, unwise decisions that have come back to haunt the states. However, subnational governments are hamstrung by mandates, conditional grants, and
restrictions of various kinds on the pricing of publicly provided services. Nor can
they rely on broad-based taxes to mobilise much revenue from their own
sources. In short, they are unable to respond to the demands of their
constituents.
Another plausible explanation for the failure to deliver quality basic public
services is the failure fully to decentralise and empower local governments.
Rather than empowering communities to deal with their own problems, state
governments and the central government have created substitute institutions in
the form of specialised agencies for water provision, housing, and so on. These
parallel government institutions have served to further weaken development of
local governments and to reduce local government accountability.
Objective 1: The reform should strive to increase the level and quality of subnational public services by increasing the level of sub-national government
revenue mobilisation, provision of operation and maintenance costs and other
necessary costs, increasing the rate of cost recovery, and introducing policies
that guarantee more accountability of government officials for the quality of
service delivery.
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Impose Aggregate Fiscal Discipline on the States

Many States in India run large fiscal and revenue deficits. In some cases, these
deficits reach 50 per cent of the budget or even more, and revenue expenditures
are routinely financed through borrowing. Some states are beginning to bring
their revenue budgets into balance. However, there are no consequences to
fiscally prudent behaviour just as there are no consequences to fiscal
irresponsibility. In fact, irresponsible fiscal behaviour at the sub-national level is
facilitated, if not encouraged, by institutions and practices that impose a soft
budget constraint on sub-national governments and sometimes by perverse
incentives fostered by the transfer system.
Besides the macroeconomic issue of the long term sustainability of debt
accumulation by the public sector, the current arrangements for state financing
have introduced a “tragedy of the commons” problem leading to the inefficient
and wasteful use of scarce resources. This reform direction would be in keeping
with the recommendation of the TFC to reduce the level of debt as well as the
size of the recurrent deficit of the states.
Objective 2: The states should be fully accountable for their fiscal behaviour.
Consequently, the reform should impose a hard budget constraint and remove
any perverse incentives to irresponsible fiscal behaviour. This would force better
expenditure decisions, would likely result in a greater rate of revenue
mobilisation, and lead to lower revenue deficits. The reform package ought to be
structured to achieve this outcome.
3.

Extend Decentralisation to the Local Government Level

For the most part, the process of decentralisation in India has stopped at the
state level despite a constitutional imperative to push fiscal decision-making
down to the lowest level. Particularly, the rural local governments remain weak,
under financed, and lack administrative capacity. Urban local governments are
also under financed relative to their service delivery responsibilities and have too
little discretion in deciding their budgets. Some of the fundamental failures in
India’s intergovernmental system to deliver adequate levels of basic services to
the people can be traced to the absence of strong and accountable local
governments.15
Decentralisation in India currently translates into having intermediate level
governments, the states (many of which are very large), in charge of delivering
15

For example, many states have failed to provide adequate education services, among other
reasons, as we have seen, because a large share of school teachers fail to show up to work on a
daily basis. In many countries, part of the solution to this problem has proven to be empowering
local governments and even parents association to monitor performance and transferring budget
authority for compensation and hiring and firing employees to these local institutions.
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many local services. To realise the potential gains in efficiency and accountability
associated with moving government closer to the people, India will need to take
the next step of decentralising more fiscal powers to the local bodies. The TFC
recommends getting more resources in the hands of local governments but stops
short of recommending increased revenue raising powers.
Objective 3: The reform should be consistent with the spirit of the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional amendments and encourage and assist the states in developing a
workable system of local self-government. This will include the removal of overly
restrictive mandates, the pruning back of some of the state sponsored schemes,
the full funding of local government transfer entitlements, the granting of
exclusive expenditure responsibilities to local bodies, and the granting of some
degree of revenue raising powers to local bodies.
4.

Get the Intergovernmental System in Synch with the Economic Reforms

Since it was launched in 1991, India’s economic liberalisation has given the
private sector and the states much more discretion in shaping the flow of
investment. However, the states continue to occupy and run several commercial
services on a monopoly basis, such as the provision of electricity and bus
services. Still worse, some states have directed large amounts of their revenue
resources toward subsidising enterprises that are not self-sustaining, hence
exacerbating the weak fiscal position of the states. The absence of a commercial
orientation of the enterprises, with user charges set well below cost recovery
levels, and in some cases, an unwillingness on the part of the states to let loss
making enterprises fail or be sold off, has led to significant and recurring fiscal
losses at the state level. An objective of the intergovernmental reform must
include putting public enterprises producing merit goods on a self-sustaining
basis, divorcing others (mostly private goods producing) from the public sector,
and putting an end to the practice of financing their current account deficits with
revenues from state borrowing.
Objective 4: The reform should put the states in a position where they are
incentivised or forced to take more calculated decisions about continuing and/or
subsidising failing SOEs, or where they begin questioning the responsibility of
government for continuing subsidies, as for example, to the power sector. A key
to forcing state governments into taking a harder stance about what services
general revenues should finance is the imposition of a hard budget constraint.
Judging from history, problems such as inadequate public utility user charges will
not be legislated away as part of a general rate increase at the state level,
because there is not strong political will to support this policy. Possibly a hard
budget constraint will generate the political will to do so.
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Redesign the Institutions to Match the New Realities of Indian Federalism

An underlying objective of intergovernmental reform of the Indian federal system
will be to redesign institutions to match the intention to give state and local
governments more fiscal autonomy and requiring them to be more accountable
for their fiscal decisions. Institutions are difficult to move in most countries, and
India is no exception here, but some degree of institutional reform would appear
to be important.
A major component of institutional reform might be a rationalisation of the system
of intergovernmental transfers. At present, Centre-state transfers are based upon
recommendations of the Finance Commissions administered by the MoF and
Planning Commission allocations for both conditional and unconditional grants,
which are administered by line ministries (in the case of grants classified as state
plan assistance, releases are made by the MoF). These are programmes that are
not adequately coordinated, tend to have offsetting effects, and are not fully
transparent. There are now conditional grant programmes which encourage
economic and fiscal reforms, but still many programmes encourage sub-national
governments to behave in ways that are not consistent with the goals of a wellfunctioning, transparent, and incentive-compatible intergovernmental fiscal
system. This is a major area where institutional reform would seem necessary to
support a viable intergovernmental reform.
Objective 5: The reform should remove those institutional barriers to good
reforms and improve the overall level of coordination and directions for federal
policies. This will require, amongst others, re-examining the future role of the
Planning Commission and whether the Finance Commission should be a
permanent body.
Options for Reform
The challenges facing India’s decentralised system of finance run wide
and deep. Many of the key problems with the current system have their roots in
the design of the constitution and legal system. These problems will be difficult
but necessary to address. Other problems can be addressed through fine tuning
of current institutions and processes. Therefore, addressing sub-national
government fiscal imbalances and reforming the system of intergovernmental
fiscal relations needs to be developed at two different levels. At the first level, all
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aspects of the system are put on the table under the assumption that there will
be no restrictions on the types of reform that can be undertaken, including
reforms requiring changes to the constitution. At a second level, and perhaps as
a transition strategy, there are many changes that can be carried out to improve
the current system of decentralised finance within the framework provided by the
constitution and other fundamental laws.
I.

Expenditure Assignments and Policies
Introduction of several CSSs on subjects which are constitutionally the

responsibility of the states and incorporation of Panchayat Raj Institution (PRI)
and Urban Local Bodies’ Schedules in the Constitution, without granting
autonomous authority to these bodies has created tremendous role confusion.
This confusion over “who is responsible for what” is present at both the Centre–
state level and the state-local level. The central government has introduced
major schemes in sectors like agriculture, cooperatives, primary education, rural
roads, rural electrification, water supply, irrigation projects, police modernisation,
district administration, repair and rejuvenation of local tanks, land records,
agriculture records, and so on. More often than not, whenever a CSS gets
introduced in an area, the states stop or reduce financing of such expenditure
from their resources. Or, they start implementing a scheme as central funds
become available for that very purpose, when they may have never wanted the
scheme in the first place. As CSSs have central design, local priorities are lost
and all states start implementing the schemes with similar financing and
administrative arrangements. Whenever, such a CSS stops, the states are left
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with the liability of paying the salaries and wages of those employed for the
schemes. The National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP) of the present
government calls for closure of all CSSs, except those which represent large
national priorities.
We deal with segments of the problems offering some options for
consideration to clarify expenditure assignments, which would perhaps eliminate
role confusion and unnecessary duplication and inefficiency in public spending.
Issue 1: Concurrent List of Expenditure Assignments
The

concurrent

list

of

the

constitution

and

de-facto

concurrent

implementation on account of various CSSs weakens transparency and
accountability.
Option 1:
The Indian Constitution was framed with explicit division of
expenditure responsibilities, as part of exclusive executive and legislative powers
for Centre and states in the Seventh Schedule. However, over the years, the
concurrent list has expanded. Some entries in the Union List have been used to
over-ride roles assigned to states in the State List and gross use of Article 281
which allows the Centre to provide grants to anyone irrespective of the subject
have altered the clear division of competencies. Technological and economic
changes since 1950 have also necessitated a fresh look at these lists.
Accordingly, a thorough review of expenditure responsibilities, with each class of
expenditures unbundled by sub-function, wherever needed, could be carried out
for the division of Centre-state responsibilities and state-local division of
expenditure assignments. Insofar as possible, an exclusive list of expenditure
responsibilities should be assigned to each level of government, and the
concurrent list either eliminated or reduced to a minimum number. Exclusive
assignment of legislative and executive power should be further clarified in
specifying clearly in the law, passed under such authority, which level of
government has competence for each responsibility, for example, (i) regulating
and establishing norms for provision; (ii) financing the service; and (iii) actual
delivery of the service for each level of government that shares the responsibility.
Option 2:
Another option to clarify expenditure assignments could be to
review CSSs and Additional Central Assistance (ACA) schemes, which also has
been called upon by NCMP and simultaneously examine Article 281 afresh.
There are too many, duplicative and small CSSs and ACAs. The central
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government can first consider outlays under state plan assistance including ACA
schemes, CSSs, and grants under Finance Commission awards, as together
constituting the transfers from the Centre to the states, in conditional and
unconditional forms. The pool of this fund should be broadly divided into two
parts: unconditional and conditional block assistance. An option is to further
divide unconditional assistance into those for states and those for local bodies
and to divide conditional assistance in a similar manner. Only the conditional part
should be re-organised under ten major national programmes, adopted with the
consent of the states. These programmes can have a time-frame of at least five
years so that expenditure assignments there under are clearly understood for a
longer period of time by all concerned. Article 281 can be amended to stipulate
that the Centre would provide grant funding for subjects included in the State List
or Local List only upon such CSSs having been considered and approved by the
National Development Council (NDC). The states would then be exclusively
responsible for the subjects assigned to them.
Option 3:
Another option could be to create a national coordination
arrangement by strengthening the role of NDC for intergovernmental dialog and
coordination. Even with the most explicit and clear statement of expenditure
responsibilities, situations can be encountered in delivery of services. Rather
than including more and more detail and complexity in the law, this option can
provide a forum for effective coordination among agencies at different levels of
government that share a particular expenditure responsibility. Holding regular
meetings and providing information at all levels facilitate coordination for
clarifying an effective assignment of expenditure responsibilities. The practice of
allowing higher level governments to circumvent expenditure assignments with
backdoor arrangements - the “schemes” - should be discontinued. CSSs can
then be introduced and allowed only if the coordination forum agrees to it after
due examination and analysis.
It is recommended that the GoI make it mandatory that
Recommendation 1:
no new CSS can be introduced unless this is specifically approved by the NDC,
after a detailed proposal in this respect is placed before the public for discussion
and comment for a reasonable period of time. Similarly, cost-benefit analysis
should be done for each existing CSS and approval of NDC sought for the same.
It is further recommended that the existing CSS should be consolidated into a
small number of CSSs, reflecting major national priorities as conditional block
grants. All existing schemes must be subject to periodic evaluation for regarding
its continued relevance. Whichever existing CSS is not approved by the NDC,
funds equivalent to the average of the last three most recent years expenditure
on such CSS should be transferred to an unconditional block grant to be
distributed to the states. Options 1 and 2 should also be examined by an
appropriate commission or authority as well.

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

94

Issue 2:

Compression of Expenditures

Although the level and the economic composition of expenditures vary
considerably among the States of India, most states are running persistent
revenue deficits. As a result, they need to compress expenditures.
Option 1:
The GoI could encourage the states to pass balanced budget laws
and follow the golden rule for capital expenditures. To encourage the states to
pass such laws, the Centre can exercise its authority under Article 293 of
imposing borrowing ceilings and also incentivise it. Recommendations of the TFC
in this regard can be used with great effect by the central government to nudge
the states into enacting fiscal responsibility laws. To deal with the problem of
passing budgets with unrealistic forecasts of expenditures and revenues also
requires ex post budget balance. This also could include limiting pay increases to
government employees based on affordability.
Option 2:
The Centre and states could enter into a fiscal responsibility pact.
This pact could, for example, place ceilings on total debt, debt service payments,
wages, and subsidies as a percent of the revenue budget for both the Centre and
sub-national governments. In addition, floors as a percentage of revenues could
be placed on expenditures on education and health in order to maintain a certain
minimum standard in the face of expenditure compression. Monitoring
compliance with these norms should be assigned to an autonomous body in
order to insulate it from political influence in contrast to the practice in Brazil
where a political body is charged with enforcing the norms. The pact can provide
for developing a mechanism for reporting these data in a timely manner and
auditing the accounts to insure the quality of the information.
Option 3:
The states could come together under their own initiative, along the
lines of the VAT Empowered Committee, to coordinate on drafting and adopting
fiscal responsibility laws, sharing of resources, capital borrowing laws, and so on.
This collabourative arrangement can also discuss the borrowings of the states
and Centre as well as central institutions that currently lend to the states.
Option 4:
Leave it to the states to adopt fiscal responsibility laws on their
own, with the Centre exercising control only on borrowings by states to enforce a
hard budget constraint.
It is recommended that the GoI encourage the states to
Recommendation 2:
pass balanced budget laws and follow the golden rule for capital expenditures, by
using the leverage and incentives provided by the TFC and by exercising its
authority under Article 293 to impose borrowing ceilings. Fiscal responsibility
laws should have procedures and penalties that discourage the practice of
passing budgets with unrealistic forecasts of expenditures and revenues. This
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could include limiting pay increases to government employees based on
affordability, as mandated in the Financial Emergency provisions of the
Constitution of India.
Issue 3:

Pension Reform

The pension issue has severe implications for state finances and has
several dimensions: existing employees, new employees, and existing
pensioners. For existing pensioners, there are both wage and price indexation,
but no reforms are currently underway. For new employees, reforms have been
initiated by the central government with introduction of a DC scheme with eight
states following the lead of the Centre. For existing employees, there are very
little reforms, with only some states introducing some minor parametric changes.
The current pension obligations of the states are completely unassessed and
unfunded.
A.

New Employees

Option 1:
Some people argue that it is not appropriate to segregate and
introduce the DC scheme only for new employees. It is felt by such people that
the Centre and some states have been able to introduce this scheme for new
employees as their strength is very small. As the number of such employees
increase in number, there may be organised opposition from them on the ground
of unequal treatment. Accordingly, one option is to leave it as is for them also
and introduce pension reforms for all employees together.
Option 2:
The existing and new employees form two separate classes and
therefore they can be treated differently. While the governments are bound by
their contractual obligation to provide pensions as per the existing rules to
existing employees, there is no such obligation to new employees. The
demographic dynamics are very uncertain. Nor is there long term clarity about
the continuance of the public sector role in everything which governments do
today. Any Pay As You Go scheme runs the risk of under funding in such
situations. Leaving pension obligations to be entirely funded from the revenues of
future budgets is clearly unfair to future generations. A pure DC scheme takes
away the inter-generational equity issue and also protects budgets from unknown
dynamics. It is therefore advisable to adopt a pure DC scheme.
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Option 3:
A possible way to harmonise the interests of both individuals and
the State is to adopt a multi-pillar scheme. The new employees will get part of the
pension as a defined benefit and part would be funded out of individual accounts
based on defined contributions. This option sounds better emotionally, but it
leaves fiscal uncertainty to the extent of the DB scheme. However, if it is possible
to fund the defined DB pension on regular actuarial valuation, this can provide a
possible meeting ground.
B.

Existing Employees

Option 1:
Several retirement related benefits have been introduced for
employees over the last two to three decades. Initially to address the strains
caused by an expanding public sector and socialistic pattern of society and
subsequently as largesse by some of the Pay Commissions and weak
governments. Development of financial markets and savings-investment gaps in
the economy have also impacted several underlying assumptions, such as the
discount rate for pension commutations, percentage of commutation, and so on.
Providing leave encashment in a situation of surplus manpower does not make
much sense. Parametric aspects of the pension schemes for employees need to
be therefore revisited and rationalised. This would bring about some fiscal
benefits.
Option 2:
The other option is to convert the existing accrued rights of existing
pensioners into lump-sum investments and switch them over to a DC scheme for
the remaining period of their service like new employees. This would bring about
complete fiscal certainty and bring equity in treatment of existing as well as new
employees.
C.

Existing Pensioners

Option 1:
As pensions of such employees have crystallised, reworking them
on the basis of parametric changes would not be fair. However, pensioners in
India enjoy both wage and price indexation. There is no reason for wage
indexation to be provided to them. Their pensions should be protected in real
terms, which are ensured by price indexation. It would not be advisable to revise
their pensions on the basis of the pay revisions granted to existing employees.
Recommendation 3:
For new employees, the better course is to adopt a DC
scheme or a multi-pillar scheme with full set apart funding of defined benefits
based on yearly actuarial evaluation. For existing employees, the pension
obligations should be assessed and parametric changes, such as using a market
rate as the discount rate should be brought about. If a satisfactory assessment
of the accrued rights is done, it should be possible to require employees whose
term of service does not exceed a certain number of years to move over to the
DC scheme for the remaining term of their employment. For existing pensioners,
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there should be exclusively price indexation, and no further wage indexation
should be provided.
Issue 4:

Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises

Not only are the explicit subsidies a drain on state budgets, but the lack of
transparency in implicit subsidies and the contingent liabilities contribute to the
financial risks borne by the states. The issue of subsidies to SOEs needs to be
approached from the point of first ascertaining what kind of goods/services are
being provided by any particular SOE. There are many enterprises at the state
level which are providing pure private goods, which need not be provided at all
by the public sector. However, one has to structure the policy carefully for private
goods provided by the public sector if such public sector enterprises happen to
be operating under a monopoly situation. For example, all important highways
are nationalised by the states and only State Transport Undertakings can provide
bus services on such roads. Bus services are clearly a private good.
A.

Private Goods -- Natural Monopolies

Option 1:
Being private goods, there cannot be any justification to keep such
enterprises in the public sector, but the Government has to put in place a very
strong regulatory mechanism to ensure that private monopolists do not abuse
their monopoly power. Accordingly, India should continue with sectoral reforms,
especially in power and irrigation, to improve commercial discipline and move
ahead with privatisation of such entities, with strong regulatory mechanisms. In
short, the states should be encouraged to privatise such SOEs that are
producing private goods in monopoly situations and regulate them to prevent
unfair pricing policies.
B.

Private Goods -- Competitive Industries

Option 1:
Privatise profitable SOEs that are producing private goods in
competitive industries. In the case of loss-making SOEs, it is better to close them
down as long as private industry is providing such services/goods. In case, there
is no private provision of such goods/service for the time being, the Government
should encourage private players to provide such services and ensure that Public
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Sector Enterprises (PSEs) are managed efficiently and charge full cost recovery
as long as such PSEs have to continue.
C.

Public Goods

Option 1:
There is no alternative to public financing of public goods. The
Government should be concentrating on efficient management of such
enterprises and ensure delivery of quality services.
D.

Merit goods

Option 1:
In the case of merit goods, such as electricity to poor farmers,
primary education, and primary health services, there should be better targeting
of such subsidies. Accordingly, state budgets should clearly show the amount of
each subsidy, the intended beneficiaries, and the economic and/or social rational
for each subsidy. Bringing greater transparency to subsidies will provide the
necessary information for an informed debate about the efficacy of these
subsidies. This policy would have the added benefit of bringing greater
transparency to state and SOE relations and accounts.
Recommendation 4:
There should be transparency in the state of affairs of the
SOEs, which the GoI can help bring about. Privatise profitable SOEs that are
producing private goods in competitive industries. In the case of loss-making
SOEs, it is better to close them down as soon as private provision of such
services is ensured. In the meantime, such PSEs should be managed with full
cost recovery to prepare them for privatisation. There should be better targeting
of subsidies for PSEs providing merit services. Accordingly, state budgets should
clearly show the amount of each subsidy, the intended beneficiaries, and the
economic and/or social rational for each subsidy. There is no alternative to public
financing of public goods. The Government should be concentrating on efficient
management of such enterprises and ensuring delivery of quality services.
Issue 5:

Declining Expenditures on Capital Outlays

Capital outlays are declining as a share of GDP because state borrowings
are being diverted to finance persistent state revenue deficits.
Option 1:
Reform the fiscal laws to mandate the golden rule at all subnational levels so that borrowings are only used for capital investment purposes.
A golden rule can ensure that state governments do not borrow to finance
revenue deficits, and a fiscal responsibility law can set limits on committed
expenditures.
Option 2:
An expenditure management framework as in the U.K. ensures that
the quantity, quality, and stability of capital investment are not jeopardised by
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other rules. The DIS strategy of capital management could be applied at the local
level, thus providing local governments with more autonomy and flexibility in the
implementation of capital funds and an incentive to maintain and operate
according to established performance targets. Local bodies could determine their
own priorities for capital spending and manage the funds according to what they
judge to be the most cost effective and efficient way possible.
Option 3:
Expenditures on capital outlays could be protected by mandating
floor thresholds as a percentage of overall expenditures at the sub-national level
for public investment. Brazil’s experience with declining public capital
investments suggests that the design of fiscal rules or any attempt to implement
expenditure limits should include a floor threshold for public investments. In India,
similarly, public investments have declined because of the high commitment of
expenditures to wages, pensions, and interest. In India, a floor limit on capital
investment could be instituted as a budget policy or in the states’ fiscal
responsibility laws, aiming at ensuring that current expenditures or debt reduction
attempts do not sacrifice capital investments. However, this approach would limit
the discretion of sub-national governments.
Recommendation 5:
States should adopt the golden rule. Allow the states to
decide their capital expenditures. Do not limit the opportunities for creative
financing. Where the assets are revenue producing, the better course is to issue
revenue bonds or specific loan financing. In the case of non-revenue producing
projects, use of general obligation bonds should continue as at present.
II.

Revenue Assignments and Policies
A comparison of the intergovernmental fiscal system in India with the

major federal countries visited by the group calls for enhanced revenue raising
autonomy at the state and local levels. The following list of options is not a
complete package but presents components of a revamped and decentralised
federal financing system.
In Section I, we have described the complex and sub-optimal goods and
services tax regime in India. Section II documents the reforms in Australia from
2000 onwards which resulted in a fully harmonised integrated goods and
services tax system which provides a model for integrated goods and services
tax regime for India. Canada's experience in bringing excellent coordinated
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arrangement when both the Federal Government and provinces have jurisdiction
in levying taxes on goods and services shows that coordination can work when
different tiers of government have overlapping taxing powers. Brazil's experience
in running an origin-based VAT provides an opportunity to study the negative
consequences of such a regime.
A great deal of coordination work has been done in India by the
Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers in bringing about agreement
among most of the states on a 'uniform' VAT on goods in India. The Kelkar
Committee has proposed a national goods and services tax arrangement by
proposing to do away with central excise, service tax, and state sales taxes
which is very close to the Australian system. In the light of these experiences and
proposals in India, the following options emerge for India.
Issue 1:
Regime

Implementing a GST to Replace the Existing State Sales Tax

Option 1:
India could continue to move towards a 'uniform destination based
VAT on goods’ as a replacement of the state sales tax regimes. This would
require replacing the existing central sales tax by a prohibition on taxation of
inter-state sales by the origin states or zerorating inter-state sales; completing
the integration of Central VAT at manufacturing stage and service tax by
introducing a central goods and services tax law; accepting the
recommendations of the Kelkar Committee report; amending the Constitution if
required; and bringing about a national goods and service tax law, with
appropriate collection and sharing arrangements.
Option 2:
Institute separate state and central GSTs with concurrent taxation
on the destination basis. Such concurrent taxation in a federal country has been
modelled with a Clearinghouse arrangement, CVAT, and VIVAT basis. Except for
the limited experience with the Clearinghouse arrangement in Israel and the
West Bank and Gaza, these designs have not been attempted in any country to
the best of our knowledge. Alternatively, sub-national governments could apply
VAT on top of the central VAT on an origin basis.
Option 3:

The GoI could institute an exclusive, centrally administered GST,
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with specified proceeds shared as grants to the states. India could adopt either (i)
Australia’s approach by enacting a centrally administered VAT at a uniform rate
on a destination basis and use the revenues, in whole or part, to fund an
equalisation grant fund, or (ii) the approach used by Canada, Germany and
Spain of collecting the VAT centrally and distributing the funds across the states
according to population or estimates of shares in aggregate consumption.
Recommendation 6:
International experience suggests that a centralised
GST/VAT with a portion shared with the states based on a formula is the most
simple, prevalent, and successful model for indirect taxation. Given the
constitutional position and processes at work presently in India, however, it would
be advisable for all states to switch over to a uniform VAT using the platform
provided by the Empowered VAT Committee and for the Centre to fully integrate
manufacturing stage VAT and services tax into a Central GST, with the objective
of integrating the two in a national GST with a common tax base with both Centre
and the states levying taxation thereon along the lines suggested by the Kelkar
Report.
Issue 2:

Enhance Own-Source Tax Revenue of the States

Supposing

reform

of

indirect

goods

and

services

taxation

as

recommended above, there would still be a significant need to augment the tax
revenues of the states. Augmenting their revenue autonomy would have the
added benefit of helping the states to balance their revenue budgets, improve the
quality of public service offerings, and live under a hard budget constraint. So, we
consider below alternative approaches of augmenting the states own-tax revenue
raising autonomy.
A.

Other Tax Revenues

Option 1:
The states have several other sources of tax revenues like
transport taxation, agriculture income tax, stamp duty on conveyances,
professional tax, etc. However, these taxes are not being fully exploited even
though the states are running persistent revenue deficits. The states should be
encouraged to use their existing taxes optimally; achieving that goal will depend
to a large extent on imposing a hard budget constraint on the states. In addition,
the GoI can help in reforms of these taxes as well as enhancing their revenue
yields.
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Option 2:
Realign some of the taxes, which have wider economic implications
for their effect on the production of goods, services, and financial market
efficiency, such as stamp duty. The Centre could follow the Australian example
by bringing about a compensation scheme to encourage the states to shed these
taxes. For example, these taxes could be designed and administered centrally,
and the states could be compensated for the resulting revenue loss by increasing
resource transfers from the Centre in an offsetting amount or by providing
adequate substitute tax instruments to the states.
B.

Enhanced Revenue Autonomy

Option 1:
With goods and services taxation moving in the direction of a
national GST, the states are necessarily foregoing their revenue autonomy for a
major source of their tax revenues. The time has come to think of improving the
revenue autonomy of state governments by allowing them to tax personal
income, but not corporate income. An optimal way to do this is through a
piggyback personal income tax, where the states basically use the same base as
the Union’s personal income tax but choose a flat rate between a minimum and a
maximum set in the federal law. Tax proceeds of such additional tax would
accrue only to the states which levy such taxes. Increasing the revenue
autonomy of the states in this manner would also correct the lack of efficiency
aspect of current tax sharing arrangements between GoI and the states.
Option 2:
A certain part of the personal income taxes could be shared with
the States according to the origin principle. This would give the states a stake in
the collection of personal income tax in their states.
Option 3:
The states could be encouraged to levy and collect special excises
and VAT on beverage alcohol, transportation fuels, and tobacco products.
Several states are doing so in India by levying additional sales tax on
transportation fuels and special excise on alcohol.
C.

Modernisation of Tax Administration

Option 1:
States, with the assistance of programmes sponsored by the
Centre and bilateral and multilateral donors, could begin upgrading the
administration of their revenue collection systems in order to make better use of
the revenue autonomy they already have and the autonomy they may get in
future.
The states may not be fully using available taxing
Recommendation 7:
authority because available tax assignments are poorly conceived. In addition,
the lack of a hard budget constraint undermines the incentives for the states to
utilise their own tax revenue raising authority more fully. The GoI also should
examine the taxing powers of the states in terms of revenue sufficiency.
However, this examination must take place in the light of analysis of the desired
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vertical gap and the transfer system. The states should be encouraged to use
their existing taxes optimally. The GoI can help in reforms of these taxes as well
as enhancing their yields. An optimal way to enhance the revenue autonomy of
the states is through a piggyback personal income tax. The states would use the
same base as the Union’s personal income tax, but each state would choose a
flat rate between a minimum and maximum set in the federal law. Tax proceeds
of such additional tax would accrue only to states which levy such taxes. This
would also correct the 'lack of efficiency' aspect of the current tax sharing
arrangement between GoI and the states. It also should be possible to refer the
issue of allowing states to levy additional income tax on personal income taxes to
the next Finance Commission. States, with the assistance of programmes
sponsored by the Centre and bilateral and multilateral donors, could begin
upgrading the administration of their revenue collection systems in order to make
better use of their existing revenue autonomy and the autonomy they may get in
future
Issue 3:

Weak Administration of the Property Tax

The property tax is not being adequately exploited as a source of subnational revenues. The property tax is a notoriously difficult tax to administer and
often meets with considerable resistance from taxpayers. However, a property
tax is the ideal tax for local bodies as there is a very clear link between property
taxation and the services provided by the local bodies. The link may be
weakened when the property tax is administered by the states. To the extent that
the States of India have retained complete responsibility for all aspects of the
administration of the property tax, India is out of step with current international
best practice.
Option 1:
The best choice is to empower local governments with the
development of a modern real estate property tax, with an updated fiscal
cadastre, fair and efficient valuation or appraisal methods, and a fair and
transparent administration of the tax, including efficient appeals procedures. For
those local governments with weaker administrative capacity some of the
administrative functions, such as updating the fiscal cadastre, could be entrusted
to the state government. It would be advisable to amend the Constitution to
confer this taxation power along with power to levy professional taxes to local
bodies. Within the broad regime of unit area method or some other objective
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basis, the local bodies should be able to decide on the rates to be charged and
should collect and appropriate these taxes.
Recommendation 8:
It is recommended that the authority to levy and
administer the property tax be truly decentralised to local bodies. The cities and
rural areas should be assisted in developing the capacity to develop and
administer a modern real estate tax. The GoI and the states should provide
technical assistance, especially to rural local bodies, to improve administration of
a simplified property tax.
Issue 4:

Greater Exploitation of Non-Tax Revenues

Inadequate user charges are being levied for the private and merit goods
delivered by the Government. Likewise, the investments made by state
governments are not yielding meaningful returns. It is very important that
departmental commercial enterprises run by the Government like bus services,
electricity, and irrigation yield returns.
It is recommended that the states be encouraged to do a
Recommendation 9:
critical analysis of all merit and private goods delivered by them departmentally
and the present rate of recoveries for such services. The states should then take
up a well designed and publicly shared programme to manage the costs of
delivering these services and levy user charges at appropriate levels and
gradually close the cost-recovery gap. Similarly, the states should critically
examine the returns accruing to them from their investments. Investments must
be made to perform and yield market returns, privatised, or written off.
III.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are used to correct for vertical and

horizontal imbalances, inter-jurisdictional spillovers, and promote national
objectives. As such, a system of transfers is needed for many good reasons, but
they can easily create perverse incentives, and they are not a substitute for a
healthy degree of tax autonomy.
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Lack of adequate equalisation

Although India has an equalisation system, the formula mixes too many
objectives, does not distinguish well between fiscal capacity and expenditure
needs, and creates negative incentives for the states. The current equalisation
system needs to be overhauled. Various mechanisms are used in India in an
attempt to cover vertical and horizontal imbalances, most important of these are
tax sharing by Finance Commission, grants from the Finance Commission, and
NCA from the Planning Commission. The tax sharing formula for horizontal
distribution to the states takes several equity principles into consideration like
income (distance method), land area, and so on. There is no clear and
demonstrable link between fiscal capacity and expenditure needs, and the
distribution of shared taxes. Finance Commission grants like revenue deficit
grants are supposedly based on assessment of the fiscal needs and fiscal
capacity on normative bases. However, these computations are never shared
with the public, and there is a resulting lack of transparency.

The TFC has

sought to introduce explicit equalisation principles in a limited way in
recommending education and health grants. The Planning Commission's NCA,
distributed according to the Gadgil formula, is the least equalising. It is therefore
necessary to re-examine all the unconditional block grants, tax sharing included,
and to treat them as a single large pool of equalisation grants.
Option 1:
The objective of equalisation could be exclusively pursued by an
equalisation grant system, which would distribute a pool of equalisation funds via
a formula based on the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity
of the states. This equalisation grant system, should be designed, reviewed, and
recommended by Finance Commissions every five years and implemented by
the MoF. The pool of funds could be fixed by formula as a percent of general
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government revenues, or it could be fixed in an ad hoc manner every five years.
However, the latter is generally less desirable. The formula used for the
distribution of the equalisation funds would capture the gap between estimated
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. Those states with a negative fiscal gap
would not receive equalisation grants, and the available funds would be
distributed to each state with a positive fiscal gap in proportion; for example, to
that state’s share in the total sum of positive fiscal gaps. Other options are
available for the final distribution of available funds, for example, by bringing up
the worse off states to minimum desired disparity level. Expenditure needs could
be based either on a weighted index of proxies for needs including population,
poverty, and population profiles (school age and the elderly), and so on.
Alternatively, they could be based on a set of financial per capita norms for the
main expenditure responsibilities of the states. The fiscal capacity measure could
be based on a representative revenue system methodology that captures the
revenue potential of the state from the taxes assigned to them and their
respective tax bases.
Recommendation 10: Equalisation should be exclusively pursued by an
improved and explicitly dedicated equalisation grant system by merging the
present tax share, Finance Commission’s grants, and Planning Commission’s
NCA. The equalisation grant will be funded by a stable formula as a share of
dedicated central government revenues. The measurement of expenditure needs
would be based on a weighted index of need proxies, and fiscal capacity would
be measured by a modified representative revenue system that takes into
account the revenue potential of the taxes assigned to the states. The Finance
Commission should be entrusted with this job, and the MoF would be responsible
for implementation. It may be necessary to make the Finance Commission a
regular body in order to implement this recommendation.
Issue 2:

Centrally Sponsored Schemes

As far as conditional grants, normally referred to as CSSs and ACA
schemes, are concerned, the MoF provides the envelopes; the Planning
Commission allocates the same amongst various ministries and schemes; and
the respective ministries implement them. According to international experience,
no autonomous body is responsible for conditional grants. Although CSSs are an
important source of revenue for the States of India, these schemes burden the
administrative capacity of the states and provide a backdoor for the federal
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government to micro-manage decisions that are ostensibly the responsibility of
the states.
Option 1:
A simplified, rationalised, and streamlined (very few in numbers) set
of block grants could be established to replace the existing central schemes. This
also has been called for by the NCMP. As such, these conditional grants would
be distributed as specific purpose grants, with very few rules and mandates, by
the Union’s line ministries. These would be very different from the current
scheme-based programmes in that they would be fully administered by the
recipient sub-national government, with some discretion as defined by the
specific nature of the transfer. These programmes would be restricted to support
those functions where increased state and local government spending are
viewed as being in the national interest (i.e., improved fiscal management, tax
administration, and restructuring the finances of SOEs, improving social service
delivery, and the like).
Recommendation 11: The existing CSSs should be rationalised and simplified
into a small number of specific purpose conditional grants. The Centre should
indicate the broad mandate and objective of these grants, rather than issuing
detailed guidelines which micro-manages state affairs and uses a one size fits all
approach among the states, with different on the ground realities. The states
should be free to design their programmes and projects with the grant consistent
with the objectives of the grant. The Centre should focus on evaluating the
efficacy of these state programmes and projects as well as the sufficiency and
timeliness of funding.
Issue 3:

Planning Commission’s Loan Grants Create Distorting
Incentives

The state plan schemes are substantially loan funded, even when the
programme and project is not meant to create any capital assets. This results in
severe fiscal problems for the states. The Gadgil formula 70-30 (10-90 in the
case of special category states) loan-grant transfers create incentives for states
to assume debt in order to get the grant even though they otherwise may not
have borrowed the funds for such a purpose because of their very high debt
levels and for other reasons.
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The distinction between plan and non-plan is also no longer relevant and
could be dropped in favour of a formula-based allocation of capital grants. More
specifically, the GoI could create a set of conditional matching grants for capital
infrastructure purposes based on viability gap analysis, without any borrowing
component, distributed to the states according to a formula based on population,
land area, and an index of infrastructure deprivation. These transfers could be
administered by the Planning Commission or the MoF.
Recommendation 12: GoI should establish conditional matching grants for
capital infrastructure purposes, after assessing the viability gap by way of grants,
(i.e. without any borrowing component). These grants would be distributed to the
states according to a formula based on population, land area, and an index of
infrastructure deprivation. These transfers could be administered by the MoF.
Issue 4:

Coordination between the Finance and Planning Commissions

The Planning Commission's development projects create budgetary
obligations for the states (i.e., debt service, maintenance and operation costs,
and personnel costs) that the Finance Commission may or may not take into
account when they make their transfer recommendations.
Option 1:
The intergovernmental transfer functions of the Finance
Commission and the Planning Commission could be merged into a single
autonomous body.
Option 2:
In light of the economic and intergovernmental fiscal reforms
underway in India, the role of the Planning Commission could be re-focused.
More specifically, the distribution of block grants by the Planning Commission in
the form of NCA could be transferred to the Finance Commission. Additional
Central Assistance schemes, being very similar to the CSSs, could be integrated
with the CSSs. The Planning Commission's resource allocation role could be
limited to CSSs. The Planning Commission could concentrate on appraisal,
evaluation, and monitoring of these programmes.
The Planning Commission should be given a new set
Recommendation 13:
of responsibilities that is consistent with the economic and intergovernmental
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reforms underway in India. These new responsibilities should include appraisal,
evaluation, and monitoring of the programmes and schemes; evaluating the
creditworthiness of the states; and reporting to the nation about the success or
failure of the projects. The distribution of block grants by the Planning
Commission in the form of NCA should be transferred to the Finance
Commission.
IV.
Revenue Deficit and Debt
The States of India have been running persistent revenue deficits since
the mid-1980s. This has led to unsustainable debt accumulation and a growing
share of expenditures committed to debt service. Diverting Planning Commission
loans to cover revenue deficits has also led to a decline in the share of state
government resources available for investment in economic development and
social infrastructure. A fundamental reason behind this fiscally irresponsible
behaviour is the existence of soft budget constraints.
Issue 1:

Soft Budget Constraint

Soft budget constrains typically arise when there is a high vertical gap, low
sub-national revenue autonomy, high sub-national borrowing autonomy, and a
history of debt forgiveness by the central government. In India, soft budget
constraint

has

been

institutionalised

by

central

government

providing

autonomous borrowing through small savings, lending by the Centre to the
states, lending by the GoI owned institutions to the states without insistence on
debt servicing capacity, ways and means advances from the Reserve Bank of
India and MoF and the like. Neither the Centre, nor the states, passed any law
placing limits on their borrowing as envisaged in the Constitution of India. GoI
has been providing substantial loan funding knowing fully well that the states are
using the same for funding their revenue deficits. GoI in 2003 decided to adopt
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afiscal responsibility law. Some states have also done so. Now, the TFC has
recommended a fiscal responsibility law that places statutory limits on both
revenue deficits and fiscal deficits. The soft budget constraint have resulted into
enormous build up for loans and other liabilities of the states. The financing
framework of the states now needs to be brought within a regime of hard budget
constraints.
Option 1:
Either through the creation of a federal-state pact resulting in a
federal budget code and/or the adoption of “Fiscal Responsibility Acts” by all
states independently, borrowing practices should be brought under control by
imposing the golden rule (state borrowing can only be used to finance capital
investment spending) and ceilings of total debt and debt service payments as a
percent of the revenue budget. Overseeing and enforcing these provisions may
require personal liabilities and prosecution under federal laws of state
government officials, as in Brazil. Monitoring compliance with these norms should
be assigned to an autonomous body in order to insulate it from political influence,
in contrast to the practice in Brazil. The Union Government must also assist in
developing a mechanism for reporting these data in a timely manner and auditing
the state accounts to insure the quality of the information provided by the states.
Option 2:
The Centre could impose strict control and limits on state borrowing
using its authority under Article 293(3) and disband providing loans from Union
sources. State borrowing could be based on creditworthiness rather than need or
an artificial sense of no-default. The Centre could take measures to eliminate any
form of inter-budgetary payment arrears, and prohibit state governments from
borrowing from public enterprises of any sort. The Centre could require the states
to maintain at arms length the operation of existing public enterprises. The
Centre could require the inclusion of all contingent liabilities as part of the
published quasi-fiscal deficit. The failure to repay debt as scheduled should carry
significant consequences.
Option 3:
Borrowing sources could be streamlined and borrowing limits reimposed. All borrowing from special sources (required holdings of state
government bonds by commercial banks, borrowing from pension funds, and
shares of rural small savings, etc.) are examples of financial repression and
should be phased out in a pre-announced manner over a two or three year
period. Over the longer term, there should be a plan to phase-out all Union
Government lending to the states (including small savings) and substitution of
(consensual) private market lending. Imposing market discipline on state
borrowing should be a long-term goal of the GoI and needs to be fully
coordinated with financial sector reforms.
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States should be encouraged to adopt fiscal
Recommendation 14:
responsibility laws imposing a strict hard budget constraint. The centre should
simultaneously use its authority under Article 293(3) to impose prudent borrowing
control. Following recommendations of the TFC, loans from the Centre should be
discontinued. Gradually all borrowing from special sources (required holdings of
state government bonds by commercial banks, borrowing from pension funds,
and shares of rural small savings, and so on) should also be eliminated.
Issue 2:

Sub-National Government Debt Bailouts

International experience shows that bailouts, which are often used to
resolve fiscal crises at the sub-national level, create a culture of soft budget
constraints and lead to more fiscally irresponsible behaviour down the road.
There have not been serious sub-national debt bailouts, but occasionally the
Finance Commissions have recommended certain debts of the Centre to the
states be written off. Occasionally, the central government has also done so on
its own. More often than not, Finance Commissions have recommended debt
consolidation at lower rates of interest, or debt waiver linked to fiscal
improvement. There is however a feeling amongst the states that there business
would not come to a standstill even if they did default on GoI loans or loans taken
from the finance sector.
Option 1:
The experiences of Brazil and Mexico with fiscal adjustment
through debt-rescheduling and debt forgiveness, respectively, followed by a
regulatory framework, and a credible no-bailout commitment may present a
reasonable option for stabilising the most fiscally distressed sub-national
governments. In India, this could be an option to stabilise budgets in the most
indebted states, such as Rajasthan and West Bengal, in exchange for strict
control, at least for a reasonable length of time. The TFC calls for rescheduling of
existing central government debt of the states and debt waiver linked to states
adopting fiscal responsibility laws and eliminating their revenue deficits by 200809.
Option 2:

The GoI could immediately enforce a hard budget constraint.
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Option 3:
If a state becomes fiscally insolvent, which is a real possibility, the
Centre may not be able to hold to a no bailout policy. If so, it may be wise to have
a clear set of policies regarding the circumstances under which debt forgiveness
will be granted to a state. Such provisions are enshrined in the Financial
Emergency provisions of the Constitution, but have never been invoked. It may
be advisable to bring a law under the financial emergency provision of the
Constitution to define the conditions under which a state may be declared to be
in financial emergency and rules for its resolution mandating states to undertake
politically difficult reforms, such as restructuring and privatising SOEs, eliminating
subsidies, cutting down on salaries, and undertaking pension reforms to name
just a few.
Option 4:
Capping the size of contingent liabilities assumed by state
governments, and including all contingent liabilities as part of the published
quasi-fiscal deficit.
Recommendation 15: Establish a clear set of policies regarding the
circumstances under which debt forgiveness will be granted to a state in the case
of fiscal insolvency. It may be advisable to bring a law under the financial
emergency provision of the Constitution to define the conditions where a State
may be declared to be in financial emergency and rules for its resolution, such as
restructuring and privatising SOEs, eliminating subsidies, cutting down on
salaries, and pension reforms to name just a few
V.

Economic Reforms

Issue 1:

Poor Performance of State Owned Enterprises

Reforming the management practices and restructuring the finances of
SOEs, particularly in the power, irrigation, and transportation sectors is vitally
important for improving the fiscal condition of the states and sustaining the
performance of India’s national economy.
Option 1:
The states could be required either to privatise SOEs or establish
an arms-length relationship between the state and the SOEs. In particular, the
SOEs must be required to maintain a separate and proper set of books that are
subject to annual audit by an independent body or private firm. The Union
Government could agree with the states to develop SOE rationalisation and/or
privatisation plans, which would be executed over a period of several years.
Incentives and significant penalties should be attached to these agreements.
Option 2:
Impose a hard budget constraint on SOEs and bring greater
transparency to SOEs’ accounts. This may create the political will to address the
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problem of insufficient cost recovery and poorly targeted subsidies. Accordingly,
SOEs should be subject to a hard budget constraint, meaning that revenues
should balance costs. The practice of allowing SOEs to incur operating losses
should be immediately discontinued. SOEs should achieve budget balance by
increasing tariffs and/or through explicit transfers from state budgets. Electricity
boards should end the practice of retaining revenues from the electricity tax and
running arrears. Any subsidy from the state to SOEs, implicit or otherwise, could
be made explicit. The cost of such subsidies, the intended recipients of the
subsidy, and the rationale for the subsidy could be clearly documented in state
budgets.
Option 3:
Rationalising the operations of SOEs along commercial lines and
imposing a hard budget constraint may result in one or more states becoming
financially insolvent. The Centre chould have in place an explicit, transparent,
and detailed regime to deal with states that default on loans, accumulate arrears,
or otherwise become financially insolvent. They could not be allowed to mask
insolvency through such well-known and frequently practised artifices and
subterfuges. The proposed regime to restructure state finances in case of loan
default should lend credibility to the Centre’s determination to achieve its stated
objectives, penalise bad behaviour by states that are not pursuing genuine
reform, and reward good behaviour by pro-active states that are successfully and
earnestly pursuing reforms.
Recommendation 16: The states should be required either to privatise or
establish an arms-length relationship with SOEs producing private
goods/services. The Union Government should agree with the states to develop
SOE rationalisation and/or privatisation plans, which would be executed over a
period of years. Incentives and significant penalties should be attached to these
agreements. In the meantime, the SOEs should be required to maintain a
separate and proper set of books that are subject to annual audits by an
independent body or private firm. Any subsidy from the state to SOEs, implicit or
otherwise, should be explicit in state budgets, clearly documenting their cost,
intended recipients, and economic and/or social rationale.
VI.

Local Governments
Given the population size distribution of the States of India, the lack of

greater decentralisation to local bodies is a serious shortcoming of the current
system. The full benefits of decentralisation will not be achieved until local
governments are empowered with their own resources and exclusive
competencies.
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Issue 1: Lack of Full Decentralisation to the Local Level.
Although decentralisation is no panacea, many countries have proven that
moving political, fiscal, and administrative decision-making closer to the people
achieves efficiency gains, better service delivery, and greater accountability.
Option 1:
Each state could be entrusted with the specifics of
intergovernmental fiscal relations within the state, as is now the case. However,
the institutional arrangements could be monitored to determine that fiscal
decision-making power was being passed though according to the intent of the
constitutional amendments.
Option 2:
The GoI could legislate a much more defined structure for the
relationship between the states and the local governments. This is, for example,
the solution adopted by the Russian Federation with the approval of a
comprehensive Budget Code in 2002.
Option 3:
The Union Government could get directly involved in fiscal activities
(e.g. transfers, with local governments), as is now the case in Australia, the U.S.,
and several other federal countries to provide local governments with their own
resources and allow them to pursue their own objectives more independently
from state governments.
Option 4:
Recognising the diversity of local governments and their variations
in scale, tax bases, poverty levels, and administrative capacity, India could take
an asymmetric decentralisation approach to local governments as far as
categorising them to determine spending, tax, and borrowing authority, as well as
reporting requirements. The approach could be augmented by requiring local
bodies to prove that they have established the necessary administrative capacity
before they are allowed to assume new authority.
Recommendation 17: The GoI could legislate a much more defined structure
for the relationship between the states and the local governments. Recognising
the diversity of local governments and their variations in scale, tax bases, poverty
levels, and administrative capacity, India could take an asymmetric
decentralisation approach to local governments as far as categorising them to
determine spending, tax, and borrowing authority, as well as reporting
requirements.
Issue 2:

Expenditure Responsibilities

Setting appropriate expenditure assignments for each tier of government
is a crucial component in any decentralisation policy, since the design of the
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other important pieces of the system (notably, revenue, transfers, and borrowing)
depend on it.
Option 1:
As previously discussed, a commission or authority could be seated
to review the State and Local Body Lists and make recommendations for change.
In which case, the focus could be on assigning exclusive assignments to each
tier. In a very limited number of cases, there is a need for concurrent
assignments. However, such cases could be unbundled into sub-functions which
are explicitly assigned to a particular government level. Coordinating bodies
could be strengthened or created to deal with the inevitable coordination issues
that will arise among the tiers of government.
Option 2:
Administrative capacity may be developed through training and
capacity development programmes sponsored by the states and the central
government. In addition, it would be desirable to introduce an asymmetric
treatment whereby only those local governments that can demonstrate sufficient
administrative capacity would be delegated additional budgetary autonomy. This
may be an incentive for those with lower capacity to take advantage of available
training and capacity development programmes. To the extent that local
governments (particularly urban local governments) are entrusted with more
fiscal discretion, the capacity training should be extended to policy areas such as
forecasting and general fiscal planning.
Recommendation 18: Designate
exclusive
sub-function
expenditure
assignments, insofar as possible and develop the administrative capacity of local
governments.
Issue 3:

Revenue Autonomy

International experience suggests that local governments implementing
expenditure functions are more likely to do so responsibly the more they are
responsible for raising the revenues they spend.
Option 1:
The best choice to develop tax autonomy at the urban local
government level is a modern real estate property tax, with a well-developed
fiscal cadastre, fair and efficient valuation or appraisal methods, and a fair and
transparent administration of the tax, including efficient appeals procedures.
Another way to enhance local tax autonomy associated with the real estate tax is
to regulate the voluntary introduction by municipalities of betterment or
improvement levies. These are surcharges to the property tax that local
governments may approve within their jurisdictions, as one-time or multi-year
charges, for improvement directly benefiting certain homeowners, such as
improvements in street lighting, sidewalks, and so on. These levies have become
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common in many developing countries and in some cases represent a significant
source of revenue for local governments. Another possibility is to develop a
piggyback flat rate payroll tax. Local governments could be given the option of
introducing or not their piggyback flat-rates also up to a nationally legislated
maximum rate. A final possibility for promoting local tax autonomy is the
assignment at this level of some tax on motor vehicles.
Option 2:
Rural local governments are a more difficult case. The need for
some autonomy is important to reinforce the GoI’s objective of local selfgovernance. Yet administrative capability at the gram panchayat level is very
weak. Still, it is possible to strengthen the property tax, in the form of a
rudimentary levy, and to encourage greater reliance on user charges, licenses,
and fees. Other forms of taxation, such as presumptive taxes on agricultural
income could be explored. States will need to build incentives into their transfer
systems to promote increased revenue mobilisation by rural local governments.
Option 3:
Certain taxes currently assigned to the states (e.g., electricity tax,
entertainment tax, and so on) could be assigned to local bodies.
Option 4:

Local bodies could levy a piggyback tax on wages.

Option 5:
The central government could issue a model Municipal Act with a
minimum revenue assignment for local governments. This minimum revenue
assignment to local government should differentiate between urban and rural
local governments and go beyond current assignments from states to local
governments, which include low revenue yield taxes, such as the property tax, or
highly distortionary levies, such as octroi.
Recommendation 19: Provide urban local governments with revenue raising
autonomy by allowing them to levy a modern real estate property tax, introduce
betterment or improvement levies, and introduce some form of tax on motor
vehicles.
Issue 4:

Intergovernmental Transfers to Local Governments

The design of transfers is of critical importance for efficiency and equity of
local service provision, autonomy, and fiscal health of local governments.
Option 1:
The State Finance Commissions (SFCs) could be required to report
on designated features of the state fiscal system. The work of the SFCs could be
monitored and evaluated by the Centre.
Option 2:
The Centre could provide direct transfers to local bodies. However,
this is not practical given the number of local bodies, particularly rural local
bodies.
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Option 3:
The states could be required to distribute full entitlements of
transfers to the local governments, rather than failing to distribute them in order
to preserve the fiscal position of the state.
Recommendation 20: Reform the system of state-local government transfers by
phasing out the state-based schemes in favour of block grants and allocate them
according to formulae. The central government should monitor and evaluate the
performance of the SFCs
Issue 5:

Borrowing Constraints on Local Governments

International experience suggests that local borrowing has the potential to
generate significant benefits by allowing them to finance public capital projects.
However, local government access to credit markets has proven to create
significant moral hazard problems.
Option 1:
Local bodies should be subject to a strict golden rule. The Centre
and/or states could provide grants for capital projects. Local bodies could be
authorised on an application basis to borrow funds on a creditworthiness basis if
the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) a local body has the revenue
capacity to repay loans and (ii) a local body demonstrates that it has sufficient
administrative capacity.
Recommendation 21: The Centre and/or states should provide conditional
grants to local governments for their capital projects. Local bodies should be
authorised on an application basis only, subject to statutory limits, to borrow
funds on a creditworthiness basis for capital infrastructure projects subject to the
following two conditions: (i) the local body has the revenue capacity to repay the
loan and (ii) the local body has sufficient administrative capacity to monitor the
proper disposition, management, and repayment of the loan funds.
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Table A.1
Centre: Profile of Fiscal Imbalance
(per cent of GDP)
Ratio of Revenue
Fiscal
Revenue
Primary
Year
to Fiscal Deficit
Deficit
Deficit
Deficit
(%)
1990-91
6.61
3.26
2.83
49.36
1991-92
4.72
2.49
0.65
52.72
1992-93
5.33
2.76
0.72
51.73
1993-94
6.43
3.81
2.15
59.21
1994-95
4.74
3.06
0.39
64.60
1995-96
4.23
2.50
0.02
59.16
1996-97
4.11
2.38
-0.24
58.01
1997-98
4.81
3.05
0.50
63.45
1998-99
5.14
3.85
0.67
74.78
1999-00
5.41
3.49
0.75
64.55
2000-01
5.69
4.08
0.93
71.74
2001-02
6.18
4.39
1.47
71.06
2002-03
5.87
4.37
1.10
74.36
2003-04RE
4.77
3.60
0.27
75.59
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).
Figures for 2003-04 are revised estimates.
Fiscal deficit figures exclude States’ share against small savings.
Primary deficit is derived by netting interest payments from fiscal deficit.
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Table A.2
Major Taxes of the Centre: Performance since 1990-91
(per cent of GDP)
Total
Union
Corporation Income Customs
Central Tax
Year
Excise
Tax
Tax
Duties
Revenues
Duties
(Gross)
1990-91
0.94
0.95
3.63
4.31
10.12
1991-92
1.20
1.03
3.41
4.30
10.31
1992-93
1.19
1.06
3.18
4.12
9.97
1993-94
1.17
1.06
2.58
3.69
8.82
1994-95
1.36
1.19
2.65
3.69
9.11
1995-96
1.39
1.31
3.01
3.38
9.36
1996-97
1.36
1.33
3.13
3.29
9.41
1997-98
1.31
1.12
2.64
3.15
9.14
1998-99
1.41
1.16
2.34
3.06
8.26
1999-00
1.58
1.32
2.50
3.20
8.87
2000-01
1.71
1.52
2.28
3.28
9.03
2001-02
1.60
1.40
1.76
3.18
8.20
2002-03
1.87
1.49
1.82
3.33
8.76
2003-04r
2.27
1.45
1.78
3.33
9.20
Year
As Percentage of Centre’s Gross Tax Revenues
1990-91
9.27
9.34
35.85
42.58
1991-92
11.66
9.99
33.04
41.73
1992-93
11.92
10.58
31.86
41.31
1993-94
13.28
12.04
29.30
41.85
1994-95
14.98
13.03
29.02
40.46
1995-96
14.82
14.02
32.15
36.13
1996-97
14.42
14.16
33.28
34.95
1997-98
14.38
12.28
28.87
34.45
1998-99
17.06
14.08
28.28
37.03
1999-00
17.87
14.94
28.19
36.04
2000-01
19.93
16.84
25.21
36.33
2001-02
19.57
17.11
21.53
38.79
2002-03
21.35
17.04
20.74
38.06
2003-04r
24.71
15.80
19.36
36.24
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).
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Table A.3
Trends in Central Government Expenditures
(per cent of GDP)
Capital
Revenue
Interest
Pensions Subsidies
Expenditures
Expenditure Payments
12.93
3.78
0.38
2.14
5.59
12.60
4.07
0.37
1.88
4.46
13.76
4.61
0.45
1.78
4.44
12.59
4.28
0.39
1.35
3.92
12.06
4.35
0.36
1.17
3.81
11.77
4.21
0.36
1.07
3.23
11.62
4.35
0.37
1.13
3.08
11.84
4.31
0.45
1.22
3.40
12.43
4.47
0.58
1.36
3.61
12.86
4.66
0.74
1.26
2.53
13.30
4.75
0.69
1.28
2.29
13.21
4.71
0.63
1.37
2.67
13.75
4.77
0.59
1.76
3.02
13.09
4.49
0.55
1.61
4.02

1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04RE
Average
13.09
4.15
0.40
1.93
(1990-93)[A]
Average
13.42
4.74
0.64
1.47
(2000-03)[B]
B-A
0.32
0.59
0.24
-0.46
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).

Total
Expenditure
18.52
17.06
18.20
16.51
15.87
15.01
14.69
15.24
16.04
15.39
15.58
15.88
16.77
17.11

4.83

17.92

2.66

16.08

-2.17

-1.85
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Table A.4
Explicit Subsidies Relative to Centre’s Revenue Receipts
(per cent of GDP)
Year
Food
Fertilizer
Others
Total
1990-91
4.45
7.98
9.67
22.11
1991-92
4.32
7.85
6.39
18.56
1992-93
3.78
7.82
3.01
14.60
1993-94
7.31
6.02
1.99
15.31
1994-95
5.58
6.32
1.08
12.98
1995-96
4.88
6.12
0.50
11.50
1996-97
4.80
6.00
1.47
12.27
1997-98
5.90
7.41
0.54
13.85
1998-99
6.09
7.76
1.94
15.78
1999-00
5.20
7.30
1.00
13.49
2000-01
6.26
7.16
0.51
13.93
2001-02
8.69
6.26
0.55
15.50
2002-03
10.43
4.75
3.59
18.78
2003-04RE
9.58
4.48
2.93
17.00
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).
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Table A.5
Aggregate State Finances: Alternative Deficit Indicators
(per cent of GDP)
Rev.
Revenue Fiscal Primary
Def./
Year
Debt/GDP
Deficit Deficit Deficit
Fiscal
Def
1993-94
0.45
2.35
0.52
19.05
21.79
1994-95
0.69
2.72
0.79
25.55
21.40
1995-96
0.73
2.59
0.76
28.06
21.00
1996-97
1.31
2.77
0.90
47.37
21.00
1997-98
1.23
2.94
0.93
42.01
21.73
1998-99
2.61
4.31
2.24
60.48
23.02
1999-00
2.82
4.64
2.34
60.87
25.20
2000-01
2.61
4.16
1.69
62.60
27.42
2001-02
2.68
4.09
1.41
65.49
29.37
2002-03
2.29
3.94
1.14
58.09
31.15
Averages
1993-96 [A]
0.62
2.55
0.69
24.22
21.79
2000-3 [B]
2.53
4.07
1.41
62.06
31.15
[B]-[A]
1.90
1.51
0.72
37.84
9.36
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).
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Year

1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03

Table A.6
Aggregate State Finances: Main Fiscal Indicators
(per cent of GDP)
NonOwn NonFinance
Finance
Own Tax
Total
Tax
Commission Commission
Revenues
Revenue
Revenues
Transfers
Transfers
Revenues
5.30
1.59
3.05
2.02
11.96
5.31
1.55
2.86
1.55
11.27
5.20
1.51
2.90
1.30
10.91
5.01
1.47
2.94
1.29
10.71
5.14
1.43
2.90
1.33
10.80
4.93
1.26
2.44
1.17
9.31
5.09
1.38
2.50
1.29
10.26
5.46
1.37
3.02
1.20
11.04
5.32
1.19
2.84
1.28
10.63
5.52
1.23
2.80
1.22
10.77
Averages

1993-96
[A]
5.27
1.55
2.94
1.62
2000-3
5.44
1.26
2.88
1.23
[B]
0.17
-0.29
-0.05
-0.39
[B]-[A]
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).

11.38
10.81
-0.57
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1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
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Table A.7
Aggregate State Finances: Expenditure Indicators
(per cent of GDP)
Total
Plan
Non-Plan
Interest
Revenue
Pension
Revenue
Revenue
Payments
Expenditure Expenditure
Expenditure
12.41
1.82
0.61
2.22
10.19
11.96
1.92
0.63
2.06
9.91
11.63
1.83
0.66
2.01
9.63
12.02
1.87
0.72
2.10
9.93
12.03
2.01
0.77
1.93
10.10
12.41
2.07
0.93
1.99
10.43
13.08
2.30
1.16
1.87
11.21
13.65
2.48
1.24
1.91
11.74
13.31
2.63
1.26
1.85
11.46
13.06
2.80
1.24
1.81
11.24
Averages

1993-96
[A]
12.00
1.86
0.63
2.09
2000-3
13.34
2.65
1.25
1.86
[B]
1.34
0.79
0.62
-0.24
[B]-[A]
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).

9.91
11.48
1.57
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Table A.8
Comparative Performance of States: Revenue and Fiscal Deficits
(per cent of GDP)
Revenue Account [Deficit(-)]
Fiscal Account [Deficit(-)]
States
1993-96[A] 2000-03[B]
[B-A]
1993-96[C] 2000-03[D]
[C-D]
Arunachal
24.28
1.76
-22.51
1.48
-12.70
-14.18
Pradesh
-0.01
-1.90
-1.88
-2.38
-3.73
-1.34
Assam
-1.56
-7.28
-5.72
-6.70
-11.41
-4.71
Himachal
4.56
-1.82
-6.38
-3.85
-8.28
-4.44
Pradesh
6.07
-2.46
-8.53
-3.02
-6.06
-3.04
Jammu &
3.32
0.84
-2.48
-3.20
-5.28
-2.08
Kashmir
7.53
-9.07
-16.60
-5.82
-17.79
-11.96
Manipur
-0.19
-2.12
-1.93
-5.26
-7.97
-2.71
Meghalaya
8.10
11.30
3.20
-8.26
-3.42
4.84
Mizoram
2.57
-0.61
-3.18
-4.04
-7.20
-3.15
Nagaland
Sikkim
Tripura
Total: SCS
1.96
-2.53
-4.49
-7.04
-3.64
-3.40
Andhra Pradesh
-0.51
-2.03
-1.51
-3.16
-4.57
-1.41
Bihar
-1.83
-1.87
-0.04
-2.85
-4.52
-1.67
Goa
1.44
-2.44
-3.89
-2.30
-4.68
-2.38
Gujarat
0.10
-4.66
-4.75
-1.82
-5.74
-3.93
Haryana
-0.75
-1.32
-0.56
-2.50
-3.69
-1.19
Karnataka
-0.07
-2.21
-2.15
-2.71
-4.37
-1.65
Kerala
-1.18
-4.17
-2.99
-3.32
-5.13
-1.81
Madhya Pradesh
-0.61
-2.05
-1.44
-2.16
-3.94
-1.78
Maharashtra
-0.09
-3.09
-3.00
-2.16
-4.12
-1.96
Orissa
-2.00
-4.91
-2.91
-4.63
-7.84
-3.21
Punjab
-1.88
-4.53
-2.66
-4.37
-6.14
-1.77
Rajasthan
-1.09
-3.87
-2.78
-4.51
-6.05
-1.54
Tamil Nadu
-0.71
-2.50
-1.78
-1.99
-3.75
-1.77
Uttar Pradesh
-1.77
-2.98
-1.21
-4.04
-5.07
-1.03
West Bengal
-1.53
-5.47
-3.95
-3.18
-7.31
-4.13
Total: GCS
-0.86
-3.19
-2.33
-2.93
-4.97
-2.04
All States
-0.72
-3.15
-2.43
-2.96
-5.08
-2.12
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).
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Table A.9
Outstanding Debt Relative to GSDP: State-wise Position
(per cent)
States
1993-96[A] 2000-03[B] Col.[B-A]
Arunachal
36.48
54.82
18.34
Pradesh
31.40
34.75
3.35
Assam
41.95
61.79
19.84
Himachal Pradesh
58.01
55.99
-2.02
Jammu & Kashmir
38.16
47.88
9.72
Manipur
24.12
38.68
14.56
Meghalaya
53.05
85.29
32.25
Mizoram
42.71
49.91
7.20
Nagaland
53.65
63.24
9.59
Sikkim
38.77
38.11
-0.67
Tripura
Total: SCS
39.68
47.17
7.48
Andhra Pradesh
21.86
29.93
8.07
Bihar
36.80
44.35
7.55
Goa
41.64
33.54
-8.10
Gujarat
21.07
37.92
16.85
Haryana
19.85
28.02
8.17
Karnataka
19.62
27.27
7.65
Kerala
27.27
37.58
10.32
Madhya Pradesh
19.95
30.42
10.47
Maharashtra
15.63
27.11
11.48
Orissa
36.21
63.68
27.47
Punjab
34.55
46.66
12.10
Rajasthan
28.28
44.88
16.60
Tamil Nadu
18.87
26.16
7.29
Uttar Pradesh
33.94
46.94
13.00
West Bengal
23.26
42.73
19.47
Total: GCS
24.12
36.06
11.94
All States
24.86
36.65
11.79
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).
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Table A.10
Own Tax Revenue: Comparative Performance of the
States
(per cent)
Average OTR/GSDP (%) Buoyancy
States
1993-96[A] 2000-03[B]
Col.[B-A]
Arunachal
0.55
1.47
0.91
Pradesh
3.69
4.58
0.90
Assam
4.87
5.08
0.21
Himachal Pradesh
3.11
4.51
1.40
Jammu & Kashmir
1.44
1.21
-0.23
Manipur
3.02
3.26
0.23
Meghalaya
0.59
0.97
0.38
Mizoram
1.18
1.19
0.01
Nagaland
3.44
4.58
1.15
Sikkim
1.95
2.19
0.24
Tripura
Total: SCS
3.30
3.96
0.66
Andhra Pradesh
5.90
7.30
1.40
Bihar
3.71
4.46
0.75
Goa
7.91
6.46
-1.45
Gujarat
7.51
7.71
0.20
Haryana
7.22
8.30
1.09
Karnataka
8.53
8.33
-0.19
Kerala
8.45
8.11
-0.34
Madhya Pradesh
4.91
6.45
1.53
Maharashtra
6.64
7.76
1.12
Orissa
3.93
5.81
1.87
Punjab
6.88
7.13
0.25
Rajasthan
5.50
6.48
0.98
Tamil Nadu
8.40
9.00
0.60
Uttar Pradesh
4.76
5.88
1.12
West Bengal
5.46
4.26
-1.20
Total: GCS
6.26
6.95
0.69
All States
6.12
6.79
0.67
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).
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Table A.11
States: Comparative Trends in Expenditure
(per cent of GDP)
Revenue Expenditure
Capital Expenditure
States
1993-96[A] 2000-03[B] [B-A] 1993-96[C] 2000-03[D]
[D-C]
Andhra Pradesh
13.47
15.56
2.08
3.87
2.93
-0.94
Bihar
16.50
18.11
1.60
1.04
2.67
1.63
Goa
17.11
17.25
0.13
3.86
2.33
-1.54
Gujarat
12.52
18.37
5.85
2.37
2.43
0.06
Haryana
13.06
13.45
0.39
2.33
2.52
0.18
Karnataka
13.96
15.33
1.36
3.08
2.44
-0.64
Kerala
14.93
16.11
1.18
2.23
1.07
-1.16
Madhya Pradesh
13.29
16.74
3.45
1.90
2.37
0.47
Maharashtra
10.68
14.10
3.42
2.56
1.47
-1.09
Orissa
16.49
22.22
5.74
2.83
3.23
0.40
Punjab
12.75
15.33
2.59
2.65
2.11
-0.54
Rajasthan
15.43
18.06
2.63
3.89
2.30
-1.59
Tamil Nadu
13.95
15.60
1.66
1.85
1.51
-0.34
Uttar Pradesh
14.28
16.78
2.50
2.63
2.23
-0.40
West Bengal
11.80
15.02
3.23
1.78
1.94
0.16
General Category
13.33
16.05
2.72
2.51
2.12
-0.38
Special Category
26.27
27.66
1.40
5.71
4.69
-1.03
All States
13.94
16.67
2.72
2.66
2.26
-0.40
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).

138

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Table A.12
State Expenditure Trends: Comparative Profile
(per cent of GDP)
Interest Payment/TRR
Pension Expenditure/GSDP
States
1993-96[A] 2000-03[B] [B-A] 1993-96[C] 2000-03[D]
[D-C]
Andhra Pradesh
14.07
22.37
8.30
1.01
1.49
0.48
Bihar
21.78
24.92
3.14
1.01
2.82
1.82
Goa
14.21
19.50
5.29
0.55
1.28
0.74
Gujarat
15.18
24.59
9.41
0.60
1.25
0.65
Haryana
15.26
23.35
8.09
0.54
1.10
0.56
Karnataka
12.08
18.07
6.00
0.92
1.42
0.50
Kerala
17.61
27.34
9.73
1.72
2.57
0.85
Madhya Pradesh
13.34
18.36
5.02
0.67
1.17
0.50
Maharashtra
11.93
20.75
8.82
0.36
0.88
0.52
Orissa
22.39
35.85
13.46
0.68
2.21
1.53
Punjab
32.13
38.51
6.38
0.64
1.62
0.98
Rajasthan
17.38
30.57
13.19
0.73
1.91
1.18
Tamil Nadu
11.98
18.61
6.63
0.93
2.11
1.19
Uttar Pradesh
22.30
28.27
5.97
0.54
1.21
0.67
West Bengal
20.34
44.33
23.98
0.61
1.44
0.83
General Category
16.70
25.40
8.70
0.72
1.51
0.80
Special Category
13.41
16.98
3.57
1.11
2.39
1.28
All States
16.37
24.57
8.20
0.73
1.56
0.83
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005).

